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A B S T R A C T
This thesis is a discursive and institu tional history o f refugees in the tw entieth  
century. I t explores the relations of power that form and transform  the condition of 
possibility for representations of refugees and interventions made in the name of the 
‘refugee problem ’. The focus is on the relationship betw een the governm ent of 
refugee, the states-system, and the cultural specificities of W estern  modernity.
The thesis contains three propositions. Firstly, the issue o f refugees is an effect of 
the division of the world’s territory and population into sovereign states. This is the 
s tru c tu ra l con dition  of refugees. The problem  of refugees -  the problem  that 
requires intervention or government -  is tha t they are outside the state-citizen 
regulatory norm. The international refugee regime seeks to reestablish this order of 
states and citizens. Secondly, characterizations of refugees are historically linked to 
the imaginaries and explanations of international (dis)order. This is the h is to r ica l  
sign ificance  o f refugees. R epresentations o f refugees m irror the concerns and 
contradictions tha t arise from particular images o f world (dis)order. From  this 
perspective, the practices o f the refugee regime are a ttem pts at recovering a 
historically specific articulation o f ‘norm ality’. Thirdly, W este rn  concerns have 
dom inated the refugee agenda and we cannot ignore the configuration of power in 
international relations, or the effects o f these relationships for the government of 
refugees. This is the cu ltu ra l m eaning  o f refugees. To support these claims, I 
examine 3 historical periods in the governm ent o f population displacement: post 
1919, post 1951, and post 1989. Each period is distinguished by significant shifts in the 
international political environment and perceptions of international order.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
m a p p in g  the refugee qu estio n  in in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s
For unlike the refugees of the 1940s and 1950s, most of whom were 
the result of relatively transient forces (international conflict, 
totalitarian regimes), the present crisis is fueled by a range of factors, 
including the flourishing of violent civil wars, the deliberate targeting 
of civilian populations, and the problems of maintaining durable and 
humane state structures in conditions of poverty, which are extremely 
difficult to address, let alone solve. ... The rise of frequent and 
inexpensive air travel and the spread of international communications 
have resulted in a situation in which those claiming entry to Western 
states are now more likely to be fleeing African or Asian (sic) or, 
particularly in the case of the United States, Central and South 
American states than European ones. ... Facing few avenues for entry 
to the West, economic immigrants have swelled the ranks of asylum 
seekers.... As Western states have recently discovered, in an 
international environment characterized by steep and increasingly 
well-advertised economic inequalities, it is very difficult to maintain 
protection for refugees without attracting large numbers of 
immigrants.
Matthew Gibney,
'Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees'.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a response to a particular view of the refugee problem in the 
twentieth century. Gibney's description of the current refugee crisis is an 
example of this prevalent representation of refugees in the West. For him, 
refugees are non-Western, poor (but not so poor that they cannot buy a plane 
ticket), and the victims of ethnic hatred. While the European refugees of the 
1950s were the result of the 'transient forces' of 'international war and 
totalitarian regimes', today's non-Western refugees are the result of 'the 
flourishing of violent civil wars', which he implies, are not transient. This 
view is historically incorrect and Eurocentric.
Western liberal states are vocal in their criticism of the various forms of ethnic 
cleansing carried out by other countries. But the historical studies of Charles 
Tilly (1975) and Michael Mann (1999) have shown that these same practices 
have been employed by Western states to pacify their own populations in the 
past. Preece (1998), Proudfoot (1957), and Simpson (1939) have observed that 
many instances of population displacements in Europe were the result of 
national policies. But the chorus of 'new times' at the end of the Cold War 
has sanitized and silenced the history of refugees.
The thesis seeks to recover this history of refugees in the twentieth century. It 
will demonstrate that in some important respects, the refugee condition today 
are similar to earlier periods. The system of states, the project of 
nationalization, and the state-citizen attachment remain the defining features 
of refugeehood. The other continuities are the predominance of Western 
states in setting the agenda on refugees and the often Eurocentric 
representations of refugees. This history of refugees will also show that 
changes in the refugee regime are due to shifts in the historical conditions for 
governing. Similarly, how the refugee question is understood results from
2
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changes in the international environm ent and the interpretation of these 
changes.
This thesis, then, is a history of refugees that considers the conditions of 
possibility for the refugee to emerge as a subject of government. The focus is 
on the interconnection between the governm ent of refugees, the states- 
system, and the internationalization of Western cultural practices and values. 
The argum ent is that the problems presented by refugees to international 
relations are the effects of the organization of the world and the hum an 
population into a system of sovereign territorial states, and of the cultural 
specificity of Western modernity.
The thesis does not offer policy prescriptions or attem pt to provide an 
exhaustive account of all instances of population displacem ent in the 
twentieth century. Rather, the objectives of the thesis are to examine the some 
of the normalized claims about refugees, to render visible the relations of 
power that create and transform the meaning of refugees and the ways in 
which they are governed; and to explore the deeply embedded W estern 
cultural practices of the refugee regime. In short, the discourse on refugee is 
the subject of analysis. By discourse, I mean the historically variable ways of 
specifying knowledge and truth. The refugee question does not have a 
singular m eaning or value, but an entanglem ent of meanings. It gains 
significance w ithin the w ider context of the in terpretations of the 
international environm ent and the pow er relations underpinning these 
articulations.
In order to map the continuities and changes in the discourse of refugees, the 
thesis is arranged into roughly three periods: post 1919, post 1951, and post
3
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1989. Each period is distinguished by significant shifts in the international 
political environment. The post 1919 period saw the end of empire and the 
redefinition of political community in Europe. Likewise, the post-Second 
World War settlement involved territorial and demographic changes. The 
period also marked the beginning of the Cold War between the US and the 
(former) Soviet Union and the process of decolonization in Asia. The two 
striking dynamics of the post 1951 period were Cold War politics and 
decolonization, which led to the expansion of the states-system and the 
refugee regime. The post 1989 period, which saw the end of East-West 
conflict, presented a distinct international environment, and had many 
implications for international relations. Of course, historical events are not 
discrete or linear processes. But this chronology allows me to examine the 
interpretation and conceptualization of changes that have had profound 
consequences for the discourse on refugee in the West.
The thesis draws on a range of theoretical orientations. It is loosely aligned 
with Foucault's work on modern government in the West and with 
postcolonial writings. Both forms of theorization focus on the disciplinary 
and normalizing effects of knowledge and practices, and the power relations 
that produce subjectivities and truths about such subjects. Foucault's cultural 
histories of the modern West are interrogations of the constitution of power 
relations. Postcolonial studies analyze the historical relationships between the 
West and non-West. Their project is to challenge the universal claims of 
Western modernity (Chakrabarty 1992, 2000 ;and Mingolo, 2000) and to 
unveil the strategies of power (Escobar 1995a; Esteva 1992; Mamdani 1996). 
Using this range of theoretical interpretations, I propose to insert a 
perspective on the history of refugees that examines the cultural specificity of 
the West.
4
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I should clarify that my usage of the word 'West' refers to more than the 
geographical areas of Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New 
Zealand. The term acts here as shorthand for a set of cultural values and a 
mode of thought. The main themes of Western thought are the abstract figure 
of the human, reason, and progress.1 The important feature of these ideas is 
that they connote a universalizing temporal structure that measures cultural 
distance assumed to exist between the West and the non-West (Chakrabarty, 
2000, p. 7).
This introductory chapter begins by examining various historical studies on 
refugees and identifying gaps in the current literature. I then turn to a 
consideration of the notions of 'difference' and 'international order'. 
Following this, I turn my attention to the recent development of critical 
perspectives on refugees. It is this critical that I will be developing 
throughout this thesis. The final section sets out the research questions that 
motivated this thesis and I conclude with a brief outline of the following 
chapters.
H is t o r i e s  of  R efu g ees
There are a number of distinguished historical explorations of refugees and 
population displacement. Most focus on events in Europe. Bramwell (1988), 
Kulischer (1948), Marrus (1985), Proudfoot (1957), Schechtmann (1946,1962), 
and Simpson (1939) have written histories of population displacement in
1 Latouche (1996, p. 25-26) suggests that the idea of the West has to do with a religion 
(Christianity), a philosophy (the Enlightenment) and an economic system (capitalism).
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Europe in the inter-war years. These studies not only describe the plight of 
those forced to flee from their homes, but the political context leading to their 
displacement, the politics of the international response, and the policies and 
practices of various governments and humanitarian agencies. There are a few 
institutional history of the refugee regime. Holborn's historical studies of the 
International Refugee Organization (1956) and the early years of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1975), and Woodbridge's (1950) 
three volumes on the United Nations Relief and Administration, are 
considered the most authoritative works in the area. An institutional history 
of refugees by Gordenker (1987) examines the political constraints on 
responses to refugee situations. Salomon (1991) analyses the way in which 
Cold War politics shaped the formulation of the refugee regime. More 
recently, Skran (1995) has detailed the emergence of the refugee regime in 
inter-war Europe.
Despite the depth of research, there are two problems with these histories of 
refugees. They take for granted the effects of the national state form on 
population displacement. Furthermore, these studies take the view that the 
refugee regime consists only of practices and institutions that offer 
international protection once the person has crossed international borders. 
They have been inattentive to both the effects of the principle of national self- 
determination on forced migration and the significance of the minorities 
protection regime in governing population displacement.
The minorities regime was created after the territorial and demographic 
changes in Europe at the end of World War One. National minorities were 
the consequences of creating states based on the principle of national self- 
determination. The League of Nations imposed various domestic political 
arrangement on a number of states that would guarantee the rights of their
6
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national minorities. The regime sought to maintain the new European order 
of national states by implementing a number of domestic guarantees for those 
who were either denied national states of their own, or became minorities as 
a result of territorial changes.
Historical studies of national minorities and the minorities protection system 
by Macartney (1934), Mair (1928), and Preece (1997,1998a) also have failed to 
notice the connection between minorities protection and refugee protection. 
The distinction made between the refugee regime and the minorities regime 
may be an analytic device. But the distinction distorts the functioning and 
purpose of the idea of international protection, which both regimes claim to 
be about. Both the minorities and refugee regime were part of a wider project 
to regulate the conduct of states towards their populations, regulate 
population displacement, and maintain the order of territorial states. The 
minorities regime was the domestic aspect of international protection. The 
refugee regime was the external aspect of international protection. Its 
primary function was to govern populations crossing international borders. I 
suggest that an analysis of the overlapping functions of the two regimes will 
reveal the historical conditions for refugees to emergence as an international 
problem.
Studies of refugee movements outside Europe have tended to focus on the 
humanitarian relief efforts rather than the international politics of governing 
these refugees. The exceptions are the analyses by Ferris (1987), Zolberg, 
Suhrke and Aguayo (1989) and Loescher (1993) and some of the contributions 
in Loescher and Monahan's (1989) Refugees and International Relations. 
Although their works have drawn attention to the geography of displacement 
after 1960 and the international context to refugee movements, their
7
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characterization of non-European refugees raises a question about the effects 
of such views on the formulation of practices.
These studies suggest that the solution to refugees in developing countries 
must take into consideration the rural character of these countries and their 
lack of economic and human development. Sorenson (1994, p.186) argues that 
the discourse of development constructs recipients as passive targets of aid 
with little capacity for agency -  despite the rhetoric of participation. Harrell- 
Bond's (1986) research on the distribution of aid also exposes the 'autocratic 
paternalism' of many refugee agencies. The representation of refugees as non­
agents of their own lives reflects a wider issue concerning the colonial legacy 
in many of these countries. At stake is the relationship between the West and 
the non-West after decolonization.
The discourse by which non-Western refugees have been rendered intelligible 
is far from innocent. One aspect of the government of refugees is informed by 
a Eurocentric worldview. Development strategies often legitimate marginal 
conditions in the non-Western countries. The representation of refugees 
outside Europe, particularly in Africa, as inseparable from the broader issues 
of development has justified practices that impede the settlement of these 
people in the West, while also allowing Western states to have a significant 
role in the domestic affairs of these countries.
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C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g  R ef u g e e s
Beyond the historical approach, the refugee also figures in other ways in 
academic discourse. International migration and population studies consider 
the motivational 'push-pull' factors of movement. International law considers 
refugees as legal subjects with rights. Political theory seeks to address 
refugees as a normative issue. Sociology looks at the 'problem' of integration 
for refugees in the countries of settlement. Political science looks at national 
government responses to these non-citizens. Development studies offer ways 
to improve the delivery of relief and aid to refugees in developing countries. 
Ethnic and racial studies offer accounts of refugees as the 'Other'. Likewise, 
anthropology and cultural studies explore the deployment of difference and 
the fluid and constructive character of refugees. Political geography reminds 
us of the spatial dimension of refugee movements. The discipline of 
International Relations asks whether refugee movements signal the erosion of 
sovereignty, which can be positive or negative. These approaches and their 
subject matters are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Indeed, 'refugee studies' 
is a research area where different disciplines intersect in the study of an 
aspect of international relations. But two themes in refugee studies require 
inspection: difference and international order.
Refugees and difference
The politics of identity and the politics of difference have become central to 
the discussions on refugees. There is much to be commended in analyses that 
consider the construction of refugee identity by the media (Koser and Lutz 
1998), by national policies (Soguk 1996), and by refugee law (Akram 2000; 
Tuitt 1996). They have highlighted the politics of representation and the fluid 
meaning of refugees. The assertions of cultural identity and difference
9
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emerge from specific historical conditions. Ethnic identity, for example, is 
often an effect of institutionalization by anthropologists and administrators 
(Turton, 1997). At stake is the construction and deployment of identity for 
political ends.
But the identity/difference narrative also surfaces in a large number of 
studies that connect ethnic violence with population displacement (Brown, 
1993; Carment, 1994; Gurr and Harff, 1994; Weiner, 1992). Since the end of 
the Cold War, intra-state ethnic or communal violence is perceived as a major 
source of international instability. This view has been particularly popular 
amongst US analysts of the nature of conflict after 1989 (Kaplan. 1996, 1994; 
Moynihan 1993). The depiction of refugees as the victims of ethnic conflict 
and of the abandonment of rationality normalizes an explanation of conflict 
that is emptied of history while distancing the West from its own history. It is 
necessary, therefore, to resist the assumption that conflict is somehow sui 
generis to the history of the Balkans and of Africa. It is equally important to 
question the Western intellectual habits that treat instances of racism as 
aberrations in Western states or the problem of other cultures (Wallerstein, 
2000). Cultural separatism and the principles of modern liberal democracies 
belong to the same history.
One of the most profound consequences of the politics of difference for 
refugees is exclusion. The exclusionary immigration policies of Western states 
and their effect on refugee admission have attracted much scholarly attention 
(Bloch, Gavin, Schuster, 2000; Collinson, 1999, 1993; Dowty 1987; Robinson, 
1998; Widgen, 1989). In the EU, the adoption of restrictive asylum policies 
and the Schengen treaties, and in particular, the 1990 Agreement have created 
structures for exclusion (King, 1993, p.184). The strategies of representation,
10
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that is, the production and normalization of difference, have been crucial for 
this task of exclusion.
In a critique of refugee studies, B.S. Chimni (1998) notes the moment when 
the rapid growth of refugee studies coincided with the characterization of 
'new' asylum seekers in the 1980s. He argues that the production of 
knowledge, in creating "the myth of difference' has functioned to exclude 
Third World refugees from Western states. This myth is part of the strategy of 
containment adopted by Western states (Chimni, 1998, p. 369). The other 
deterrence strategies include the positivist reading of international refugee 
law and the depoliticization of the international refugee regime, which have 
enabled various in-country 'preventive' solutions to be possible for 'new' 
refugees. This insightful reading turns attention to the underpinning 
Eurocentric assumptions and to power relations within the international 
refugee regime.
But the government of refugees through a strategy of difference is not simply 
aimed at exclusion. Interpreting the practices and policies of the refugee 
regime solely as exclusionary misses an important aspect of government as a 
modality of power. Malkki (1998, p.440) suggests that an engagement with 
'the very asymmetrical and uneven ways in which people and societies are 
incorporated' would make for a better understanding of the exclusions and 
power relations built into universalizing and abstract visions of the world. 
Similarly, Mamdani (1996, p.15) questions the opposition between 
marginalization and inclusion. For him, the activity of incorporation that 
produces the effect of exclusion is a form of power.
11
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Therefore, to understand difference as exclusion gives only a partial view of 
the exercise of power. In the governm ent of refugees, a regime of 
differentiation has enabled the form ulation of m ultifarious practices for 
internally displaced persons, refugee women, refugee children, 'refugee 
w arriors', and refugees from developing countries. In other words, the 
discourse of difference has enabled displaced populations to be incorporated 
in distinctive ways into the regime. The effects of refugee policies may be 
exclusionary but the activities carried out by the regime suggest it is an 
exercise of power performed with political goals in mind. The international 
refugee regime does more than construct refugees as difference; it governs 
through difference.
The refugee regime m aps out social relations through its practices of 
representation and intervention. The assemblage of practices of the refugee 
regime defines the terms of inclusion and exclusion. I suggest that the 
answers to questions of who is included and excluded from the category of 
refugee and the benefits of international protection are reflections of 
particular worldviews and effects of power relations. This thesis, as a 
discursive and institutional history of refugees, would draw attention to the 
relationship betw een the m eaning of refugees and the strategies of 
incorporation.
Refugees and international order
The theme of refugee and difference overlaps the topic on refugees and 
international order. The idea of international order is ambiguous but it 
implies a state of security, peace, and stability. The im portant reason why 
refugees are subjects of government in international relations has to do with
12
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the global system of sovereign states. The movement of people across 
international boundaries is a regulated affair. States have the right to control 
their borders and entry is subject to rules and conditions. 'Irregular' 
population movements, including refugee movements, undermine the state 
sovereignty and are seen to be disruptive of national and international 
stability. The refugee represents a failure of the system of states. Refugee 
movements also represent the failure of states to govern their populations. 
The conduct of the refugee-producing state infringes on the sovereignty of 
receiving countries and imposes a set of obligations on these states to assist 
non-citizens in a material or legal manner.
Publications by the United National High Commissioner for Refugees (1997a, 
1995a, and 1993) repeatedly represent refugees as a sign of disorder in the 
international system. For example, High Commissioner Sadako Ogata (1993, 
iii) announced that 'the subject of refugees and displaced people is high on 
the list of international concern not only because of its humanitarian concerns 
today but also because of its impact on peace, security and stability'. 
Likewise, the literature that explicitly links security and refugees focuses on 
the threat posed by refugees to states (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 
1993; Weiner, 1995, 1993). According to Rupesinghe (1996, p. 141), the 
emergence of identity conflicts is blurring the boundaries between internal 
and external wars, with important consequences for sovereignty and non­
intervention.
The refugee problem, therefore, is intimately linked with the ordering of the 
world and its populations into sovereign territorial states. National 
citizenship is part of this governmental arrangement that seeks to manage 
populations inside and outside the state. A consequence of these practices is 
that problematization of the movement of populations across states. The
13
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concept of "refugee7 reflects a world in which individuals need to belong to a 
state to ensure their protection (Aleinikoff, 1995, p.257). In other words, the 
ordering of the world and its populations into states produces the experience 
of citizenship and alienage.
Yet, this relationship between the refugee and states has often been 
misconstrued. Claudena Skran (1995, p.3) claims that "refugees present a 
challenge to conventional ways of thinking about international politics 
because they "do not fit neatly into the state-centric paradigm which assumes 
that each individual belongs to a state". On the contrary, the issue of refugees 
highlights the centrality of the order of states. Refugees are an issue in 
international relations because the world is divided into a plurality of states in 
which the human population is segmented, ordered, and governed. What 
will be our understanding of refugees if states are not the political and spatial 
foundations of modern life and the ideas of nation and nationality have no 
value? The presence of refugees may rise questions about the adequacy of the 
state-nation-citizen arrangement as a form of life but that is something quite 
different from claiming the refugee as a figure that challenges the confines of 
the national states system.
Some writers see refugees as indicating the emergence of a different world 
order -  a deterritorialized politics that challenges state-centrism. Sogut (1996) 
argues that by cutting across space, refugees create a new space not subject to 
traditional notions of boundaries and boundedness. In a similar vein, some 
papers in Shapiro and Alker's (1996) edited volume, Challenging Boundaries: 
Global Flows, Territorial Identities, celebrate the possibility of deterritorialized 
international relations. My concern is that to interpret the movement of 
people, whether refugees, migrants, or guestworkers, as an expression of a 
transversal politics that challenges state sovereignty is to depoliticize the
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condition of movement. In the case of refugees, states can assert a right to 
exclude refugees, which may leave the refugee stateless, unable to enter a 
country of asylum and unable to return (Aleinikoff, 1995, p. 258).
Thus, arguments against the state-centric view of international order are 
misplaced. Such views ignore the operation of subtle modalities of power in 
politics and the functioning of the states system to render populations 
governable. Like Liisa Malkki (1995, p.5), I contend that refugeehood is linked 
to the modem system of nation-states, or as she phrases it The national order 
of things'. The universalizing order of states and nations underpins the 
modern explanation of the refugee phenomenon. In other words, the 
problematization of refugees and population displacement affirms the value 
of the international order of state-citizens.
International order involves both normative and organizational 
arrangements. The presence of refugees blemishes the perceived international 
organizational and normative order. Refugees have symbolic value beyond 
the structural order of the states system. The characterization of refugees as 
an anomalous state of being (re)produces and maintains certain conceptions 
of the world and social relations. In other words, the representation of 
disorder is crucial for the maintenance of order. The disorder of refugees 
represents not only a threat to the international order of states and a sign of 
the failure of a state to provide for its citizens, but also a rupture in the 
modern imagination of belonging, community, and identity. If disorder and 
order are two sides of the same coin, which is my contention, then, the 
disorder of refugees is a solution to the ordering practices of identity 
formation and community building. The symbolic meanings of refugees 
secure, what would be otherwise, the indeterminacy of identity and 
community.
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As refugees are increasingly constructed as Third World7 people, the asylum 
policies of Western states have become more restrictive and draconian. The 
politics of refugees emphasize the potential for refugees to disrupt the 
national imagination. The debate on whether refugees possess the socio­
cultural and moral attributes to be autonomous, productive, and responsible 
citizens is the subject of intense research. The politics of difference and the 
problem of order merge in the politics of social cohesion and integration 
(Cohen and Layton-Henry, 1997).
The 'cultural7 disorder of refugees is most evident in the contemporary 
discourse on refugees. The project to reform the international refugee regime 
reflects the anxiety of Western liberal-democratic states to control the entry of 
refugees from developing countries. Loescher (1993, p.4) describes the current 
refugee crisis as an increase in South-North movements and 7the perpetuation 
and growth of the refugee problem in the Third World7, which have resulted 
in an increased number of asylum seekers in industrialized countries. This 
image is dubious because the number of asylum seekers finding their way to 
Western states is very low compared to the number who seek asylum near 
their country of origin. Nonetheless, the image is an incitement to find 
mechanisms to contain refugee movements. According to Loescher (p.10), 
there is an urgent need to go beyond the understanding of the refugee crisis 
as a strictly humanitarian problem and include measures to solve the 
problem of refugee generation.
The perception is that repression and civil wars within states, rather than the 
conditions in host and resettlement countries are causing the refugee crisis. 
The emphasis on state responsibility for the causes and consequences of 
forced migration creates the need to control those 'weak7 states that produce 
refugees. The push for a comprehensive refugee policy that is 'multilevel,
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cooperative and integrative' (Suhrke, 1994) or 'preventive and solution- 
oriented' (UNHCR, 1996) is the latest project to transform regime practices It 
is a strategy designed by the Western states to govern non-Westem refugees 
through the discourse of prevention. The international order is one that 
justifies and produces a form of global apartheid (Richmond, 1994).
C r it ic a l  P e r s p e c t iv e s
Aristide Zolberg (1983) is one writer who has acknowledged the importance 
of the relationship between refugee movements and states. He argues that 
one of the central causes of population displacement in modern history is the 
creation of new national states. Since Zolberg's work a number of authors, 
such as Nyers (1999, 1998), Soguk (1999) and Xenos (1996), have written on 
the relationship between nation-building, state-building and the implications 
of this for how refugees are understood in modern political life. The problem 
of refugees, Xenos (1996, p. 237) suggests, is a problem that has the question 
of sovereignty at its core.
The project to problematize the international system has been taken up by a 
number of scholars. Dillon (1995, 1998), for example, critically examines the 
ontological horizon of an international relations that produces 'the scandal of 
refugees'. He poses the question that if the 'political architecture of modern 
international political power commonly produces 1:115 forcibly displaced 
people globally', then 'one is inclined to ask about the foundations upon 
which that architecture is itself based' (Dillon, 1998, p. 30). For him, 
international relations articulates a sovereign power that create strangers and 
violent exclusion. International relations is a politics of estrangement, Dillon
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concludes, invoking an Levinasian-inspired ethics of hospitality towards 
those rendered as 'Other' by sovereignty.2
For the purpose of this thesis, the most interesting aspect of the project to 
analyze the contours of international relations is the application of Foucault's 
suggestive writings on modern government to refugee studies. With various 
degrees of effectiveness and varied emphases, Lippert (1999), Dillon (1995), 
and Owen (1997) have deployed Foucault's neologism 'governmentality' to 
analyze the modalities of power that operate in the government of refugees. 
Lippert (1999) emphasizes the technologies, rationalities, and other 
institutional practices of the refugee regime in the constitution of 
'refugeeness'. Interestingly, although he insists that refugee camps are spatial 
technologies of government, he does not mention the territorial state as 
serving a similar purpose. For Dillon (1995) and Owen (1997), however, the 
significance of the system of sovereign states is crucial for understanding the 
condition of possibility for the production of the figure of the refugee.
My approach to the government of refugees in international relations concurs 
with the one outlined by Dillon and Owen. Foucault's characterization of the 
government of a citizen population within a state underplays the significance 
of relations between sovereign states in enabling this task. That is, governing 
conduct between states through norms such as sovereignty and non­
intervention makes possible the domestication of populations. Therefore, the 
arrangement of sovereign states is important not because states are the 
powerful actors, but because one of the purposes of states is the government
2 The notion of estrangement as foundational to the constitution of international relations is 
found also in James Der Derian's genealogy of diplomacy. See J. Der Derian (1987) On 
diplomacy: a genealogy of Western estrangement Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell.
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of populations. The normalized features of the states-system - sovereignty, 
territory, and population as citizens -  are what give rise to the subject of 
refugees. There is, then, a geopolitical dimension to governing populations. 
Geopolitics refers to a specific way of reasoning about the significance of 
territory and its relations with political, social, and economic conduct. It 
politicizes territory and territorializes populations.
The critical perspectives of Soguk (1999) and Nyers (1998,1999) also illustrate 
how the contemporary discourses of refugee and issues of humanitarian 
intervention, human rights and democracy are framed within the political 
ontology of nation-states and how this discursive order limits what is 
considered possible in the formulation of refugee policy. This is no 
autonomous space outside the political order of nation-states (Agamben, 
1996, p.162). These authors recognize the state-nation-citizen order in the 
formulation of the refugee question. They also identify the crucial purpose of 
the government of refugees as being to assert and normalize state and citizen 
order. The international refugee regime is part of the discursive practices 
central to the constitution and circulation of the refugee category. The 
discourse of refugees, according to Nyers (1999, p.21) defines the refugee as 
lacking with respect to both citizenship and the nation-state, while citizenship 
is understood as the performance of political rights. Putting it differently, our 
present conceptualization of human rights for refugees is framed within the 
limits of rights as citizens. The practices of the regime seek to restore the 
state-citizen link, or transform the refugee into a citizen. At the same time, 
the 'work' of international refugee policies, institutions, and experts functions 
to create international order and (re)produces the refugees as disorder.
These insightful analyses of the politics of refugees expose the underlying 
assumptions about international relations. They also highlight the complicity
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of knowledge to strategies of power. But they have reduced the significance 
of the refugee problem to a one-dimensional problem of the 
state/nation/citizen hierarchy. What is missing is a historical analysis of the 
way in which the international geopolitical environment influences 
interpretations of the refugee problem. How have decolonization, the global 
economic order and 'North-South' issues, the Cold War and the post Cold 
War influenced the interpretation of the refugee problem and the activities of 
the international refugee regime? How was third country resettlement a 
viable option in the '50s and '60s but less so today? What is the rationale 
behind the development of a regionalized refugee regime under the name of 
'burden sharing and differentiated responsibility'? These are central 
questions to the politics of refugees and this thesis will address these 
questions.
In the analyses by Soguk and Owen, the citizen remains an abstraction, rather 
than a figure inscribed by historical and cultural signification. Citizenship 
also connotes cultural membership. Indeed, the relationship between the 
juridical articulation of citizenship and the ethnocultural ideal of citizenship 
presents a dilemma for liberal democratic states. This dilemma is clearly 
present in the discourse on refugees. The international refugee regime does 
seek to restore the international order of states and citizens, but the citizen is 
deployed into different ways. For example, the conflation of discourse on 
citizenship with the idea of 'home' has been used to legitimate repatriation as 
the best strategy for dealing with refugees. Thus, the problem of refugees is 
not just a legal one. In the West, refugees are invested with socio-cultural 
meanings.
What is missing in these analyses, then, is an examination of the 'coloniality 
of power'. Mignolo (2000, p. 16) claims that this strategy of power constitutes
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itself through a 'classification and reclassification of the world's populations', 
an institutional structure functioning to articulate and manage such 
classifications, and an epistemological perspective from which the production 
of knowledge can be channeled. Eurocentrism, he suggests, is the metaphor 
that describes the coloniality of power.
By deploying Mignolo's conceptualization of the relationship between the 
West and the non-West, one can begin to demystify the cultural history of 
refugees and to historicize the universal claims of the international refugee 
regime. The international refugee regime is an achievement of the West. The 
terms of refugee discourse are the outcome of the European states system. 
The refugee regime has not always been international. We cannot ignore the 
fact that the initial architects of the refugee regime were Europeans and its 
practices were designed for Europeans. While Europe was dealing with its 
displaced populations after the two world wars, a large part of the world's 
populations were subjects not citizens. The incorporation of non-Europeans 
into the refugee regime is more complex than an articulation of universal 
ideals. Western modernity is culturally specific knowledge with global 
designs. By mapping the mode of incorporation, we see the relations of 
power that produce the refugee as a cultural identification, and the 
relationship between the West and non-West. A sense of Western political, 
economic, and cultural superiority to other regions and peoples is deeply 
embedded in the regime. Currently, the international refugee regime, with its 
practices of prevention and regional solution is a form of distancing that 
continues colonial power relations.
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R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n s
This thesis addresses two core questions: How do refugees as a subject come 
into being? And what is the 'work7 of the international refugee regime? The 
first question asks about the historical circumstances that enabled the subject 
to emerge and to be constantly redefined. The definition of the term 'refugee' 
has been far from constant in the twentieth century. There has been a range of 
categories of displacement, including for example stateless persons who may 
or may not be refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and internally displaced 
persons. The 1951 Refugee Convention defines 'refugee' and distinguishes 
them from other kinds of population displacement. But since the Convention 
is interpreted and applied under national law, the operative definition of 
'refugee' is somewhat fluid. More recently, the debate on the whether 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) should come under the auspices of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) illustrates the 
continuing reinterpretation of the significance of population displacement.
The refugee becomes a subject of government through two tactics of 
subjectification: first, the arrangement of sovereign states; and second, the 
deployment of a particular conceptualization of international order. The 
internationalization of the European states system and its related institution 
of citizenship are crucial for understanding the refugee issue. The two 
important functions of the historical nation-state-citizen arrangement are to 
govern the world's human population and to order international relations. At 
the most fundamental level, refugees are the effects of a world divided into 
territorial national states of citizens. The state, with its attributes of 
sovereignty, territory, and population is a technology that seeks to 'divide 
and govern' the world's populations (Hindess, 1997). In this context, the idea 
of 'international order' is a tacit approval of this practice of dividing and 
organizing the world and its population into territorial states. The implication
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of the normalization of this 'structural' form of order is that the refugee, by 
crossing state boundaries and becoming a non-citizen, represents an 
anomalous state of being.
Another aspect of the disorder of refugees relates to the inability of certain 
states to govern their populations in a manner that does not cause flight. The 
government of populations as citizens is the responsibility of states. The 
failure to observe such a duty causes problems for the international order of 
states. The (mis)conduct of states affects domestic and international stability. 
International law has focused largely on the regulation of relations between 
states to ensure stability. More recently, it has turned its attention to the state- 
citizen relationship. Through the discourse of human rights, international law 
now seeks to secure the orderly conduct of states towards their populations 
to secure domestic and international stability.
The international order is also a normative ordering of relations grounded in 
internationalized norms and codes of conducts. Although these norms are 
contested and violated, their institutionalization and universalization in 
political discourse have furnished them with a capacity to describe 'what is' 
and 'what should be' in the world. Above all these norms, whether implicit or 
explicit, project a historically and culturally specific world vision.
While I have chosen to consider the government of refugees on the 
international level, I also recognize that national policies are equally 
important in the government of refugees. The distinction between the 
international and national is intended to draw attention to the value of 
boundaries in the management of populations. In this thesis, I refer to an
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'international' that is always conscious, of its symbiotic relationship with the 
national.
The second research question concerns the purposes of the refugee regime. I 
am not evaluating whether certain practices are desirable. Rather, I am 
interested in the social relations that are reflected and reproduced by 
particular policies, institutions, and forms of knowledge. In other words, my 
concern is with the politics of governing refugees through the activities of 
representation and intervention. The thesis approaches policies, institutions, 
and meanings from an ethnographic perspective in an attempt to expose the 
power relations that underpin the institutional arrangements, the production 
of knowledge, and the formation of policies. The government of refugees, I 
suggest, is part of a larger project to render the world manageable through an 
order of states. There is a connection between the activities of the government 
of populations and inter-state conduct.
Refugee movements signify three kinds of disorder. First, the refugee- 
producing state is perceived to lack the capacity or appropriate techniques to 
govern the population within. Second, refugees disrupt the international 
order of state/community and citizen/population. Third, refugees are people 
who have become disconnected from the disciplinary or regulatory state- 
citizen bond. These three disorders incite a range of governmental regimes 
that aim to restore the state-citizen tie and preserve the value of the states- 
system as an instrument of population management. International protection 
is a political act and the term 'refugee' is a political identity.
The international refugee regime was not the manifestation of a profound 
plan. Indeed, the emergence of an international refugee regime addressed the
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'mass outflow within the already-existing immigration control measures' 
rather than because of a commitment to protecting peoples (Barutciski, 1998, 
p.244). The crucial goal of 'international protection' was to regulate inter-state 
population movements. Characterization and categorization of population 
displacement were techniques of ordering that reflect power relations and 
political calculations.
Related to the issue of power relations is Eurocentrism - a concept that 
characterizes the universalistic claims of Western ideas and the pattern of 
relationships between the West and the non-West. The articulation of 
Eurocentrism is changeable, but the core belief about the qualitative 
superiority of European existence over other forms of human life remains 
constant. In other words, this belief contains a philosophy of history and a 
vision of universalism that venerate the motifs of Western culture. Mignolo 
(2000, p.17) points to the Western tendency to project European local 
knowledge and histories to global designs, 'from the dream of Orbis 
Universalis Christianus to Hegel's belief in a universal history that could be 
narrated from a European perspective'. Indeed, the globalization of European 
modes of thoughts and models of social relations to the rest of the world has 
fortified and reproduced this self-image. For the purpose of the thesis, then, 
the critique of Eurocentrism is concerned with the implications of this 
normalizing and universalizing worldview for the government of refugees.
Indeed, there are two striking features of the contemporary discourse on 
refugees. First, images of refugees are predominantly of non-Western(ized) 
populations. Second, the most influential architects of the international 
refugee regime are Western states. Whether as supporters or critics of 
particular practices, the West has dominated the political discourse on 
refugees and the formulation of refugee policies.
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One aspect of the thesis is to examine the consequences of the ascendancy of 
the nation state form as a technology for governing populations. It takes the 
system of territorial sovereign states seriously, because the refugee is a 
political subject that is intelligible vis-a-vis her relationship to the normalized 
order of states and citizens. The problem of refugees -  the problem that 
requires intervention or government -  is that they are outside the state-citizen 
regulatory norm. A second aspect of the thesis is to explore the historical 
representation of refugees and some of the activities of the refugee regime. I 
suggest that the government of refugees has two components: the modes of 
thought (theorization) about the social world and the practices informed by 
these habits of thought.
The thesis contains three related propositions. Firstly, the issue of refugees is 
symptomatic of the division of the world's territory and population into 
sovereign states. This is the structural condition of refugees. Related to this is 
the value attached to the normalized bond between state, nation, and citizen -  
a bond that is strategic for the management of states and population. The 
discourse of refugees (re)produces particular realities of international 
relations and truths about who we are and where we belong. The refugee is a 
political identity that affirms and reproduces the international order of states. 
Secondly, the characterization of the refugee is historically linked to 
imaginaries and explanations of international (dis)order. This is the historical 
significance of refugees. Representations of refugees mirror the concerns and 
contradictions that arise from particular images of world (dis)order. Policy 
activities are attempts at recovering a historically and culturally specific 
articulation of 'normality'. Thirdly, Western habits of thought have mainly 
informed and transformed practices towards refugees and 'other people of 
concern'. This is the cultural meaning of refugees. Western concerns have 
dominated the refugee agenda and we cannot ignore the configuration of
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power in international relations, or the effects of these relationships for the 
government of refugees.
C h a p t e r  Ou t l in e
Chapter Two introduces the theoretical strategy of the thesis. I draw upon 
Foucault's analysis of government in the modern West to suggest that the 
government of refugees is an articulation of biopolitics and geopolitics. The 
former politicizes life and addresses the government of population. The latter 
politicizes territory and produces a relationship between territory and vitality 
(life). It is in this sense that the states-system is crucial for the government of 
refugees. I will show that the refugee question arises because the unregulated 
movement of people disrupts the organizational structure of the system of 
states, which is seen both as a prerequisite for international order and the 
core of international order itself. A central objective of governing refugees, 
then, is to maintain and reproduce the international order of national states 
where populations are governed through the normalized institution of 
citizenship. The values of the state, the nation, and the citizen are 
(re)produced in the refugee regime. Indeed, the refugee regime, I suggest, 
should be considered as a set of cultural practices, which prescribes and 
naturalizes a particular image of political order and human relations.
After setting the theoretical foundation, Chapters Three and Four of the thesis 
explores the changes and continuities in the meaning of the refugee question 
and its deployment in the larger context of the imaginations of order and 
disorder. Chapters Two and Three focus on the advent of population 
displacement as an international political concern and the development of 
'international protection' regimes that addressed this concern. There was an
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external and internal dimension to international protection after World War 
One. The external dimension was the refugee regime and the internal was the 
minorities protection regime. Both regimes contributed to the wider project of 
establishing and maintaining international order by dealing with vulnerable 
groups whose condition signaled a possible destabilizing situation.
The aim of Chapter Three is to focus on an overlooked issue in the history of 
governing displacement. I suggest that to understand the refugee question, 
one needs to begin with an examination of the related issue of national 
minorities. The remapping of Europe based on the principle of national self- 
determination (and nationalist ideals) unwittingly raised a number of 
dilemmas for post 1919 Europe and the existence of national minorities in 
new states was one of these dilemmas. The primary goal was to uphold the 
new international order of sovereign states in Europe, which was believed to 
be the key to peace and stability. But there was a fear that the thwarted 
ambitions of groups who had been denied their own national states and the 
harsh nationalizing policies of new states would lead to internal unrest, 
international conflict and population displacement. The minorities protection 
regime was a preventive measure that sought to counter such incidents. 
Under the auspices of the League of Nations, the regime, through 
constitutional and other domestic arrangements, sought political guarantees 
for the national minorities of states with 'mixed populations'. The minorities 
protection regime was an integral part of the system established to regulate 
the outcome of the First World War.
The topic of Chapter Four is the institutionalization of a regime for displaced 
populations in the period from 1919 to 1951. The events of the Russian 
Revolution initiated the institutionalization of population displacement as an 
international problem and lead to the development of a refugee regime. The
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objectives of the chapter are to demonstrate that shifts in defining the term 
'refugee' and efforts to address population displacement were largely limited 
to Europe. But I also show that, despite the definitional shifts, the term 
'refugee' is organized around the relationship between a person and a state -  
whether it is the state of domicile or the asylum state. Through an exploration 
of the functioning of refugee agencies and other regime practices as such 
travel documents, population exchanges, and repatriation and resettlement 
programs, it will be evident that the purpose of the regime was to reestablish 
the contractual relationship between a person and a state and to maintain the 
international order of state-nation-citizens. In effect, the governing activities 
normalize refugees as anomalous beings who are potentially disruptive to 
national and international order.
Chapter Five explores the incorporation of non-Western populations as 
subjects of the refugee regime. Too often, the history of the international 
refugee regime has interpreted the expansion of the regime after World War 
Two as an achievement for human equality. This view, I suggest, disguises 
the Eurocentric aspect of the regime. I argue that the representation of the 
non-Western refugee condition as different from the Western condition has 
served to justify interventions that are loaded with Eurocentric assumptions. 
The insertion of the discourse of development into explanations of refugees 
represents a significant shift in the perception of the refugee problem and the 
practices designed to manage it. The objective of this chapter is to show that 
the refugee-development governmental strategy is a form of colonial 
discourse, which characterizes non-Western peoples as 'backward'. In other 
words, the discourse reproduces the developmental or evolutionist view of 
society, which has been a feature of Western thought.
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For the West, the end of the East-West conflict and the subsequent events in 
the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia brought on crises of representation 
and government in international relations. Chapter Six examines two 
influential perspectives on the new world (dis)order, and two well-know 
examples being Fukuyama's vision of liberal world order and Huntington's 
pessimistic prediction of civilizational conflict. There are two reasons for 
devoting so much space to this topic. First, the two images of (dis)order 
illustrate the West's habit of universalize its cultural specificities. Second, 
weak and strong versions of these characterizations of international order 
have informed the government of refugees since 1989. As I argue throughout 
the thesis, the meaning of the term 'refugee' must be located within the wider 
context of international relations.
Chapter Seven considers Western responses to the global refugee crisis after 
the end of the Cold War. The focus of the chapter is on how this crisis 
prompted a search for a comprehensive approach to the government of 
refugees. It explores some of the technologies of this prevention-protection- 
solution strategy, which has constructed refugee movements as threats to 
international order. One development is the deployment of the language of 
rights and human security to legitimize highly interventionist practices. It 
also notes the re-emergence of national minorities as an issue in the 
government of refugees. This chapter will demonstrate that the contemporary 
international refugee regime is a practice of geopolitical humanitarianism. 
The regime is simultaneously an enterprise of liberal internationalism and a 
form of global apartheid.
The Conclusion summarizes the terrain covered by this thesis on refugees. It 
reflects how a history of the government of refugees is also a history of 
international relations. International relations, here, refer to the normalized
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order of states and citizens, and the relationship between the West and the 
non-West. My concluding remarks consider the implications of my research 
for refugee studies. The thesis ends w ith an invitation to pluralize the 
meaning of community.
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T h e  S t a t e  of  R e f u g e e s
b io p o l i t i c s ,  g eo p o l i t ic s ,  reg im e
In a world that abhors the presence of unadministered spaces or people, the 
presence of forced m igrants m ust be treated as abnormal. Government 
authorities invariably react to refugee situations by tryin g  firs t to contain 
them and later to eliminate them.
Leon Gordenker, 
Refugee in International Politics
My introductory chapter contextualized this thesis by exploring some of the 
themes and approaches in the broad field of refugee studies. I also mapped 
the core issues of the thesis. The objective of this chapter is to establish the 
theoretical foundation of the thesis. It delves more deeply into the 
relationship, mentioned in the previous chapter, between the government of 
populations, the order of territorial states and the constitution of refugees.
THE STATE OF REFUGEES
My theorization of the government of refugees in international relations 
engages with Foucault's suggestive work on modern government in the 
West, with its theme of power and its effects on social relations and human 
experience. His characterization of government as the government of 
population, or biopolitics, presents a productive way to examine the 
discourse on refugees. But another strategy of power has enabled the subject 
of refugees to emerge -  geopolitics. Geopolitics refers to a specific way of 
reasoning about the significance of territory and its relations with political, 
social, and economic conduct. The arrangement of sovereign states is of 
significance for geopolitics not because states are the powerful actors, but 
because one of the purposes of states is the government of populations. The 
central proposition is that the interplay between geopolitics and biopolitics 
produces a regime of truth about international relations and the forms of life 
possible (and desirable) inside and outside the state. The subject of refugees, 
therefore, is an effect of ordering the world and its populations into states, 
which produces the experience of citizenship and alienage.
One of the preconditions for states to perform their governmental function is 
the creation and maintenance of relatively ordered conduct between states. 
At the basic level, the purpose of the principles of sovereignty and non­
intervention in international relations is to create the conditions of co­
existence. The activities of international regimes also aim to ensure that the 
conduct of a state does not have deleterious implications for other states.
This chapter, then, connects the government of population with the 
government of territorial sovereign states. By doing so, it presents the 
conditions of possibility for the problematization of refugees. Refugee 
movements signify three sets of disorder. First, the refugee-producing state is 
perceived to lack the capacity or appropriate techniques to govern the
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population within. Second, refugees disrupt the international order of 
state/community and citizen/population. Thirdly, refugees are people who 
have become disconnected from the disciplinary or regulatory state-citizen 
bond. These three disorders incite a range of governmental regimes that seek 
to restore the state-citizen tie and preserve the value of the states-system as 
instruments of population management.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section outlines some 
aspects of Foucault's innovative work on modern government in the West as 
a modality of power. According to Foucault, the central object of government 
is population -  a social and political object discovered by the human sciences. 
His conceptualization of power beyond the juridical mode offers a distinctive 
view on the role of the state and the activity of governing populations. 
Although his work focuses on the government of a population within a state, 
his analytics also provide a number of insights about the government of those 
populations characterized as outside the state.
The second section extends the discussion of government to the international 
level. The objective is to complicate Foucault's characterization of 
government by reinserting sovereignty into the activity of government. The 
effect of sovereignty on the government of population is more significant 
than Foucault assumes. I propose that sovereignty and the modern states- 
system are geopolitical designs that are fundamental to the task of governing 
populations. As noted in the previous chapter, a few scholars are engaging in 
the concept of government to study refugees in international relations. While 
Lippert (1999) shuns the question of sovereignty and Soguk (1999) 
emphasizes the practices of statecraft, Owen (1998) and Dillon (1995) 
recognize the intersection between sovereignty and government in the 
problematization of population movement across borders. My objective is to
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elaborate on some of the propositions made of Dillon, Owen, and Soguk by 
draw ing attention to the distinctive value of states as technologies of 
population control. My claim is that the system of states is a potent political 
arrangem ent and the character of statehood: sovereignty, territory, and 
population delim it w hat and how claims can be m ade in international 
relations, as well as by whom . 1
The final section takes a broad look at the art of governing refugees by 
examining the idea of regime. Conventional theories of regime mostly 
emphasize the desirability of international co-ordination and co-operation 
and the positive outcomes of consensus building. I take a slightly different 
view of regimes by proposing that the diverse activities of regimes are 
significant because they (re)construct and normalize a particular view of 
political reality. The roles of experts and policymakers and the value of 
knowledge have been particularly important to this task. Experts and policy­
makers are the forefront of (re)interpreting and transforming the 'reality' of 
refugees. Hence, my approach to regime is essential an anthropological one. I 
am interested in regimes as cultural phenomena that (re)produce cultural 
values and establish a grid of relationships.
1 Too often, discourses of globalization have obscured this task of states. Their charges 
against the state and their announcements of 'the erosion of sovereignty' proceed largely 
from an understanding of the exercise of power as hierarchical and oppressive.
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BIOPOLITICS: GOVERNMENT AND POPULATION
Foucault's discussion of government is a continuation of his project to 
conceptualize political power and power relations in a way that challenges 
the notion of power as capacity and as right and power relations as based on 
consent or domination.2 Political power, he insists, does not emanate from a 
single source as claimed by the juridical notion of sovereignty; it is dispersed 
and heterogeneous.3 To demonstrate this, he presents a genealogy of modern 
government in the West and claims that the perceptions of and reflections on 
the practical problems of politics are the effects of modalities of power. 
Foucault uses the neologism 'governmentality' or 'government' to focus on 
issues of the mentality or rationality that underpins the activity of governing. 
His conception of government is as an activity rather than an institution. The 
concept of 'government' describes a distinct form of rationality. That is, how 
government can be rationalized can be thought of in terms of some kind of 
rational principle of what governments can and cannot do (Burchell, 1992, 
p.33). It also refers to the regulation of conduct or the conduct of conduct.
Government, then, is a modality of power that does not emanate from a 
single source or supreme authority such as the state. It is not aligned 
exclusively with a particular political apparatus such as the state and its 
agencies, or a set of political instruments such as rules and administrative
2 Foucault's thoughts on the topic are scattered in various collections of interviews and 
lecture notes. The most coherent account of his ideas on government are in the 
"Governmentality" lecture given at the College de France in 1978, which has been translated 
and published in English in The Foucault Effect (1991). See G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. 
Miller eds. (1991) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, M. Foucault (1988) 'Politics and Reason' in L. Kritzman ed. Michel Foucault: 
Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, London: Routledge; and 
P. Rabinow ed. (1997) Michel Foucault: Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, New York: The New 
Press.
3 For an analysis of different characterizations of power in Western political theory see, B. 
Hindess (1996) Discourses of Power: from Hobbes to Foucault, Oxford: Blackwell.
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judgements to achieve political ends. Rather, government is an exercise of 
power that involves a complex and heterogeneous array of practices, 
institutions, reflections and networks of norms, 'working' to produce a 
regime of truth and to form subjects. The art of government, therefore, does 
not seek conformity to external law. It is no longer about the imposition of 
laws on subjects. To achieve the goals of government, law is one of the many 
tactics to be employed.4 *Insofar as modern states generate laws, those laws 
are policies -  regulations concerned with order at the level of populations 
informed by the regularities and interests depicted by the human sciences 
rather than by a sovereign will. Lemke's analysis of governmentality 
provides an elegant description of the twin activities of government -  
representation and intervention.
[T]he term [governmentality] pin-points a specific form of representation; 
governm ent defines a discursive field in which exercising power is 
'rationalized7. This occurs, among other things, by the delineation of 
concepts, the specification of objects and borders, the provision of arguments 
and justifications etc. In this manner, government enables a problem to be 
addressed and offers certain strategies for solving/handling the problem. In 
this way, it also structures specific forms of intervention. For a political 
rationality is not pure, neutral knowledge which simply 're-presents' the 
governing reality; instead, it itself constitutes the intellectual processing of 
the reality which political technologies can then tackle. This is understood to 
include agencies, procedures, institutions, legal forms etc. that are intended 
to enable us to govern the objects and subjects of a political rationality 
(forthcoming, original emphasis).
4 For attempts to apply a Foucauldian approach to law see, A. Hunt and G. Wickham (1994)
Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance, London: Pluto; and A. Hunt (1993)
Explorations in Law and Society: Towards a Constitutive Theory of Law, New York and London:
Routledge.
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According to Foucault, around the early eighteenth century, some reflections 
on the problem of government came to be outside the framework and 
institution of sovereignty. The doctrine of the reason of state and the science 
of police (policy) or Polizeiwissenschaft were the two modalities of power with 
concerns distinct from sovereign power. If reason of state was about ensuring 
the existence and the strengthening of a state, then police science assisted in 
the attainment of these ends by maintaining internal order and gathering 
information and knowledge about the 'reality' of the state. Both political 
rationalities were interested in the potential to know, to increase, and to 
manage the 'forces' of the state. The rationality of police, in particular, was 
concerned with exhaustively detailed knowledge of the reality of the state 
and the regulation of the population within (Gordon, 1991, p.10). Elaborate 
administrative and bureaucratic machinery became a feature of government.
The next shift in the history of modern government occurred with the 
development of capitalism in the West and the demographic 'upswing' of the 
eighteenth century in Western Europe (Foucault, 1990, p.141). The necessity 
for coordinating and integrating these developments for the purpose of 
production caused 'population' to emerge as an object of surveillance, 
analysis, intervention, and modification. These new conditions gave rise to a 
different political rationality, which Foucault identifies as liberalism -  the 
govemmentality, which persists in the West today.5
In Foucault's thesis, the 'discovery' of 'population' was an innovation. The 
phenomena of a population as a totality and as individual units with specific 
set of regularities constituted a calculable and amendable governmental
5 In his writings on government, Foucault specifically deals with liberalism as a form of 
political rationality and not as political philosophy.
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problem through sophisticated tables and graphs.6 Statistical analyses, for 
example, 'revealed' the inner dynamics or regularities of the population such 
as manpower and the balance between population growth and the resources 
it commanded.
[Statistics shows also that the domain of population involves a range of 
intrinsic, aggregate effects, phenomena that are irreducible to those of the 
family, such as epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, ascending spirals of 
labour and wealth; lastly it shows that, through its shifts, customs, activities, 
etc., population has economic effects.... (Foucault, 1991, p. 99).
This form of knowledge was not enough though. Numbers and graphs 
needed to be situated and supported by general theories that accord them 
meaning and value.
The government of a population 'requires an abstract and theoretical 
knowledge of social processes' (Dean and Hindess, 1997, p. 6). Phenomena 
emerge as problems when they are thought of or rationalized through a 
particular set of knowledge and understanding. Their meanings emerge from 
a broader set of meanings, ideals, and prescribed order against which they 
are measured. As Dean and Hindess (1998, p.9) suggest, problems are far 
from self-evident, they become known, or knowable through grids of 
evaluation and judgement. In other words, an object of government needs to 
be identified and problematized.
6 For a govemmentality approach to a genealogy of statistics see I. Hacking (1990) The Taming 
of Chance, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; and (1991) 'How should 
we do the history of statistics?', in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller eds. The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Govemmentality, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
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The 'work' of human sciences, and similarly policy, plays an important 
function in the processes of problematization and government.71 will discuss 
this aspect of experts and knowledge in the final section on regimes. For now, 
let me say that the human sciences and policies create representations of 
reality that are receptive to interventions. The human sciences, in 'revealing' 
the internal dynamics of populations enable an assessment of whether certain 
groups and/or individuals should or should not be an object of regulation 
(Barry, Osborne, and Rose, 1996, p.9). Knowledge and policy are particularly 
potent tactics of governments because the modes of intervention do not 
necessarily conform to state intervention. The perception of experts as 
independent and neutral authority engenders their knowledge and know­
how as 'truths'. These knowledge truths can then be deployed to 
depoliticalize practices and to enable the government of persons, places, and 
activities in specific and diverse locales. This perspective on the functioning 
of knowledge cannot be regarded as sociology of knowledge. The point is not 
the ideological basis of knowledge but the complex functions of knowledge 
and knowledge production, and their consequences for politics. Expertise is 
part of the complex and heterogeneous assemblage of strategies of 
government that is productive and empowering as well as regulating.
Governmental policies are not same as state policies. The government of a 
state may be carried out by agencies of the state, but it may also include other 
agencies. The crucial point is that government is a realm of activity directed
7 The ways in which the human sciences and the role of experts are connected with 
technologies of government have inspired much scholarship. See edited volumes by A. 
Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose eds. (1996) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, neo­
liberalism and rationalities of government, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; G. 
Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller eds. (1991) The Foucault Effect: studies in governmentality, 
Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf; and M. Dean and B. Hindess eds. (1998) 
Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. The journals Economy and Society and History of Human Sciences 
are sources for the latest expositions on the topic.
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towards certain goals, which is distinct from the government of a particular 
state. The relationship between government and the state is not to be 
understood as one of overt control and manipulation of the former by the 
latter (Foucault, 1991, p. 103). The state comes into being through practices of 
government. Putting it differently, the state is an instrument of government 
and as such its capacity cannot be taken as a given. The question is how and 
to what extent is the state articulated into the activity of government.
This governmentalization of the state is ... what has permitted the state to 
survive, and it is possible to suppose that if the state is what it is today, this is 
so precisely thanks to this governmentality, which is at once internal and 
external to the state, since it is the tactics of government which make possible 
the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of 
the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the 
state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the 
general tactics of governmentality (Foucault, 1991, p.103).
The role of the state and its capacity to act in domestic and international 
politics, therefore, is linked to calculations of its effectiveness in carrying out 
certain political ends. The issue of what is on the agenda of states becomes 
conditional on political goals of governing rather than inherent capacity and 
the transcendent right of states to act. If Western states appear to be less 
coherent today, it may be due to a shift in the reinterpretation of state 
capacity and a shift in governmental strategies as much as to the 'forces' of 
globalization.
Foucault refers to the government of population as biopolitics8 - the field of 
regulation and intervention that identifies living human beings as the
8 The notes on the lectures titled 'Society must be Defended', 'Security, Territory, and 
Population', 'The Birth of Biopolitics' and 'On the Government of the Living' can be found in 
Paul Rabinow ed. 1997 Michel Foucault: Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, New York: The New 
Press.
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political object and makes knowledge an agent of transformation of human 
life (1990, p.143). For him, this rationality of government marks the transition 
from a 'territorial state' to a 'population state'. The population or biopolitical 
state is one that has the population and not territory as the principal object of 
government. Population and its related problems, he insists, have replaced 
issues of territory as the problematic of government today.
Since one of the propositions of this thesis is that the government of refugees 
in international relations is linked to representations of disorder, the 
discussion on biopolitics is interesting in two ways. First, biopolitics as a 
modality of power encourage interventions into matters that are considered 
to be crucial for the vitality of the population of a state. Second, it transforms 
and links the value of the state to the health and happiness of the population 
within. In a series of lectures on biopolitics, and in Discipline and Punish and 
History of Sexuality Volume 1, Foucault notes that the themes of social wars 
conceived in biological terms have become a part of the modern political 
discourse.9 It is a biological battle, concerned with the management of vitality 
and life forms, which sanctifies the state as biological and social protector. As 
Foucault suggests,
Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; 
they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are 
mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life 
necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, 
of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many 
w ars ,... (Foucault, 1990, p. 137).
9 The biologicalization of political discourse and its relations to strategies of power has been a 
persistent feature of modem government. Sociobiology and theories of degeneration, which 
permit the creation of various governmental program of regularization, exclusion, and 
extermination are the most obvious examples of this discourse.
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The contemporary campaign to characterize refugees as 'different', whether 
culturally, ethnically, or economically is one strategy to wage war against 
those who appear to threaten narratives of community and belonging. I 
suggest, however, that the anomalous state of refugees, in fact, provides the 
answer to the ambiguities of community and belonging. That is, through the 
double move of negation and affirmation, refugees represent who 'we' are 
not, thereby affirming who 'we' are.
If the biopolitical state is the protector of life, then, it would wage a 
permanent social war on those external and internal threats to the vitality its 
population. This war claims the right to kill and justifies a range of 'demonic' 
treatments of some to ensure the protection of others. In other words, the 
affirmation of the life of those others and their particular way of life compels 
the elimination of objects that symbolize threats. Moreover, when the 
affirmation of life is linked to the assumption that a nation is a society of 
people with a distinct cultural identity, it provides a strong justification for 
the creation of exclusionary governmental policies. Both points are relevant 
for the government of refugees because they illustrate how the 
characterization of refugees as an aberrant state of being compels various 
forms of interventions.
Yet, Foucault's 'internal' view of governing population is incomplete. It is too 
limiting to understand biopolitics as a power that is exercised over those 
persons living as members of a population of a state. This view assumes that the 
division of the world's population into sovereign territorial states is of little 
consequence.101 am suggesting, however, the creation of a plurality of at least
10 Foucault does acknowledge the government of inter-state relations in his remarks on the 
balance of power, the diplomatic-military technique, and the Treaty of Westphalia. The issue 
is that he pays insufficient attention to the value of the modem character of state and the 
states-system for government.
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nominally independent states is a precondition for 'internal' government. 
There is an art of government operating to manage relations between states 
and phenomena outside, which may intrude into the domestic 'inside'. In this 
sense, the government of population is carried out on multiple levels and not 
simply within a state. This is where the international dimension of sovereignty 
must be taken seriously.
Ge o p o l i t i c s : S o v e r e ig n t y  a n d  T e r r it o r y
The following section re-evaluates the concept of sovereignty, its relations to 
territory, and the task of government. The objective is to recover the 
significance of sovereignty and territory in the government of populations 
and relations between states. This is not a history of the idea of sovereignty. 11 
Rather, sovereignty is seen as a way of thinking that has been instrumental to 
the territorialization of political community and to how populations, 
including refugees are thought about. Spatial practices of government, or 
geopolitics, operate alongside biopolitics to impose an international territorial 
order onto populations. I will also discuss how geopolitical knowledge is 
important to making international relations thinkable and (re)producing a 
relationship between territory and population. A biopolitical state is also a 
territorial state. Territory maps relationships and to 'map' a territory is to 
exercise power. Territory is not neutral but invested with meaning and value. 
A 'globalizing' territorial arrangement - the states-system is significant for the 
government of populations.
11 The scholarship on sovereignty and international relations is enormous. For an insightful 
summary of the debates of the past 10 years, see Special Issue: Sovereignty at the Millennium 
(1999) Political Studies, Vol. XLVII, pp. 423-605.
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S o v e r e i g n t y
Another way to look at sovereignty is as an issue between states. The 
character of the modem international system requires states to deal with each 
other. A state does not exist in isolation; states are relational political 
institutions. A state is only a state when it is formally recognized as such by 
other states. In this sense, sovereignty lays down the main condition and 
standard of conduct between states.
In the international context, the theory of sovereignty has implied that states 
should be regarded as independent in all matters of international politics, 
and should in principle be free to determine their own fate within this 
framework. External sovereignty is an attribute which political societies 
possess in relationship to one another; it is associated with the aspiration of a 
community to determine its own direction and policies, without interference 
from other powers (Held, 1989, p. 216).
)
The principle of sovereignty is formulated in such a way that it has internal 
and external aspects. The former refers to the presence of supreme or final 
and absolute legal authority within a particular political community. The 
latter claims that there is no final and absolute authority above and beyond 
the sovereign state. The relationship between internal and external 
sovereignty is symbiotic.
The idiom of sovereignty is an historical artefact of Europe. The attempt to 
the end religious conflict that consumed much of Western Europe for over a 
century resulted in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Like the Augsburg 
settlement of 1555 with its principle of cujus regio ejus religio (religious 
uniformity within the state), the Treaty of Westphalia was an attempt to 
'deconfessionalize' politics in Europe (Hunter, 1998). The Treaty formally 
recognized the exclusive control of states in their own internal affairs. States
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were independent externally, but the idea of juridical equality among states 
had yet to emerge. 12 Nevertheless, after two hundred years of improvized 
development, political events had legitimized the state form as the political 
arrangement of Western Europe. The system of states was instrumental to the 
government and pacification of the population of a Europe plagued by 
religious conflict. The modern notion of international order grew out this 
distinctive historical experience.
For the purposes of this thesis, there are important implications of the 
institutionalization of a system of sovereign states. Firstly, the creation of a 
plurality of independent states is a precondition for and indeed, part of a 
broader art of government. The functioning of sovereignty in inter-state 
relations helps to secure the conditions that make the 'internal' government 
of population possible. Secondly, the arrangement of sovereign states with 
distinct populations is seen as critical to securing international order, and 
constitutes the minimal condition of international order .13 The international 
order is also a normative one that defines a set of norms about conduct 
between states and distinguishes political life inside and outside the state. 
Thirdly, the attributes of statehood: sovereignty, territory, population, and 
the legitimate use of violence anchor understandings of modern politics and
12 Westphalia did not settle the question of internal sovereignty once and for all. Foucault 
claimed that disputes over sovereignty were by and large settled by the seventeenth century 
and that the emergence of an ’art of government' became the focus of government. But Ian 
Hunter's (1998) work on seventeenth and eighteenth century Germany showed that was not 
the case. Not only was the idea of sovereignty put to ends which were not concerned with 
the exercise of a sovereign will, but the issue of sovereignty remained a topic of much debate 
well into the eighteenth century in Germany. See I. Hunter (1998) 'Uncivil Society: Liberal 
Government and the Deconfessionalization of Politics', in M. Dean and B. Hindess eds. (1998) 
Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
13 International relations theories invest much energy in trying to understand and resolve 'the 
problem of order'. For an analysis of how international theories have tried to deal with this 
problem, see N.J. Rengger (2000) International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of 
Order: Beyond International Relations theory?, London and New York: Routledge.
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frame and fix the foundations and conditions of international relations 
(Jackson, 1999, p.423). Problems in international relations are often 
represented as transgressions of the norms of political life as expressed by the 
order of sovereign territorial states. To put it differently, the 'properties' of 
the modern state are technologies that condition and govern the objects of 
international relations. This feature of modern politics means that the 
doctrine of sovereignty and the modern system of states cannot be taken for 
granted.
While I assert that sovereignty is significant for the task of government, I do 
not assume that state sovereignty is an unproblematic and fixed principle. 
Sovereignty is an effect of a range of political practices; it comes into being 
through activities of affirmation. The writings of Biersteker and Weber (1996), 
Campbell (1992), and Walker (1993) are useful reminders that the activities of 
'statecraft' involve first and foremost, the production and maintenance of 
sovereignty. Following this approach, one could argue, as Soguk (1999) does, 
that 'the refugee problem' functions to secure the sovereignty of a state. I 
would push this argument further and propose that 'the refugee problem' is 
related to securing sovereignty in a world of states. That is, the assertion or 
performance of sovereignty is vis-a-vis other states.
States need not merely to establish territorial and juridical control but also 
rules and institutions to regulate their conduct with each other. Since the 
status of sovereign statehood is relational and requires a degree of 
reciprocity, some code of inter-states conduct is necessary. Martin Wight 
(1977, p.135) points out that it would be impossible to have a system of 
sovereign states 'unless each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, 
recognized that every other state had the right to claim and enjoy its own 
sovereignty as well'. The basic code of inter-state conduct also allows an
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impression of predictability and order in international relations. The norms of 
sovereignty such as equality, political independence and non-interference 
form a code of conduct that governs international relations, and gives rise to a 
minimal foundation of order. Robert Jackson (1999, p.423) insists that without 
more or less contiguous independent states, each one having an outward 
aspect as well as an inward aspect, and without the consequent necessity of 
ordered contact and regulated interaction between them, the notion of 
international relations loses much of its intelligibility. The maintenance of this 
order is fundamental to the possible realization of the diverse and at times 
seemingly contradictory objectives of international relations.
State sovereignty and the related principle of non-interference created the 
conditions of possibility for the implementation of consolidation, integration, 
and domestication programs within the state. The domestic activities of 
governing presuppose that states have the capacity to keep things within 
their boundaries under control. The order of states requires the governments 
of states to develop an art of governing that does not cause problems for 
other states. States are not to violate the sovereignty of other states either by 
creating problems for neighbouring states, or for the society of states. A state 
that causes an incident regarded as an 'international' problem or a 'threat to 
international peace and security' forfeits the non-interference condition of 
inter-state conduct. These 'weak' or 'rogue' states, not having mastered the 
art of government, ’invite’ assistance and intervention. A goal of 
international regimes and institutions is to socialize and manage these states.
Thus, the domestic and the international are not exclusive domains of policy 
formulation. The international affects the national and vice versa. This is most 
obvious in immigration and refugee policies where the distinction between 
domestic and foreign is ambiguous. These issues illustrate the point that the
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government of a state and its population relies upon international 
governmental technologies. The possibility of a good life within a state 
requires the surveillance and regulation of those events and people who are 
outside.
S t a t e - c i t i z e n - r e f u g e e
Providing the conditions for the good life for its 'people' is the valuable task 
of states. The crucial justification of modern state form has rested on the 
assumed capacity of states to contribution to the realization of an individual's 
liberty and justice. Jackson (1990, p. 267) suggests that if states cannot be 
justified in terms of some version of the good life, then, the classical rules of 
the sovereignty game will be undermined. Walker (1993, p.14) also notes that 
the demands of state sovereignty were advanced historically 'on the ground 
of universalizing claims about peace, justice, reason and humanity in 
general'.14 The 'empowerment' of the state as the site on which claims of the 
good life can be made has affected how we have come to think of political life 
inside and outside the state, and international relations.
If the object of government is the life, welfare, and happiness of the 
population of a state, then, the members of this population should be citizens. 
Due to historical circumstances, the modern citizen has taken on a national 
character. One is, ostensibly, a national citizen. The status of national 
citizenship entails legal and social as well as cultural and normative 
dimensions that has important consequences for the government of
14 The history of national self-determination contains a similar narrative of equality and 
justice.
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populations inside and outside the state. The citizen-state nexus has been 
instrumental for governing populations and managing inter-states 
population movement in the twentieth century. As Barry Hindess (1997, p.2) 
argues 'the assignment of populations to states should itself be seen as an 
important governmental practice, and one on which the development of 
government within states clearly depends'. Moreover, like sovereignty, 
citizenship has internal and external aspects.13
By outlining the rights, obligations and duties of the national population and 
the state in relation to each other, 'the international culture of citizenship' 
characterizes and affirms the difference between citizens and aliens (Hindess, 
1996). The normalized international order of states and state-citizen bonds are 
constitutive of the refugee condition. The state-citizen arrangement 
problematizes inter-state population movement. The crossing of territorial 
boundaries transforms a person into an 'alien'. An aspect of the institution of 
citizenship is chauvinistic. Citizenship is a form of membership in an 
exclusive state-community. As a member, one has privileges within the state 
and has a status that is distinguished from that of non-citizens.16 Thus, it can 
be argued that the refugee is an effect of the international arrangement of 
states and citizens.
Soguk(1999) and Owen (1998) have emphasized the tactics of citizenship in 
their discussion of population displacement and refugees. Soguk (1999, p.21) 
retheorizes the refugee discourse as a boundary-producing discourse
13 Political theory and sociology have tended to focus on the 'domestic' view of citizenship, 
without much consideration as to its political purpose in the division and government of the 
world's population.
16 The general perception of citizens is that they are members of a culturally nationalized 
population with attributes that make them governable. Non-citizens, however, are 
characterized as less governable because they do not possess the historical memory and 
cultural etiquette of the 'host' state.
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instrumental to the task of statecraft. Refugees "fix' the citizen/nation/state 
imagination. Similarly, Owen argues that the refugee is a bipolitical entity -  
an artefact of the governmentalization of global political relations and of the 
citizen-alien game. For him, refugees both disrupt and affirm the norms of 
national and international political life.
The refugee is a person whose tie to her state-community is broken. The 
fractured citizen-state bond represents the failure of a state to carry out its 
governing activities in a fitting manner. The reception to her presence ranges 
from hospitable acceptance through grudging tolerance to mistrust. It 
depends on the symbolic meaning attached to refugees, and domestic and 
international environments. The point, however, is that governments, faced 
with 'disorderly' movements of people into their sovereign territory, act to 
avert breakdown of the national and international order. The refugee has 
transgressed the regulatory bond of state-citizen.
The refugee signifies exceptionalism in inter-state relations and movement. 
Migrants remain under the 'protection' of their states, and therefore, can 
make very few claims in non-national states. Refugees, however, constitute 
people who are entitled to claim a range of support from a state that is not 
their own because their condition indicates the failure of the normalized 
state-citizen arrangement. Thus, being a refugee, because of and despite the 
anomalous state, enables the person to make various 'humanitarian' claims 
on the international community.
Yet, the claims made by refugees on the international community of states are 
limited by the state-citizen arrangement. I am not suggesting that states do 
not have prescribed obligations towards aliens. They do. International
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refugee law outlines such 'international' obligations. But under a hierarchy of 
obligations, the primary obligation of states is to their citizens. In this sense, 
refugees are constructed as burdens to states. They consume the scarce or 
limited resources of states that should be allocated to their national 
populations. The theme of burden-sharing in refugee discourse may at first 
appear to highlight an apparent tension between duty and burden .17 But the 
issue cannot be posed in dualistic terms. The very choice we are presented 
with is an outcome of a particular naturalized understanding of a world's 
population divided into sovereign states. In the case of refugees, duty is 
burden.
The normative debate on refugees is an iteration of this dualism. At the core 
of the two related dilemmas of 'duty beyond borders' and 'duty to man and 
citizen' is the question of how to reconcile the claims of citizenship and 
humanity. 18 International distributive justice is about fostering some of the 
conditions considered to be 'basic goods' intrinsic to an individual's 
development within the political community of states, which takes us back to 
the importance of inter-state relations. Moreover, whether one positions the 
debate along the lines of liberalism versus communitarianism, partiality or 
impartiality, deontology or consequentialism, the dilemma is one based on
17 The significance of burden-sharing as a solution to the refugee problem was confirmed at 
the Forty-ninth session of the Executive Committee in 1998, which focused on international 
solidarity and burden-sharing. See UN Doc. A/AC. 96/904. For other attempts to insert 
burden-sharing arrangement as response to refugees see, Centre for Refugee Studies (1996) 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility: A Model for Enhanced International Refugee Protection 
within Interest Convergence Groups, Discussion Paper, Refugee Law Research Unit, Centre for 
Refugee Studies, Toronto: York University; J. Hathaway ed. (1997) Reconceiving International 
Refugee Law, London: Martinus Nijhoff; and J. Milner (2000) Sharing the Security Burden: 
Towards the Convergence of Refugee Protection and State Security, Refugee Studies Centre 
Working Paper No. 4.
18 For a philosophical undertaking that is characteristic of this 'dilemma' see, A. Linklater 
(1982) Men and Citizen in the Theory of International Relations, New York: St. Martin's Press. For 
analyses of the man-citizen issue that characterize the question as part of one and the same 
problem see, E. Balibar (1994) 'Man and Citizen: Who's Who?' Journal of Political Philosophy, 
Vol.2, No.2, pp.99-114 ; and (1991) 'Citizen Subject', in E. Cadava, P. Connor and J-L. Nancy 
eds. Who Comes After The Subject?, New York: Routledge, pp.33-57.
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the current order of things which grounds the aspirations of 'humanity' 
through citizenship.19 We may want to pursue the good life elsewhere and 
change our citizenship, but we do not wish to be stateless.
The notion of state as protector and provider is a powerful one. No matter 
how cynical and disenchanted one is with government, the notion that a 
government, whether it is liberal, conservative, or socialist, is responsible in 
some way for the welfare and happiness of its populations has not totally lost 
its purchase. The idea that states are obliged to their 'nationalized' 
populations can be found in the discourses on democracy and human rights. 
The promotion of democracy and the observance of human rights remain 
tasks for governments of states. Finger-pointing exercises in international 
politics are directed to states.
Putting it differently, if human beings are considered equal, their equality is 
recognized only within the bounds of the state in which they belong. We 
make appeals for refugees in the name of common humanity but the grounds 
on which universalizing claims about peace, justice, and equality are 
advanced is not to some global cosmopolis but against a certain state which is 
the 'contractual guardian' of its citizens. As Arendt observes, the idea of a 
cosmopolitan citizen is an oxymoron. Similarly, in 'Citizens of Humanity', 
Malkki (1994) suggests that imaginaries of the national form and the national
19 The literature on ethical issues in the movement of populations is a flourishing enterprise. 
For example see, B. Barry and R. E. Goodin eds. (1992) Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the 
Transnational Migration of People and Money, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf; J. Carens 
(1992) 'Refugees and the Limits of Obligation', Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 21- 
44; (1989) 'Membership and Morality: Admission to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States', 
in W. R. Brubaker ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America, 
Lanham: University Press of America; M. Gibney (1999) 'Liberal Democratic States and 
Responsibilies to Refugees' in American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No.l, pp. 169-181; and 
M. Gibney ed. (1988) Open Borders? Closed Border? The Ethical and Political Issues, Westport: 
Greenwood.
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citizen provide the grid of intelligibility in contem porary discourses of 
'in te rn a tio n a l com m unity ' and  'h u m an ity '. In terna tionalism  and 
cosmopolitanism, then, are not in opposition to the naturalized state-nation- 
citizen order; they are constitutive of the system of sovereign territorial states.
T e r r i t o r y
Territoriality is a historical process, which is never far from the idea of state 
sovereignty. It is significant in that it provides a tangible basis for the 
exercise of sovereign and governmental power. The links between territory 
and sovereignty are reinforced by heterogeneous governmental programs, 
which aim, with varying degrees of success, to utilize and manage a defined 
territory, and to control populations over vast geographical areas. Like 
sovereignty, territory  is not a given bu t comes into being through 
territorializing practices. Writers like Kuehls (1996) and Ferguson (1996) 
suggest that the w ay we understand territory is a result of acts of 
territo ria lization , w hereby heterogeneous elem ents are transform ed, 
regrouped and experienced as a unity. Their w ritings suggest that the 
'mechanics' of making territory impose order and define political and social 
relations. Functioning alongside sovereignty, territory  is deployed to 
problematize inter-state movement in a way that intra-state movement is not. 
The territorial ideal creates subjectivities and demands constant affirmation 
through territorializing and terrorizing practices such as m igration and 
refugee policy. The etymology of 'territory' provides a clue to the significance 
of the territorial state for biopolitics. The obvious derivation of territory 
seems to be the Latin territorium which describes the land surrounding a town 
which is under the jurisdiction of the town (Baldwin, 1992, p.209). But the 
origin of the Latin word is not the obvious terra - earth, but rather terreor - to 
frighten. From this, territorium suggests that it is a place where people are
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frightened off, rather than the conventional meaning of land (Baldwin, 1992, 
p.209-10). In other words, the idea and ideal of territorial sovereignty has a 
regulative effect on the government of populations.
According to Gottman (1972), the significance of territory has two main 
dimensions. At the international level, it is connected with the organization of 
states and the conduct of interstate relations. The territorial state as a political 
organization defines, 'at least for a time, the relationships between the 
community and its inhabitants on one hand, and between the community and 
its neighbours on the other' (Gottman, 1973, p.ix). The meticulously 
demarcated border is a modern innovation and is a strategic device, which 
separates and joins.20 Moreover, when territorial borders are conflated with 
boundaries of nation and culture, notions of difference between states and 
myths of homogeneity within a state are (re)produced. The exclusive 
characterization of territory in international relations raises a series of issues 
concerning the regulation of 'other' 'different' people wishing to enter.
The justification for exclusive territorial rights can be found in Western 
political thought.21 The purpose of international law, according to Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Vattel, and Lauterpracht is the delimitation of the exercise of
20 Previously, peoples had not used the idea of fixed boundaries as effective dividing lines of 
political authority. It is too easy to forget that it took many years before the linear frontier 
(border) was accepted by all the people of Europe as indispensable for the geographic 
demarcation of national sovereignty. Even what was considered as a highly organized state 
such as the France of Louis XIV possessed incomplete records of the exact geographic limits 
of its territory.
21 The common understanding of the territorial exclusivity of states draws on John Locke's 
notion of the right of man to acquire and protect his property for his own use or purpose. 
Utility transforms land into territorial property and property ownership, in turn, is taken as 
an indication of civilization. See, M. J. Shapiro (1997) Violent Cartographies: Mapping the 
Culture of Wars, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. For an insight exploration of the 
relationship between political theory and international theory see, R.B.J. Walker (1993) 
Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
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sovereign power on a territorial basis. The tenets of modem international law, 
therefore, assign to territory an essential role in relations between states. Due 
to the relational aspect of territoriality, questions of territorial sovereignty 
and legitimacy are settled by mutual recognition in international law. Indeed, 
the most basic tenet of modern international law is the concept of recognition 
and a basic rule of interstate relations is the prima facie recognition of 
territorial integrity.22 Recognition, however, does not guarantee non­
intervention. Historical examples of intervention are not difficult to find. But 
it is too easy to be skeptical about the efficacy of international law. In fact, if 
we judge international law in terms of its efficacy, we miss other ways in 
which it is significant. This perception does not consider how international 
law, when functioning as a territorializing norm, becomes an extremely 
useful and malleable instrument for governing interstate conduct, 
populations as groups, and individuals.
The importance of state sovereignty for world order is an argument that has 
dominated discussions on non-intervention in international relations.23 
Consider this comment by Barutciski (1999, p.10) on the recent humanitarian 
intervention in Serbia and Kosovo: 'interventions have implications not just 
for refugees but also for the regional and international orders that ultimately 
determine the security of states and respect for human rights'. For him, the 
state as a sovereign political-territorial ideal provides the conditions for 
coexistence and relative stability in a world of states and for human 
happiness. Much of international law is an affirmation of this belief that
22 See I. Brownlie (1966) Principles of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
23 See H. Bull ed. (1984) Intervention in world politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press; and J. Vincent 
(1974) Nonintervention and International Order. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press.
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sovereign territorial states are foundational for international stability and for 
the pursuit of democratic ideals.
One may agree or disagree with many UNHCR's activities but the underlying 
rationale for its work is less disputed, because like many other institutions 
and practices of the international refugee regime, it is reaffirming the status of 
territorial states as the ultimate provider of human welfare. Its 1997 report on 
the state of the world's refugees draws attention to internal conflicts which 
are threatening human, state, regional and international security. The 
'humanitarian agenda' is to provide the conditions for 'stable' government 
that can ensure 'human security' so that people are not 'forced' to migrate. 
Democratization is seen as a positive path to 'human security'. The report 
also proposes that the international community has a responsibility to ensure 
that all states observe the principle of human rights and move toward some 
form of liberal democracy for the sake of both 'human security and the 
security of states' (UNHCR, 1997, p. 261).
To conceive of the location of community in terms of territorial states is a 
powerful strategy of biopolitics and provides the conditions for the 
problematization of refugees in international relations. Connolly (1991, p. 
464) argues that the current political imagination 'fosters a sense of 
connection between the life of the member and their identification with one 
place' - a territorialized community of fate. I have already noted that political 
theory has naturalized the limits of community within the confines of 
territorial states. Another important way to understand the geopolitical 
character of political life is to examine knowledge that has emerged out of the 
practical problems of managing the territorial state and its population.
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In Critical Geopolitics, Gearoid O' Tuathail performs a genealogical exploration 
of geopolitical thought. The focus of his study is the emergence of a new kind 
of geopolitics around the late nineteenth century when the 'Great Powers' of 
Europe embarked on an unprecedented program of imperial expansionism 
and territorial acquisition. Geopolitical thought, O' Tuathail argues, was part 
of a general wave of fin de siede theorizing on the new century that began in 
the 1880s. For him, modern geopolitical discourse as a particular mode of 
politicizing territorial space has a distinct character.24 It is concerned with the 
'social evolution' of states, the conduct of international relations, and the 
education and vitality of the population. Moreover, like discourses of social 
war in biopolitics, discourses of the state in geopolitics invoked biological 
allusions to describe how population, government, territory, and state are 
connected.
The concept of geopolitics was introduced formally in 1899 by Swedish 
political scientist and journalist Rudolf Kjellen as part of an empirical system 
for understanding the state and its relations to other states. For him, the state 
is a 'living' organism that is integral part of society, national and 
international. In Der Staat als Lebenform25 (1917), Kjellen identifies five 
interrelated aspects of the state. The first is territory (Reich), which represents 
the body of the state. In and through its territory the state becomes 
geographically individualized and a geographical individual. The duty of the 
state to preserve the territory of the realm and its resources is analogous to 
man's obligation to preserve his body and his health (Mattem, 1942, p.74). 
Thus, geopolitics is concerned with the various kinds of boundaries (not just
24 Geopolitik as a specific field of enquiry came out of geography, particularly the political 
geography of the nineteenth century that set out to define the relationship between 
geography and policy, particularly foreign policy.
25 The title translates into English as The State as a Form of Life.
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the physical). It considers the implication of boundaries for the life and safety 
of the state in relation to neighbouring states.
The second aspect of the state is people (Volk). The state has an ethnic 
personality. The idea of ethnopolitik is an integral part of geopolitics. The idea 
of Volk represents past, present, and future generations and posits 
responsibility on the part of the state to regulate the life of the present 
generation so as not to harm the interests of the generations to come 
(Mattern, 1942, p.76). Ethnopolitics studies the relations of Volk, state, and 
nation.
Ethnopolitics deals with the mathematical relation of the realm and people 
eg. the population policy as a power factor in relation to the outside world. It 
is concerned about falling birth rate, the two children system, and birth 
control, as phenomena affecting the quality and vitality of the nation.... 
Ethnopolitics must concern itself with the influence of people upon the 
territory and of territory upon the people as a factor determining their 
respective degrees of growth (Mattern, 1942, p.77).
The state is not just a territory; it is a Lebensraum - a living space or a territory 
for a people.
The third aspect is household (Haushalt). According to Mattern (1942, p.78), 
the particular branch of geopolitical science that deals with the idea of the 
state as household is 'Politics of Economics'. This 'Politics of Economics' goes 
beyond the concerns of public finance and administration of state property, 
and includes such interests as the growth of population and 'materialization' 
of existence. The fourth aspect is society (Gesellschaft). Society is the content 
matter of the state. It views the imperative to maintain order as essential for 
the social and economic welfare and progress of society. The last aspect of the
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state is government (Regierung). The politics of governing refers to the degree 
of success in the coordination of (conflicting) interest groups. Governing is an 
activity to secure legally protected freedom to an unfree society through 
institutions and by way of preventive, prophylactic action, which is 
preferable to other 'harsher' measures.
Other writers on geopolitics, like Haushofer and Ratzel, also used biological 
analogies to describe the intimate connections between state, territory, 
government, and population. RatzeTs geopolitical ideas adopted concepts 
from the natural sciences as was common in the nineteenth century and 
developed a theory of expansionism based on the concept of Lebensraum. 
Halford Mackinder's geographical imagination at the turn of the twentieth 
century had similarly rationales. His campaign to establish geography in the 
school curriculum was part of a larger project to fashion an efficient national 
population.
Mackinder's efforts to promote geographical education fitted into the context 
of late Victorian and Edwardian social concerns about 'population', 'health', 
and 'national efficiency'.26 He called for a detailed measure of male 
demographic health or 'man power' - a term first used by Herbert Spencer - 
in addition to 'sea power' and 'land power'. According to O'Tuathail (1996, 
p.109), Mackinder's geopolitics was an incitement to an imperial biopolitics, 
to the surveillance, administration, and proper health of the working classes, 
so the nation's man power would be fit to fight for the empire. Even critics of 
geopolitik, like Strausz-Hupe who argued against the nexus between
26 For an exposition of new views of the meaning of space which emerged in the years before 
World War One, and of the ways space came to be considered not a mere void but a positive 
constitutive factor in politics and culture, see S. Kern (1983) The Culture of Time and Space. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
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population pressure and national expansion in German geopolitical thought, 
did not discount the connection between population and the desire for a 
'demographic living space' . 27
Western geopolitical knowledge has been highly influential in shaping the 
relationship between territory and population in international relations. With 
the transfer and normalization of Western practices of international relations, 
the geopolitical imagination is much more prevalent than Realism in the 
discipline of international relations. Geopolitics is a discursive practice for the 
administration of territory and population. It interweaves with other forms of 
knowledge to value and devalue sets of relations -  between citizen and 
citizen and between citizen and foreigner.
T h e  A r t  o f  G o v e r n m e n t
So far, I have drawn attention to the biopolitical and geopolitical aspects of 
the refugee problem in international relations. I have suggested that the 
partition of the world's population into territorial sovereign states have 
implications to how we think about human relations inside and outside the 
state. The state-citizen bond is a regulatory tool that governs the population 
within a state and problematizes inter-state population movement. With the 
normalization of an international order of states-citizens, refugees are 
represented as an exception, an irregularity.
27 Like many critics of geopolitical thought, Robert Strausz-Hupe did not discount the 
relevance of 'geography' in international affairs. For him, there were certain 'strategic 
passage lands between Europe and Asia' which were becoming increasing important because 
these areas had the potential to 'make' history (1942, p.180).
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In this final section, I want to examine how representation and intervention -  
the twin activities of government - are possible. I have already hinted at the 
heterogeneous assemblages of techniques, programs, agencies, and modes of 
thought that are constitutive of government. In this thesis, I will refer to this 
complex assemblage of governmental practices as 'regime7. The international 
refugee regime, therefore, is a composite of inter-state and non-state 
institutions operating on various levels, national government departments, 
refugee policies, emergency aid assistance, development programs, 
handbooks and code of conduct manuals, experts, research institutions, 
academic publications, conferences, speeches, briefing notes, information kits, 
evaluations, camps and transit centres, safe havens, international laws, travel 
documents, and so forth. My task is to examine the 'work' of the regime in 
the constitution of refugees and their government. The aim is to 
anthropologize the norms, practices, and truth effects of the regime. Such an 
approach takes regime practices as cultural practices, which govern refugees 
through the (re)production of particular cultural values and norms. The 
thesis is interested in the cultural specificity and universalizing aspects of 
regime.
The meaning of refugees in the twentieth century is not a straightforward 
story about the creation of legal definitions. 'Refugee' is not an objective 
phenomenon or a single issue. It is a manifestation of an assemblage of 
knowledge and practices, which sets the parameters of possible and desirable 
responses to the 'refugee problem'. Indeed, the international refugee regime 
is one of the many international governmental regimes aimed at population 
management. It is a practical system within a wider assemblage of practical 
systems concerned with regulating inter-state movement (Owen, 1998, p. 10). 
The regime inscribes the nature, character, and causes of refugee movement 
and orders relations. In doing so, it is a reflection of a particular international
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political imagination. The regime contains notions of the good and how to 
realize it.
Although this thesis is not a direct engagement with the conventions of the 
discipline of international relations, it is relevant at this point to briefly 
discuss how 'regimes' have been conceptualized in the discipline. While 
theorization on international regimes is the domain of the US-dominated 
discipline of international relations28, the 'English School' of international 
relations has focused on the idea of international society.29 Both schools of 
thought are concerned with the possibility of cooperation in international 
relations. Regimes are the implicit or explicit set of 'principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge 
in a given area of international relations' (Krasner, 1982, p.186). The idea of 
international society also stresses the significance of establishing the codes of 
conduct among the various actors in international relations.
For some, the international regimes are seen as the new location of political 
community because they transcend the territorial imperatives of statist 
community and question the assumption that states are unitary actors in 
international relations (Samhat, 1997). Regimes constitute transnational
28 For a comprehensive overview of regime theory see, A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. 
Rittberger (1997) Theories of international regimes, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
29 Hedley Bull is often seen as the key figure in the intellectual development of the idea of 
international society -  although Dunne (1998) includes E.H. Carr and Martin Wight in his 
history of the concept. See H. Bull (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics, London: Macmillan; and T. Dunne (1998) Inventing International Society, London: 
Macmillan. The upsurge in normative international theorization has 'revived' the study of 
international society in the past 10 years. See M. Griffiths (1992) 'Order and international 
society: the real realism?' Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp.217-240; R. Jackson, 
'The political theory of international society', in K. Booth and S. Smith eds. International 
Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity; and N. Wheeler (1996) 'Guardian Angel or Global 
Gangster: a Review of the Ethical Claims of International Society', Political Studies, Vol. XLIV, 
pp. 123-135.
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networks that challenge the 'hard shell' of the state and influence the 
international agenda beyond confines of state interest. This argument is often 
followed by claims for the emancipatory political potential of regimes and 
emergent global civil society.
For others, regimes are sites of domination and contest disguised under 
presuppositions of benevolence, legitimacy, and consensus. Susan Strange 
(1982) argues that a benign view of regimes obscures the unequal economic 
and power relationships in international politics where the weak are forced to 
act according to the dictates of the powerful. Her 'forced consumption' 
argument rejects any significant role for principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures in international relations. James Keeley (1990, 
p.84) insists that regimes go beyond agenda setting to include disputes over 
the 'correct' naming and evaluation of things, over standards of judgement, 
and over objectives and mechanisms. But for him, the core issue is that 
regimes are not liberal enough; there are crevices of non-democratic 
tendencies.
Much discussion on the international refugee regime has followed similar 
lines. Skran (1995) celebrates the invention of the regime as a triumph of 
internationalism. Others like de Waal (1997) and Chimni (1998) criticize the 
contemporary refugee regime as being a 'humanitarian mode of power' and 
'corrupted by geopolitics'. But reformists like Loescher (1993), Suhrke (1998), 
and Hathaway (1997) for example, constitute the largest group. Given that 
refugee movements are often constructed as 'state of emergency' events that 
demand both quick responses and later, long term programs of action, the 
prevalence of the problem-solving approach is not surprising.
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Cultural (re)production
There is, however, a different way to examine the refugee regime. In an 
attempt to read policy through an anthropological lens, Shore and Wright 
deploy the writings of Malinowski and Mauss to suggest that policy 
functions in at least three distinct ways: as a rhetorical narrative that either 
justifies or condemns the present; as a charter for action; and as discursive 
formations that empower some people and silence others (1997, p. 7). They go 
on to claim that policies not only codify norms and values, they also explicitly 
contain models of society (1997, p.7). This approach is also useful for 
analyzing the self-evident qualities of the refugee regime. Regime describes 
'what is' and prescribes 'what should be'. It is an expression of the history 
and culture of those that generate them. It establishes and orders 
relationships and interactions with far-reaching implications. This 
proposition requires a consideration of the historical and cultural specificities 
of the international refugee regime. Cultural signifiers are important, not only 
because they repress and coerce but because they are affirmative, positive 
and productive (Said, 1991, p.171). Cultural (re)production, then, is an 
important purpose of the refugee regime, because it is through such activities 
that the normal and universal are possible in refugee discourse.
The very category 'refugee' can be interpreted as a cultural and historical 
artefact. The politics of categorizing and labeling is part of the activity of 
governing refugees and restoring international order. Roger Zetter (1985, 
1991) is a scholar in refugee studies who recognizes the utility of labeling as a 
process of subjectification in the refugee regime. Although definitions and 
categories appear self-evident at first, labeling and definitional boundaries 
are tactics that seek to standardize and differentiate individuals. They impact 
on the formulation of refugee policy and the allocation of assistance.
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Moreover, a definition is only possible through its linkages within a field of 
meanings, a field which the refugee regime (re)produces through its various 
programs, activities and institution.
The international refugee regime is a set of knowledge, practices and rituals, 
and belief about the relationship between sovereign territorial states and 
populations of citizens. It is a set of regulatory technologies that 
problematizes and institutionalizes refugee issues, brings them onto the 
international agenda, legitimates and normalizes conduct, procedures, 
practices and norms, and socializes and civilizes those who are participants. 
It also legitimates certain kinds of political interactions and solutions, and 
effects a sense of shared interests and common modes of perception through 
and in political discourses, persuasions, and negotiations.
In its diagnostic and prescriptive functions, the refugee regime produces 
norms and principles, which are potent regulatory devices for international 
order. The regime creates a set of shared symbols and references, mutual 
expectations and visions of the international political order. The normalizing 
effect of the values and normative principles shapes possibilities of choice 
and action and influences subjectivity or agency. The appeal to a common 
good deepens the meaningfulness of a specific vision of order. The concern is 
with order as both prescription and aspiration. In other words, the 
international refugee regime seeks to achieve international order through a 
process of ordering, which defines relationships between actors based on 
certain values and norms and principles. The questions one needs to ask are 
who defines the international order and its norms, principles and values? 
What are the embedded cultural symbols or meanings? And what do they 
reveal about the 'inner worlds' of the government of refugees in international 
relations? Knowing, naming and defining a normative order is not an act of
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making transparent what is merely there, given, a content that is passively 
registered by others. Instead, to know and to make claims on behalf of truth 
and knowledge is a political activity, an exercise of power.
Our habits of thought about the political are occupied by concepts like 
citizenship, human rights, democracy, civil society, and freedom, all of which 
bear the burden of European or Western history (Chakrabarty, 2000, p.4). 
While ethical debate within the refugee regime has its origins in the various 
philosophical traditions -  virtue ethics, rights-based ethics, natural law, 
utilitarianism, and political realism - the tendency to focus on their 
differences has obscured their similarities and common historical 
foundations. We cannot ignore the fact that the modem history of thought on 
refugees began with reflections on problems in Europe, the initial architects 
of the refugee regime were Europeans, and the practices were designed for 
Europeans. The exclusion and then later the incorporation of non-Europeans 
into the refugee regime is a shift which is more complex than an articulation 
of universal ideals. Deeply embedded in liberal internationalism is a sense of 
political, economic, and cultural superiority to 'othered' regions and people. 
To anthropologize the international refugee regime, then, is to demystify the 
rituals of power and the relationships of power that are constitutive of the 
politics of refugees.
Hurrrell (1993, p.50) recognizes the specificity of regimes when he argues that 
the development of regime is an outcome of Western thought about 
international relations. For Bull and Watson (1984), the organizing principles 
and norms of international relations are the accomplishments of the 
expansion of the European society of states to the rest of the world. The 
writings of Bozeman (1960), Holsti (1998), Gong (1984), Mazuri (1990), and 
Mignolo (2000) have also drawn attention to Western Ethnocentrism and
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parochialism in the academic discipline of international relations and in 
general, to representations of international relations. Therefore, as an 
arrangement for prescribing action, international regimes is far from 
universal, if we understand 'universal7 to mean a respectful acknowledgment 
and acceptance of diverse beliefs and understandings of the human 
condition. In this sense, the international refugee regime can be understood 
as practices that regulate the relationship between the West and the non- 
West.
But the regime is a governmental program that cannot be interpreted as 
simply oppression. To reduce the invocation of norms and principles to 
ideology and the development of rules and procedures to manipulation is 
misleading. Such a view neglects the productive effects of the regime. That is, 
regime practices also create agency and provide the space for the practice of a 
'responsible7 liberty. They encourage agency and active participation. For 
example, UNHCR literature speaks of enterprising refugees and partnership 
in action with civil society. The tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, 
management, incitement, motivation, and encouragement are all part of the 
administration of conduct. 'Failed7 ideas and policies do not become extinct 
but are shelved for future reference, subjected to reinterpretation and 
reformulation, deployed for other purposes, instrumentalized in other ways. 
Many critics of regime pay insufficient attention to these ordering and world­
making effects of regime practices. The regime produces and circulates 
particular views of the world and the appropriate ways of acting in it. It, 
therefore, also has pedagogical and transformative values.
Perceptions of a brutish anarchical international environment are deployed to 
induce the establishment of some framework for cooperation and negotiation. 
Refugee movements characterized as disorderly and anomalous symbolize
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the specter of anarchy. The refugee regime attempts to facilitate and order 
responses to govern refugees and restore a sense of manageability and 
predictability in international life. Indeed, the 'early warning' strategy of the 
regime is perceived as essential to the reduction of uncertainty and risk. The 
production of knowledge and the circulation of information are crucial in this 
project to predict and govern refugee movement.
The pursuit of order requires a systematic acquisition and circulation of 
information and an enterprise of knowledge that renders a domain thinkable 
and translatable into policy. To have a refugee regime requires an investment 
in intellectual machinery 30 that conceptualizes processes and devises theories 
that define and characterizes the issue. The government of refugees requires 
particular analyses that can project the probability of events occurring, link 
apparently discrete processes into a chain of events, establish causal-effect 
relationship, and predict possible consequences.
The production and circulation of knowledge, then, is indispensable in the 
activities of government and cultural (re)production. Knowledge is not just 
ideas, but ideas directed towards a certain goal. It is theoretical and technical. 
Expert knowledge explains social and political processes, identifies desirable 
goals, and allows the creation and application of practices. Expertise 
produces regimes of truth about the nature and the characteristics of 
refugees. It articulates the cause-and-effect relationships of complex 
problems, frames the issues for debate, and proposes specific policies or 
solutions. In other words, knowledge is central to the activities of governing
30 This concept was coined by Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller. N. Rose and P. Miller (1992) 
'Political power beyond the State: problematics of government', British Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 43, No.2, pp. 182.
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and to the formation of its object, for government is a domain of cognition, 
calculation, experimentation, and evaluation (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 175). 
As Rose and Miller argue, expertise as a resource that others cannot easily 
appropriate has come to play a crucial role in establishing the possibility and 
legitimacy of government.
The experts within the international refugee regime have inter subjective 
understandings, shared discursive practices, and a shared commitment to the 
application and production of knowledge. The dissemination of information 
forges alliances and bringing into being a sense of shared interest. The 
debates between experts, however, are not necessarily signs of instability. 
Disagreements over methodology and theory, policy enterprise, interests and 
goals, and even normative beliefs contribute to problematization and 
institutionalization of refugees.
C o n c l u d i n g  R e m a r k s
This chapter has argued that the refugee problem in international relation is a 
manifestation of biopolitical and geopolitical strategies of power. The fusion 
of biopolitics and geopolitics is the politicization of territory and the 
territorialization of population. Citizenship and states are part of the 
dispersed and heterogeneous tactics of the government of populations. Thus, 
the division and government of the world's population into states and the 
primacy of the state-citizen relationship in the repertoire of human 
experiences are two crucial conditions of possibility for refugees to emerge as 
an international issue.
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The governm ent of refugees, then, is connected to the maintenance and 
reproduction of the international order of nationalized states where the 
population within is governed through the institution of citizenship. The 
government of international relations stresses the importance of securing 
order among the society of states so as to allow states to carry out the task of 
providing the conditions of justice and human security for their citizens. The 
refugee question in international relations arises because the unregulated 
movement of these people disrupts and threatens the organizational structure 
of the system of states, which is seen both as a prerequisite for international 
order and the core of international order itself.
The normalizing effects and the relations of power evident in biopolitics and 
geopolitics are rearticulated in the international refugee regime. The 
invention of a regim e consisting of a range of program s, practices, 
institutions, agencies and so forth was central to the task of representation 
and intervention. Moreover, I have drawn attention to the functioning of the 
regime in (re)production of specific cultural values. The international refugee 
regime, I suggest, should be reconsidered as a set of cultural practices that 
prescribes and naturalizes particular image of political order and hum an 
relations.
The next chapter substantiates the abstract claims of this chapter and 
exam ines the historical circum stances that called for in ternational 
interventions in territorial and population issues in Europe. It proposes that 
the development of an international protection regime for certain groups of 
people w as an experim ent in the governm ent of population  and 
displacement. The regime is interpreted as a response to the consequences of 
remapping Europe based on the principle of national self-determination (and 
nationalist ideals) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
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'triumph' of the national state over other forms of political arrangements has 
unwittingly raised a number of dilemmas for the new Europe.
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n a t io n a l  m in o r i t ie s  a n d  E u ro p e a n  o r d e r
The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of 'self- 
determination', the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such 
ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of 
impossible demands on the Peace Congress, and create trouble in many 
lands.
Robert Lansing, 
The Peace Negotiations
Chapter Two set out my theoretical approach to governing refugees in 
international relations. The refugee question, I suggest, is intimately linked 
with the ordering of the world and its populations into sovereign territorial 
states. National citizenship is the part of this governmental arrangement. The 
functioning of these practices manages populations inside and outside the 
state and problematizes the movement of population across states. As such, 
the geopolitical and biopolitical strategies of power give rise to the condition 
of possibility for the refugee question in international relations.
THE MINORITY QUESTION
Yet, refugees have symbolic values beyond the structural order of the states 
system. The characterization of refugees as anomalous (re)produces and 
maintains certain conceptions of the world and social relations. In other 
words, the representation of disorder is crucial for the maintenance of order. 
The disorder of refugee represents not only a threat to the international 
order of states and a sign of the failure of a state to provide for its citizens, 
but also a rupture in the modern imagination of belonging, community, and 
identity. If disorder and order are two sides of the same coin, which is my 
contention, then, the disorder of refugee is a solution to the ordering 
practices of identity formation and community building. The symbolic 
meanings given to refugees secure what would be otherwise the 
indeterminacy of identity and community.
Questions of inclusion and exclusion, then, are at the core of the refugee issue. 
The question of who is included and excluded from the category of 'refugee' 
and the benefits of international protection is just as important as inclusion 
and exclusion from the nation-state community. The assemblage of practices 
of the refugee regime has been crucial to defining the terms of inclusion and 
exclusion. The regime maps out social relations through its practices of 
representation and intervention. The rest of the thesis constitutes the 
historical and empirical support for these propositions.
This chapter marks the beginning of a historical journey through the politics 
of displacement. It examines the development of population displacement as 
a political concern and the invention of 'international protection' in Europe at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. International protection involved 
some kind of intervention, and it had two distinct aspects. One aspect was 
the minorities protection regime and the other was the refugee regime. The
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former governed newly created states and their treatment of their national 
minorities. The aim was to constrain population movement. The latter 
governed the movement of displaced population, including minorities across 
state boundaries. The aims were to regulate population movement and to 
manage these people after they crossed state boundaries. The League of 
Nations was in charge of both regimes and therefore collaborative programs 
were common.
While the following chapter examines the ameliorative practices of 
international protection, this chapter focuses on the preventive practices of 
the minorities protection regime. The objective is to demonstrate the 
importance of minorities protection in the overall project of governing 
populations and inter-state relations. If we are to grasp the impact of the 
refugee discourse on ordering of relations within and across states, we need 
to take a wide view of the practices that govern population displacement.
The minorities protection regime played a role in the reconstruction of 
Europe politically and demographically. The political outcomes of applying 
the principle of national self-determination did not satisfy the ambitions of all 
parties. The architects of the new Europe were cognisant of the likely 
problems ahead if no safeguards were implemented. The minorities 
protection regime was an experiment in the international management of 
state-minority relationships in newly created states of Europe. It aimed to 
counter the thwarted ambitions of groups who had been denied a national 
state of their own and to deal with those who now found themselves 
categorized as national minorities. It also attempted to manage the 
extremism of national self-determination and policies of national 
homogenization that could lead to internal unrest, international conflict, and 
population displacement.
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This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores the historical 
conditions that led to the end of empires and the rise of national state form as 
the political unit of Europe after World War One. The second section discusses 
the Peace Treaties of 1919, which remapped territorial boundaries based on 
the principle of national self-determination and created a new European 
order. The architects of the Peace Treaties and the League of Nations were 
institutionalizing a new perception of international order and international 
conduct. The geopolitical engineering, however, did not resolve the all the 
questions of nationhood in Europe. The final part examines efforts to address 
the consequences of creating national states. The minorities protection regime 
was such an attempt by European powers to affirm the principle of national 
self-determination and to resolve the effects of this principle on governing 
populations and states. The regime was applicable only to newly created 
states.
The relationship between the minorities protection system and the refugee 
regime has been scantly acknowledged in scholarship on the emergence of 
the international refugee regime. In Beyond Charity: International Cooperation 
and the Global Refugee Crisis (1993), Gil Loescher devotes a few paragraphs to 
the relationship between minorities, nation-state formation and refugees in 
Europe after World War One. He makes no mention of the minorities 
protection regime as an indication of international cooperation that sought to 
govern population displacement. Similarly, Claudena Skran's (1995) history 
of the refugee regime in Europe makes no mention of the minorities 
protection system. For Skran (1995, p.31), the origins of the refugee 
movements in Europe may have begun with the transformation of central 
and eastern Europe from polyethnic empires to nation-states. But the 
mechanisms that sought to address possibilities of population displacement 
caused by the creation of new states were of little consequence. This omission
76
THE MINORITY QUESTION
ignores the complex relationship between, on the one hand, the 
nationalization of states and the construction of national minorities and, on 
the other, the development of the refugee regime and the characterization of 
refugees as an international issue.
The links between refugees and minorities were numerous. Both refugees 
and national minorities were the effects of the institutionalization of a system 
of national states. The inscription of nationality was the basis for definitions of 
refugee and minority status. Refugees and minorities were legal categories of 
person defined vis-a-vis states against which they could or could not claim 
rights. Moreover, the number of refugees who were members of national 
minorities in the inter-war period suggests that the tension between national 
state and national minorities was a major cause of population displacement. 
In this sense, to make a distinction between the protection of minorities and 
the protection of refugees is to be inattentive to the porosity of the national 
and international and the multi-dimensional task of governing refugees and 
population displacement.
Under the name of international protection, both the minorities protection 
regime and the refugee regime were remedies for the imperfections of the 
territorial states system and for the unintended consequences of imposing a 
set of principles of conduct and normative order. The former provided 
'internal' protection -  mechanisms directed at constitutional arrangements 
and other domestic political guarantees. The latter provided 'external' 
protection -  instruments that offered minimal rights to those who no longer 
enjoyed the protection of their state. The refugee regime also calls for 
minimal obligations from countries that found themselves host to the citizens 
of other states. The minorities protection regime was largely a preventive
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measure. The refugee regime was a palliative program that initially dealt with 
displaced populations from Russia but continued in a somewhat ad hoc 
fashion as political events unfolded after World War One. The regimes were 
to contribute to the wider project of establishing and maintaining 
international order by dealing with vulnerable groups whose condition 
signalled possible destabilizing situations.1
The apparent obscurity, until recently, of the minority protection regime is a 
consequence of the authority bestowed on human rights discourse in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Since the end of the Cold War, however, 
national or ethnic minorities are once again objects of investigation. The 
problems of minorities and their cultural and political rights are national and 
international issues. Ethnic conflicts within states are seen as a primary cause 
of refugee movement in the late twentieth century. As 'ethnic minorities' 
represent populations who are mostly likely to become refugees, the 
international refugee regime, and human rights instruments are now 
perceived to be inadequate regulatory machineries. Hence, the 'resurgence' 
of minorities has prompted the creation of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities in 
Europe. I shall return to these issues in Chapter Six and Seven of the thesis. 
The point is that the current international concern over minority rights is not 
novel. As we shall see, the international protection of ethnic or national 
minorities within states is part of the government of refugees and the 
normalization of a specific representation of international order.
1The preventive/palliative interface of international protection continues today in the 
form of the close alliance between the human rights regime and the international refugee 
regime.
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T h e  E n d  o f  E m p i r e s
In the 1850s, domestic political changes and geopolitical shifts were 
transforming the political map of Europe.2 The Crimean War precipitated 
changes in an international system previously based on the balance of power 
among the Great Powers. A unified Germany and Italy and a number of 
smaller independent states (Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Romania, and later 
Bulgaria) were created. By 1871, all the European powers, with the exception 
of Britain, had undergone territorial changes. As membership to the 
European club of states increased, so did the claims of populations to be 
"nations'. The political problem was which of the numerous populations 
classifiable as a 'nationality' would acquire a state, and which existing states 
would be imbued with the character of 'nation'. The conception of states as 
states of particular nations was a significant innovation for reimagining and 
reorganizing territory, political community and populations.
The allocation of nation-statehood, however, was discriminatory and highly 
political. Western political theory on nationality and statehood was influenced 
by ideas of progress. The evolutionary and developmental models of society 
and the social world were seen as applicable to defining the necessary 
qualities of the nation.3 Western intellectuals offered arguments about which
2 I cannot do justice to the history of Europe in the nineteenth century in this work. 
Moreover, the primary sources and the number of books available cn European diplomatic 
and military history are vast. For a general guide to the literature see, A. Bullock and 
A.J.P. Taylor, eds. (1957) A Select List of books on European History. 1815-1914, 2nd ed. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
3 For critical reflections on the seduction of science, reason and progress in western European 
imagination, see M. Adas (1989) Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and 
Ideologies of Western Domination, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; P. J. Bowler (1989) The 
Invention of Progress: The Victorians and the Past, Oxford: Blackwell; A. G. Kieman (1969) 
The Lords of Humankind, Boston: Little Brown; and H. White (1973) Metahistory: the  
historical imagination in nineteenth century Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
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populations were endowed with 'nationness'. The development of nation­
states was considered to a phase in the human evolution that moved from 
family to tribe, to region, to nation and finally to a unified world 
(Hobsbawm, 1990, p.38). National self-determination was applicable to only 
those nations that were economically and culturally viable and developed in 
accordance with some sort of evolutionary schema. Eastern Europe provided 
Western Europe with its first model of underdevelopment (Woolf, 1994, p.9). 
The general belief was that small 'nations' and especially 'backward and 
inferior' groups would gain from integration and assimilation with large 
nation-states. This view was held by many mid-nineteenth century 
intellectuals, including John Stuart Mill and Engels. Consider the following 
passages by each:
Experience proves it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed 
in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion 
of the human race the absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can 
suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French 
Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly 
civilised and cultivated people -  to be a member of the French nationality, ... 
than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in 
his own mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general 
movement of the world (J.S. Mill, 1861, in Acton, 1972, p. 395).
There is no country in Europe, which does not contain in some comer one or 
several ruins of peoples, left-overs of earlier inhabitants, pushed back by and 
made subject to the nation which later became the carrier of historical 
development. These remains of nations which have been mercilessly trampled 
down by the passage of history, ..., this ethnic trash always becomes and 
remains until its complete extermination or denationalization, the most 
fanatic carrier of counterrevolution, since its entire existence is nothing more 
than a protest against a great historical revolution. (Engels, 1849, in 
Blackstock and Hoselitz, 1953, p. 63).
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Evidently, great nations were the carriers of historical development, progress 
and civilization.4 Heterogeneity was acceptable because according to the law 
of progress, some nationalities had no future, while the 'advanced' and 
'developed' nations were destined to prevail. Eventually 'smaller' nations 
would merge with greater nations. Despite the prevalence of such ways of 
thinking, the populations in 'polyethnic' empires invoked the 'nation' - for 
their political causes.
The 'national question' and 'Eastern Question' began to converge in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The 'Eastern Question' 5 was about the 
fate of the Ottoman Empire that had been in decline since the seventeenth 
century.6 The teachings of Islam demanded that the rulers could neither
4 This view provided a justification for colonizing other peoples overseas. See, T. Todorov 
(1993) On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism and Exoticism in French Thought, 
Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. An interesting shift was that racial 
categorization moved from a distinction made by the aristocracy against the masses to 
become a mode of creating and reproducing the power relations between the colonisers and 
the colonised.
5 For writings cn the 'Eastern Question' see, M. S. Anderson (1966) The Eastern Question, 
1774-1923: a study in international relations, London: Macmillan; W. M. Gewehr (1931) The  
rise of nationalism in the Balkans, 1800-1930, New York: Holt; T. E. Holland (1979) The  
European concert in the Eastern question: a collection of treaties and other public acts, 
Aalen: Scientia; E. Ingram ed. (1993), Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century: 
collected essays, 2 vols, London: Frank Cass; B. Jelavich (1991) Russia’s Balkan  
Entanglements, 1806-1914, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press; M. Kent 
ed. (1984), The Great Powers and the end of the Ottoman Empire, London : Allen & Unwin; 
J.A. R. Marriott (1947) The Eastern Question: an historical study in European diplomacy, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press; R. W. Seton-Watson (1917) The rise of nationality in the Balkans, 
London, Constable; A. Sorel (1898) The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century: the  
partition of Poland and the Treaty of Kainardji, translated by F.C. Bramwell, London: 
Methuen; and M. D. Stojanovic (1939) The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6 'The Eastern Question' was not a singular and stable issue. Like the idea of 'Eastern 
Europe', it was an ambiguous phenomenon linked to the question of whether it was a part of 
Europe. In the minds of the western Europeans, 'Eastern Europe' was conceptualised as that  
liminal space between civilisation and barbarism. See L. Wolff (1994) Inventing Eastern 
Europe. The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. Similarly, Maria Todorova deconstructs the cultural practices that  
produced the Balkans. See M. Todorova (1998) Imagining the Balkans, New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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compel unbelievers to conform to the Muslim faith nor direct their lives 
(Pearson, 1983, p.23). The millet system organised the 'polyethnic' population 
into religious communities with their own laws.7 As long as tributes were 
paid, the millet had relative autonomy. This system of government began to 
falter when in the bid for political independence, the communities 
transformed themselves into nations.
The Habsburg Empire, France, Britain and Russia all had substantial if not 
vital interests in the region. The strategic and economic importance of the 
region defined the relationships between the Powers and the Balkans. Russia 
already had a 'right' to interfere in internal Ottoman affairs with the Treaty of 
Kutchuk Kainardji of 1774. In the name of Pan-slavism, Russia encouraged 
the nationalist ambitions of the Balkan peoples under Ottoman rule.8 
Similarly, economic and geopolitical interests motivated Russia to appoint 
itself as the protector of the Eastern Orthodox community - the Serbs, Greeks 
and Romanians. Throughout the nineteenth century the Balkans became the 
scene of Great Power competition. Such was the climate of rivalry that the 
previous alliance between Russia and the Habsburgs to contain the Ottomans 
turned into competition. Furthermore, Russia's aspiration to control the 
Straits came up against Britain. The competing ambitions of Britain and Russia 
covered a large geographical area. The Crimean War was one consequence.9
7 For an account of the political and social structures in the Ottoman Empire and their 
transformation see P. F. Sugars (1977) Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804, 
Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.
8 An impressive text in English on the subject of Russia's involvement in the Balkans is B. 
Jelavich (1991) Russia’s Balkan entanglements, 1806-1914, Cambridge & New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
9 For the history of the Crimean war see H. W. V. Temperley (1936) England and the Near  
East: the Crimea: 1879-1939, London: Longmans Green; B. D. Gooch (1959) The new 
Bonapartist Generals in the Crimean War: Distrust and Decision-making in the Anglo- 
French Alliance, The Plague: M.Nijhoff; J. S. Curtiss (1979) Russia’s Crimean War,  
Durham, NC: Duke University Press; E. M. Aveling and E. Aveling eds. (1897) K. Marx: The  
Eastern question: a reprint of letters written 1853-1856 dealing with the events of the  
Crimean War, London: Swan Sonnenschein.
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The 'Great Game' over Central Asia was another struggle between Russia 
and Britain. 10 For Western Europe, Russia was at best a suspicious ally and at 
worst an outright threat. It was in the interest of Western Europe and 
particularly Britain to prevent a collapse of the Habsburg and Ottoman 
Empires; they were buffers against Russia.* 11
The 'national question' and 'Eastern Question', therefore, were entangled 
with the competition amongst the 'Great Powers' -  Britain, France, Austria, 
Russia and Prussia. Imperialist competition and expansion had lead to the 
territorial division, among the few powerful states, of the world into formal 
and informal colonies and 'spheres of influence' . 12 Since the Congress of 
Vienna, they had avoided outright conflict between themselves and 
mechanisms like the Concert of Europe were put in place to maintain the 
international system. Various understandings of the 'Eastern Question' had 
been in circulation since in the seventeenth century, and in the nineteenth 
century the form had changed again. This time, the question included the 
populations within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
As mentioned before, the Habsburg Empire had to deal with claims for 
autonomy from groups within its jurisdiction. Its divide and rule strategy had 
strengthened 'national' elites among the Magyars, Germans, Italians,
10 P. Hopkirk (1990) The Great Game: the Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
11 The British also needed the Ottoman Empire as a buffer to secure the region around the 
Suez canal.
12 The legacy of colonial empire building and imperial mentality continues to affect 
national and international politics. The dominance of the world's minority over the 
majority transformed the images, ideas and aspirations (by force and institutions) of both 
the colonizer and the colonized. See F. Cooper and A. L. Stoler, (1997) Tensions of Empire: 
colonial culture in a bourgeois world, Berkeley: University of California Press; J. Fontana 
(1995) The Distorted Past: a reinterpretation of Europe, Oxford: Blackwell; and 
V.G.Kieman (1995) Imperialism and its contradictions, London and New York: Routledge.
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Romanians, Poles, Czech, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians, and 
encouraged internal rivalry. But as the capacity of the Empire waned, it 
became dependent on other Great Powers for its security and preservation. 
Since the disappearance of a major power would destablize the balance of 
power system, the continued existence of the Hapsburg Empire was 
considered a necessity to prevent a power vacuum in east central Europe.13 
Although it received support from the Great Powers, shifting alliances and 
competing interests among them did not ameliorate the sense of 
vulnerability. The Habsburg's decision to declare war against Serbia in an 
attempt to restore prestige only precipitated its collapse.
In the Balkans, rival claims of nationhood and territory amongst populations 
introduced a new element into the politics of the region. New Balkan states 
played to both local ambitions and Great Power competition. At the same 
time, the Great Powers defended and promoted their interests and adjusted 
their alliances and rivalries without causing open conflict among themselves. 
The outcome was that Balkan states became pawns or clients of the Great 
Powers but they also used the rivalries among powerful states for their own 
(Albrecht-Carrie, 1959, p.42).14 Bulgaria was granted independence largely 
because it suited the Great Powers. But when Bulgaria became independent 
(joining Greece and Serbia), Western European states anticipated the 
'balkanization' of the region.15 Successful nationalist movements had already
13 For histories of this period see, R. A. Kann (1950) The Multinational Empire: nationalism  
and national reform in the Habsburg monarchy, 1848-1918, 2 vols, New York: Columbia 
University Press, and A. Sked (1989) The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815- 
1918, London: Longman.
14 There are a number of books cn the Balkans that focus on conflict between the Great 
Powers. See M.A. Anderson (1966) The Eastern Question, 1774-1923, New York: St. Martin's 
Press; B. Jelavich (1973) The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 
1870-1887, Bloomington: Indiana University Press; and M. D. Stojanovic (1939) The Great 
Powers and the Balkans, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15 See W.W. Haddad and W. Ochsenwald (1977) Nationalism in a Non-National State: 
the Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Columbus: Ohio University Press.
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resulted in a massive loss of territory for the Ottoman Empire. These events 
uprooted a million Muslims who migrated to the Anatolian area, and 
radically changed the ethnic balance of the region (Keyder, 1997, p.35). Even 
if the Balkan peoples had been able to agree among themselves, they could 
not have arranged their affairs alone. The consent of the Great Powers to any 
changes was vital for maintaining the balance of power. This set of 
circumstances further complicated an already difficult situation. Indeed, the 
rivalry between the Great Powers, the national aspirations of certain groups 
and the anticipated disintegration of empires were played out in the Balkan 
wars.
After the 1870s, populations within established nation-states began to 
mobilise as nations and in the process transformed the definition and 
program of nationalism.16 But Hobsbawm (1990, p.42) argues that the ethnic- 
linguistic definitions of nations that we take for granted today was an 
invention of the later nineteenth century. The debate on whether the 
Macedonian language was more like Bulgarian than Serbo-Croat had to do 
with definitions of nationhood in the late nineteenth century. The 
transformation of group self identification to take on the nation form was a 
political act, representing an aspiration to gain autonomy vis-a-vis the state 
within which it was located. Yet, nationalist projects were not always 
demands for total independence, territorial sovereignty and national 
(cultural) homogeneity. Elobsbawm (1997a, p.144) suggests that for most of 
the nineteenth century, the majority of demands for autonomy had not 
envisaged full state independence status. The assumption that 'national self-
16 The history of nationalism, nation formation, and the national form in Europe is beyond 
the scope of the chapter. For a general introduction see, J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith ed. 
(1994) Nationalism, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. For a critical analysis 
of the practices of producing the historical nation in Europe see E. Balibar (1991) 'The 
Nation Form: History and Ideology', in E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein Race, Nation, Class: 
Ambiguous Identity, London: Verso, pp. 86-105.
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determination' could not be satisfied by any expression other than 
independent statehood was a manifestation of the early twentieth century 
and primarily due to the League of Nation's interpretation of the concept 
during the Versailles Peace Conference.
P e a c e m a k i n g
When Woodrow Wilson called upon the belligerents to give an indication of 
their war aims near the end of World War One, Germany and the Central 
Powers declined but the Allies replied. Their statement of purpose was the 
principle of nationality, which was intended to be an implicit verbal attack on 
Germany. The war became partly a war of national liberation -  a war fought 
in the name of freedom, equality and justice. As Albrecht-Carrie (1959, p. 352) 
pointed out, the general appeal to such abstractions as justice and peace 
elicited a very powerful response at the popular level. For the Allies the war 
increasingly took on a crusading element. Slogans like 'to make the world 
safe for democracy' and 'the war to end all wars' were common expressions 
of the day. At the end of the war, the Allies proclaimed a moral victory for 
democracy and its institutions. Democratic ideals were perceived to be 
pathways to international peace and security. This 'democratic peace' project 
was at the core of Wilson's Fourteen Point manifesto.
In the Fourteen Points program for Europe, Wilson outlined the formula that 
the future of peace and stability in the region depended on establishing an 
international rule of law that would manage inter-state relations much more 
effectively than the Concert of Europe and the Balance of Power. The creation 
of an international organization was an essential step towards the 'good
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governance' of international relations. The League of Nations was such an 
organization. The new era of international relations, as symbolised by the 
establishment of the League of Nations, was based on transparency, 
cooperation and democratic practices.17 The belief was that in the 
international public arena, states could be made accountable for actions which 
were disruptive to 'international peace and security' -  a potent abstraction of 
the twentieth century.
The League was designed to temper suspicion and overt rivalry, and 
eliminate the need for secret alliances between states.18 Article X of the 
League Covenant established the rule of engagement in inter-state relations, 
which was to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial 
status and political independence of all member states. In return, states were 
obliged to create conditions that promoted internal stability, thus diminishing 
the risk of domestic disturbance which could lead to international unrest. The 
Covenant also circumscribed the possibility of unilateral intervention and 
emphasized collective or multilateral action that required the consent of the 
League Council. Prior to 1914, European states used war as a legitimate 
means of national advancement. In fact, the idea of war for national 
advancement was not officially declared against international law until after 
1945. Nevertheless, the League attempted to limit the right of a state to make 
war by the providing formal procedures and institutions of arbitration, 
conciliation and judicial settlement. This provision for collective security was a 
powerful discourse during the immediate post World War Two period. The
17 The League was an experiment in governmentalization of international life. It dealt with 
a myriad of issues including work and labour, transportation and communications, drug 
trafficking, protection of women and children, slavery and forced labour and health.
18 See, J. Stone (1932) International Guarantees of Minority Rights: Procedure of the Council 
of the League of Nations in Theory and Practice, London: Oxford University Press.
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notion of collective security, which remains an useful idiom of international 
relations in the late twentieth century, was an attractive solution to the 
previous system of alliances and coalitions, which was viewed by many as 
one of the causes of World War One. The new European order was to be 
based on collective security.
Yet, it would be incorrect to suggest that the Wilsonian spirit of democracy 
was compatible with the hierarchical ordering of international relations. In a 
revealing historical study of Japan's failed attempt to insert the principle of 
racial equality into the Versaille Treaty, Naoko Shimazu (1998) claims that the 
Great Powers rejected the proposal for two reasons. First, Wilson regarded 
the establishment of the League of Nations as having higher priority. 
Moreover, the proposal was considered 'as a principle unsuitable to be part of 
the Covenant of the League' (Shimazu, 1998, p.3). Second, such a clause 
threatened the major powers because the purpose of the clause was to assert 
that the Japanese state was equal with the Great Power, that Japan was equal 
with the West. The proposal for racial equality was not considered as a 
demand for universal racial equality by any of the protagonists.
Japan's racial equality proposal was an attempt to change the international 
order by challenging the 'club' of Western Great Powers. Responses to the 
proposal reflected the character of international society in 1919, which 
distinguished the principle of sovereignty from the principle of equality in 
international relations. At stake, were not a universal principle of racial 
equality but the condition of integration of non-Western states into the 
international society of states. During the Peace Conference, 'universal' was a 
term defined by the Great Powers, for the purpose of regulating relations 
primarily among the Great Powers.
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Eligibility for League membership, therefore, depended on many things -  
including conformity to the 'standards of civilisation' as exemplified by 
liberal-democratic states.19 This attitude was reflected in a correspondence 
written in 1918 from the United States' Secretary of State, Robert Lansing to 
Colonel House:
[Tlhe only certain guarantee of international peace is a League of 
Democracies since they alone possess the trustworthy character which makes 
their word inviolate.... A League, composed of both democratic and 
autocratic governments and pledged to maintain peace by force, would be 
unreliable;.... [The] proper course, the one which really counts in the end, is 
to exert all our efforts towards the establishment of the democratic principle 
in every country of sufficient power to be a menace to world peace in the 
event it should be in the hands of ambitious rulers instead of the people 
(Lansing, quoted in Robinson, 1943, p.279).20
Then, there were the peacemakers who set themselves the task of creating a 
new order in Europe. Harold Nicolson recalled his sense of calling as a young 
member of the British delegation in 1919:
We were journeying to Paris, not merely to liquidate the war, but to found a 
new order in Europe. We were preparing not Peace only, but Eternal Peace. 
There was about us the halo of some divine mission. We must be alert, stem, 
righteous, and ascetic. For we were bent on doing great, permanent, and noble 
things (Nicolson, 1945, p.31-2).
19 For a history of the deployment of 'civilization' as a regulatory device in inter-state 
relations see, G. Gong (1984) The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
20 The perceived link between democracy and peace is a prevalent one in the history of 
international relations. This disposition can be found in contemporary theories of 
'democratic-peace' and discourses of intervention. For example, J. MacMillan argues that  
relations between liberal states are peaceful and liberal states have demonstrated 
pacificistic orientations in relations with non-liberal states. A liberal-democratic domestic 
polity leads to pacific foreign policy. To support the argument, the author examines the 
historical efforts to establish and develop a liberal international order and the 
constraining power of these ideas an states. See, J. MacMillan (1998) On Liberal Peace: 
Democracy, War and the International Order, London and New York: Tauris.
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The calling of 'civilized' member states to take responsibility for socializing 
other states and maintaining world peace is a feature liberal internationalism. 
The relative success of the civilizing projects is not the point. Rather, the 
hierarchy of duty among sovereign states is interesting. Like the Balance of 
Power and Concert of Europe, liberal internationalism identifies some states 
as key participants and guardians of order. The assignment of guardianship, 
in effect, maps the grid of political interaction in international relations. As we 
will see, the 'sacred trust of civilization' was also integral to the work of the 
League of Nations.
The 'peacemakers' believed that national rivalries and frustrated national 
aspirations were also responsible for the tension that led to the war. The 
Wilsonian program counselled that peace and stability in the region required 
a redefinition of the boundaries of political communities based on the 
principle of nationality. To resolve the national question in eastern and central 
Europe, a massive reorganization of territory and population into states of 
ostensibly national character was seen as the best way to deal with the 
problem. The creation of new states based on the principle of national self- 
determination was a political innovation. Indeed, the coalescence of the idea 
of self-determination and the principle of nationality in this formulation of 
national self-determination departed from previous understandings of these 
concepts. The implication was a novel political environment that brought on a 
set of tension for governments and policy-makers in the immediate post war 
period.
After World War One, the old polyethnic empires in central and eastern 
Europe were reorganized into nation-states. The dissolution of the Habsburg 
Empire affected an estimated 40 million people. The new states were Austria,
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Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. 
Germany forfeited territory to France, Denmark, Belgium and Italy. Bulgaria 
lost territory to Greece. Serbia's sovereign territory almost tripled.21 Romania 
doubled its territory.
The Committee on New States charged with responsibility to fix the state 
boundaries of east and central Europe quickly discovered that to apply the 
criterion of national self-determination as the legitimate claim to statehood, 
for all members would result in the denial of self-determination for some. 
Certain nationalities such as Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenes, and Croats did 
not gain independent national statehood and instead became part of the new 
'multiethnic' states (Preece, 1997, p.82). Most of the newly created states had 
large populations that were conceptualized as 'national minorities'. William 
O'Sullivan Molony (1934, p.64) pointed out that the territorial changes 
redistributed about five million German nationals to Poland and 
Czechoslovakia where they became national minorities under the protection 
of the League of Nations.
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the 'Near East' drew a slightly 
different response from the Allies. The territorial disputes were not primarily 
between the victors and the defeated but between members of the victorious 
coalition (Anderson, 1966, p.351). The post war settlement in Arab parts of 
the empire and the Turkish areas of eastern Thrace, Constantinople and the 
Straits and Anatolia was slow because it was of secondary importance in 
international affairs. For the Allies, the immediate task was the division of the 
Habsburg Empire and the redrawing of the Balkan frontiers. The eventual
21 The name Yugoslavia was not in official use until 1929. Before then, the state was known 
as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
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settlement did not apply the principle of national self-determination for 
claims of statehood. For example, Turkey was partitioned and a new Turkish 
state was formed.22 A mandate system was put in place to administer as 
protectorates certain nations which were 'not yet able to stand by themselves 
under the strenuous conditions of the modern world' (Webster, 1933, 
p.281).23 There was to be no Armenian independence or Kurdish autonomy. 
In due time, the arrested development of national states in the region became 
a source of political unrest. Furthermore, the divergent approaches adopted 
by the Allies in the post war settlement had important implications for 
responses to population displacement.
T h e  P r o t e c t i o n  o f  M i n o r i t i e s
According to Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez (1999) and Jennifer Jackson Preece (1997), 
the history of the legal protection of minorities in Europe began with the 
reorganization of political communities into sovereign territorial states under 
the Treaty of Westphalia. Subsequent shifts in political arrangement, namely, 
territorial changes, precipitated some political and legal responses to groups 
recognised as 'minorities'. As the state slowly gained acceptance as the 
political form in Europe, the protection of minorities began to incorporate 
nationals as well as religious groups. The first explicit recognition and 
international guarantee of the rights of national minorities could be located in 
the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, in which Austria, Prussia, and Russia 
pledged to respect the nationality of their Polish subjects.
22 See H.N. Howard (1931) The Partition of Turkey: a Diplomatic History, 1913-1923, 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
23 For the politics of nationalism in the geographical region of Turkey and the Middle East 
see, G. Antonius (1938) The Arab Awakening, London: H. Hamilton, and A. Hourani (1983) 
Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
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It would be misleading, however, to claim that the protection of nationalities 
overshadowed religious toleration. During the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the 
question of the treatment of religious minorities was still an important issue 
(Macartney, 1934, p.166). The turning point was the transfer or redistribution 
of territory, under the principle of national self-determination, which resulted 
in the reorganisation of almost one hundred million people from the post­
imperial order of central and eastern Europe into nation-states. Although 
religious association continued to serve as an identification of nationality - this 
was the case of the population exchange of Greek and Turkish populations in 
1923 - the invocation of the nationality principle in the territorial settlements 
of the Versailles Treaties marked a significant shift in the idiom of political 
discourse.24
Wilson's liberal-democratic agenda did not grasp that an exclusivist 
interpretation of states and of the principle of nationality would create 
domestic and international political problems that would highlight the 
inherent contradictions of its agenda. The paradox of nation-state making 
was that in creating the nation, it also created other nations - national 
minorities or ethnic minorities. Balibar (1991, p.96) talks about the 'national 
process of ethnicization' whereby fictive ethnicities are produced and 
reproduced, majorities and minorities are formed and governed in the
24 For the purpose of this chapter, the significance of the principle of national self- 
determination is the ways in which it is employed to address or resolve the difficult 
political problems of the time and the consequences of its deployment in the construction of 
meaning in politics. I am not interested in the search for definitions, or the political and 
moral grounds for self-determination. For political and philosophical debates on 
nationality and national self-determination, and related issues see, C. Beitz (1983) 
'Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiments', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 80, No. 10, pp. 
591-600; W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal theory of Minority Rights, 
Oxford: Clarendon; D. Miller (1995) On Nationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press; A. Margalit 
and J. Raz (1990) National Self-Determination', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 9, pp. 
439-61; D. Philpott (1995) 'In defence of self-determination', Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 2 , pp. 
352-85; Y. Tamir (1993) Liberal Nationalism, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press; W. 
Twining ed. (1990) Issues of Self-Determination, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
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formation of the m odern nation-state. In a less philosophical manner, Claude 
Inis (1955, p.2) claims that a national minority exists when a population within 
a state claims to constitute a nation, or a part of a nation that is distinct from 
the national body to which the majority of the population of the state 
belongs, or when the majority population of a state feels that a section of the 
population does not share or does not possess the national character it 
represents. In other words, the national minority (numbers are not indicative 
of minority status) is an effect of a nationalizing state; a state has one nation 
and many ethnic groups.
The architects of the peace treaties hoped that the political reorganisation of 
Europe into territorial sovereign states along national lines would be an 
effective strategy to govern both territory and population. But the 
implementation of the principle of national self-determination as the 
legitimate basis for statehood subsequently endorsed the homogenization of 
pluralistic community into the national state. Lord Acton saw the issue 
arising from this formula of state-making.
By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, 
it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be 
within the boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling 
nation which constitute the State, because the State would cease to be 
national, which would be a contradiction of its principle of existence. 
According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilisation in that 
dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior 
races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a 
condition of dependence (Acton, quoted in Macartney, 1934, p.17).
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A state forged on the ideal of a culturally homogeneous people -  the people, 
was simultaneously liberating and oppressive.25 The need to address the 
oppressive tendencies of the national state formation was acute when the 
much championed right of peoples to self-determination was not equally 
applied to all groups. Thornberry (1994, p.13-4) summarized the tension 
between nation-states and national minorities as one of mutual construction.
[S]elf-determination and minority rights are locked in a relationship which is 
part of the architecture of the nation State, since whenever a State is forged, 
the result is the creation of minorities. This applies in the twentieth century as 
it did in the nineteenth; indeed the many contemporary exercises in nation 
building have produced many new minorities.... While secession from 
Western Empires has resulted in the creation of States, these same States 
deny the possibility of further secession by disaffected groups, which are 
required to accept the dogma of territorial integrity of States.
Thus, in the post 1919 order of things, those people denied 'external' self- 
determination in the nation-state projects after World War One became 
national minorities.
The identification of national minorities, then, was part of the process of 
normalizing and homogenizing the national state form, which 
simultaneously problematized certain groups of populations. National 
minorities were constructed as disruptive to the nation-building project and 
vulnerable to its excesses. They were national and international concerns. On 
the domestic level, they raised problems of constitutionalism, political 
cohesion, rights and obligation. On the international level, they raised issues 
of international order and intervention. For example, in the Treaty of Berlin,
25 The paradoxical character of self-determination and so-called 'democratic' nation­
building is discussed in M. Mann (1999) 'The Dark Side of Democracy: the modem tradition 
of ethnic and political cleansing', New Left Review, No.235, pp.18-45.
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the failure of some states to fulfil their obligations to minorities were 
justifications for interference by Great Powers into domestic affairs of these 
states (Inis, 1955 p.8).
How nationalizing states treated their national minorities was an important 
international concern. National minorities could be dealt with in a number of 
ways including assimilation, segregation and expulsion. Overt 
assimiliationalist policies of homogenization, however, could lead to internal 
disorder, which could threaten international peace if a 'patron' state of the 
rebellious minority came to their assistance (Macartney, 1934, p. 275). 
Likewise, practices of denationalization and expulsion created refugee 
movements and statelessness, which effected inter-state relations. 
Segregation, often involving forms of discrimination, could also cause the 
segmented population to rebel.
The general perception was that the consequences of these policies would be 
disruptive to the states system and its function of controlling and managing 
populations within a defined territory. International instruments focussed on 
minorities were attempts to manage some of the possible consequences in 
the name of 'protection' (Thornberry, 1994, p.l). The aim was to ensure a 
certain standard of conduct by new states towards the national minorities 
within their jurisdiction and define the relations between national minorities 
and the nation-state. The rationale was simple. The architects of peace also 
saw that dispute between disgruntled national minorities and majorities 
within new states had the potential to escalate into domestic and international 
violence (Preece, 1997, p. 82). Moreover, ill treatment could undermine state 
unity and create a situation whereby people fled across borders. In a bid to 
ensure international order and to consolidate new states, the League
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developed a system of international protection for national minorities. The 
national minorities treaties addressed the pragmatic need to maintain the 
new European geopolitical configuration and to render segments of the 
population governable through mechanisms of compensation.
The minorities protection system for the 'new' Europe served to protect 
national minorities and international order in two ways. First, all the new 
states as well as some established states whose boundaries were changed had 
to sign minority treaties or make unilateral guarantees regarding minority 
rights. The Allies concluded minorities treaties in 1919 with Poland, Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania and in 1920 with 
Hungary, Greece and Turkey. Minorities treaties were preconditions for 
admission to the League by Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Iraq. The 
League acted as guarantor for bilateral conventions on the treatment of 
minorities between Poland and Germany in 1921, Sweden and Finland in 
1921, and Lithuania and Germany in 1924.
There were four kinds of legal documents that provided protection for 
minorities: post-war peace treaties with minority protection clauses, 
subsequent parallel treaties designed for new states with national minorities, 
treaties with specific territories and population concerns, and unilateral 
declarations undertaken by certain states (Albania, Estonia, Iraq, Latvia and 
Lithuania) to respect the rights of minorities within their sovereign territory 
(Vieytez, 1999, p.31-32). The conditions in the treaties contained three basic 
elements: right to nationality, equality before the law, and positive and 
negative equality. The most striking feature of the treaties and declarations 
concerned cultural matters. Minorities were permitted education in their own 
languages and the state was expected to offer financial assistance to maintain
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the cultural integrity of its minorities. The content of these provisions was 
quite remarkable. The 'peacemakers' experimented with practices of 
pluralism when such programs had yet to be implemented in Western 
democracies.
The second feature of the minorities system was that it ordered and 
guaranteed the rights of national minorities by internationalizing protection, 
which was seen as more effective and less destabilizing than unilateral action. 
In line with the vision of collective security, multilateral guarantees of 
minority rights were preferable to bilateral agreements and unilateral action. 
The Allied states were anxious to avoid further instability and conflict caused 
by intervention in the European region. Yet, the problem was how to be seen 
to be upholding the integrity of the new states while at the same time 
influencing them in a way that contributed to the maintenance of 
international order. An international system of minorities treaties was a 
solution. A treaty containing provisions for minorities and providing the 
grounds for intervention, in effect, neutralized the opposition between 
intervention and sovereignty. The system also allowed a degree of 
monitoring and control over the constitutional and institutional development 
of these states.26 But the hope was that, by securing internationally the rights 
of minorities, occasions for direct intervention in individual states would 
diminish.
The duty of the League was to act as guarantor and observer of the execution 
and compliance with treaty obligations. But it could only act when one of its
26 The imposition of Treaties obligations on certain states and not others (western Europe 
and Italy) was an infringement on the principle of the equality of all states and state 
sovereignty which lies at the basis of international law. But the Powers put forward 
numerous arguments as to why they should be exempted from such obligations.
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members made a formal submission to draw attention to a treaty violation 
by an obligatory state.27 This operational constraint became one of the many 
criticisms directed at the League's apparent failure to deal with the treatment 
of national minorities.28
From the outset, the international protection of national minorities 
represented a cornerstone to the maintenance of peace and order in post 1919 
Europe. All other concerns, including the welfare of minorities, were related 
to this core objective. The minority protection system dealt with the practical 
problems of the management of inter-state relations and the relationship 
between a state and its populations. On June 9th, 1928, a report to the Council 
outlined the aims of the Treaties:
We are unanimous in considering that the system of the protection of 
minorities instituted by the Treaties, while having as its principal object the 
protection of the minority itself, is also intended, not only to prevent that 
questions concerning the protection of minorities should acquire the character 
of a dispute between nations, but to ensure that States with a minority within 
their borders should be protected from the danger of interference by other 
Powers in their internal affairs (LNOJ, 1928, p.942).
The protection of minorities was, therefore, a governmental program that 
aligned 'humanitarianism' with geopolitical objectives. It was a preventive 
measure against population displacement, a palliative step to ameliorate the 
contradictions of a new order of states, and a mechanism to ensure stability 
of this system of states. The treaties were products of political calculation
27 For an account of the submission procedures see, League of Nations (1929) Official Journal: 
Special Supplement, Documents Relating to the Protection of Minorities by the League of 
Nation', No.73, Geneva, pp.42-64.
28 For a detail analysis of the exercise of the League guarantee see, C.A. Macartney (1934) 
National States and National Minorities, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 297-356; 
and I. L. Claude (1955) National Minorities: an international problem, Cambridge, MA.: 
Flarvard University Press.
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aimed at mitigating domestic and international conflict. The strategy to 
institutionalize international protection was an act of prudence.
The Peace Treaties and the Minorities Treaties, however, created a 
paradoxical situation. The former laid down a territorial settlement based on 
the principle of national self-determination, while the latter functioned to 
temper assertions of national self-determination by attempting to secure the 
rights of minorities within existing states. It was crucial that minorities did not 
become states within the state. The drafters of the protection system feared 
that the idea of 'cultural autonomy' would be translated into 'cultural 
community' that would rival the authority of the state and encourage dreams 
of political autonomy. To further the national self-determination claims of all 
ethnic groups would lead to further territorial revision and/or new state 
formations, which would undermine the new European order. Hence, 
minorities treaties were drafted in such a way as to prevent their use as a 
basis for separatist movements or political agitation against governments. 
They were intended to maintain the coherence of the new states by 
guaranteeing rights to preserve and practice their culture and language and 
thus defusing the ambitions of self-determination by minorities.
Despite these fears and cautionary measures, there was an implicit belief that 
minorities would eventually become loyal citizens of the new states. The 
minorities treaties continued the nineteenth century belief that smaller 
nations would be absorbed into larger or greater nations. The protection 
regime represented the transitional phase in nation-state formation and 
prepared the conditions for national unity. Integration and assimilation were 
just a matter of time. Minutes of the Council Meetings document provide this 
purpose of the Treaties: 'The object of the Minorities Treaties ... was to secure
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for the minorities the measure of protection and justice which would 
gradually prepare them to be merged in the national community to which 
they belonged (LNOJ, 1926, p.144). Similarly, Austen Chamberlain insisted 
'the purpose of the Treaties was to make conditions in the minority countries 
such that the minorities could be and were loyal members of the nations to 
which they belonged' (LNOJ, 1929, p.525). Until that time came, the protection 
regime also served to remedy potential transitional difficulties.
The minority protection system was limited to the newly created states with 
'mixed populations'. There were protests by Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia 
about its discriminatory application. They argued that the treaties violated the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and the principle of sovereign 
equality. Throughout the debate, any suggestion to expand the protection of 
minorities to the whole of Europe was vehemently opposed by the Western 
powers (Fawcett, 1996, p. 21). Given that Western states had already rejected 
Japan's proposal for a racial equality clause in the League Covenant, their 
negative response to a generalized system of international minorities 
protection was hardly surprising. In fact, the major powers justified the 
selective employment of minority treaties in terms of established norms and 
diplomatic precedent (Macartney, 1934, p.238).
The 1919 Peace Treaties and the Minorities Treaties also contained principles 
governing the acquisition of nationality and specific conditions for retention 
and renunciation of nationality. In short, the functioning of these instruments 
normalized the idea that every person should be a national citizen of one 
state.29 Paradoxically, the peace treaties and the subsequent minorities
29 Some of the Minorities Treaties contained a right of nationality clause that included a 
right of certain groups to choose their nationality within the specified time limit.
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treaties created problems of nationality and statelessness. Denationalisation 
and statelessness were particularly difficult issues. In a nation-state-citizen 
order, the problem of denationalisation and statelessness was identifying the 
state or agent responsible for these populations. Furthermore, the search for 
the causes of statelessness in the light of the operation of the Treaties was 
immensely difficult. The confusion was a consequence of intricate nationality 
provisions in inter-state conventions, state laws and decrees as well as the 
provisions of the national minorities treaties themselves.
C o n c l u d i n g  R e m a r k s
The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical documentation to 
substantiate the argument that the problematization of certain populations as 
governmental subjects is intimately connected with the order of territorial 
states and the regulatory institution of national citizenship. This chapter has 
demonstrated that responses to the political upheavals of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries altered not only the international order but also changed 
perceptions about the significance of population and the movement of people 
across national states. It has also argued that the institutionalization of specific 
rights belonging to minorities must be understood against the historical 
background of nation-state building and the character of the nation-state as a 
political and cultural community.
The formation of new states and the territorial redistribution among existing 
states that followed the dissolution of empires at the end of World War One 
modified the demographic compositions of states. The minorities protection 
regime, applicable only to the new states, was part of a wider governmental
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project that sought to maintain stability and order in Europe. The regime 
aimed to preserve order by granting rights to Vulnerable' people, preventing 
separatist activities, deterring internal repression of certain groups by states, 
and mitigating unilateral state intervention.
But as constant crises appeared to destablize the region, the government of 
population and the pursuit of order in post 1919 Europe were not easy tasks. 
The minority protection system did not have the mandate to act upon crises 
brought on by the treatment meted out to certain groups in Asia Minor or 
the Middle East. This group of displaced populations became the subject of a 
distinct protection regime. At the same time, there was a need to govern the 
mass population displacement caused by the Russian revolution.
The invention of the refugee regime initially responded these predicament. 
But as population displacement became increasingly complex, the division of 
labour between the two regimes often blurred. For example, the population 
exchanges and transfer carried out following the Treaties of Lausanne and 
Neuilly came under the administrative ambit of both the minority protection 
system and the refugee regime. The palliative function of the refugee regime 
was an adjunct to the preventive function of the minorities protection system. 
However, with the inability of the latter regime to regulate the conduct of 
states towards their populations, thus causing some of their populations to 
flee, it became necessary to expand the governmental operations of the 
former regime. As the next chapter will show, the refugee regime was 
responding to conditions that disrupted the vision of order in Europe.
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P opulation 
D isplacement 19191951
History has created a new kind of human beings -  the kind that are put in 
concentration camps by their foes and internment camps by their friends.
H annah Arendt,
We Refugees
The development of the minorities protection system in Europe after World 
War One, I argued, was that the functioning of the minorities protection 
regime (re)produced and normalized the representation of (dis)order in post 
1919 Europe. A consequence of state-making and nation-building in post 1919 
Europe was the production and institutionalization of national minorities as 
distinct groups of people within the political community. Within the national 
state arrangement, the characterization of these people was as disruptive 
elements to internal and international relations. The 'problem of national 
minorities' prompted the creation of strategies and practices that could 
govern the conduct of minorities and states. The regime was to manage the 
political and demographic changes brought on by the reorganization of the
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region, based on the principles of national self-determination and sovereign 
statehood. Its core aim was to limit the potential destabilizing effects of these 
people to internal cohesion and international order.
At the same time, the mass movement of people from Russia became a 
concern for the new national states and the architects of European order. 
Instruments for controlling refugees were created in this historical context. 
Under the auspices of the League of Nations, the refugee regime worked 
alongside the national minorities protection system to manage population 
movement and to maintain the European nation-state-citizen order. While the 
national minorities protection system functioned to domesticate and 
nationalize the population within the state, the function of the refugee regime 
was to govern the entry and presence of non-nationals or aliens within the 
state's territorial jurisdiction.
This chapter examines the institutionalization of population displacement in 
Europe as a political issue between 1919 and 1951 - when state frontiers in 
and around Europe were redefined significantly twice - after World War One 
and World War Two. According to Barutciski (1998, p.244), initial refugee 
instruments were invented primarily to address the 'mass outflow within the 
already-existing immigration control measures' rather than as a commitment 
to protecting people. This chapter considers the regulatory mechanisms 
aimed at governing populations from the former Ottoman Empire, Turkey, 
Russia, and Western and Eastern European states. The first section explores 
the definition of the term 'refugee' from 1919 to 1951. The categories of 
displacement and international legal instruments are the focus. The second 
part examines the practices of the international refugee agencies. Their 
activities, I suggest, reveal much about the meaning of refugees. The Final 
section looks at governmental arrangements like repatriation, resettlement,
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population exchanges or transfers, and travel documents. These programs 
also contribute the producing truths about the refugee problem.
The chapter contains two propositions. Firstly, the refugee regime is not the 
manifestation of a profound and comprehensive plan, but a series of ad hoc 
responses to unanticipated and successive population displacements in 
Europe. Secondly, categorization and characterization of population 
displacement are techniques of ordering that reflect power relations and 
political calculations. International protection is a political act. The term 
'refugee' is not a neutral marker.
T h e  T e r m  ‘R e f u g e e ’ - 1919  t o  1945
Prior to 1921, the needs of the displaced were mainly met by of voluntary 
agencies and non-government organizations like the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Holborn, 1975, p.4). Relief, largely in the form of 
m aterial assistance, w as tem porary . In tegration , repatria tion , and 
resettlem ent w ere not institu tionalized  solutions. There w ere few 
international legal arrangem ents that addressed the plight of these people 
and the bilateral negotiations that existed lacked the institutional mechanisms 
to make them effective.
Russian nationals were the first group of people to receive international 
assistance from governments in Europe. The League of Nations took tentative 
step towards a more coordinated relief effort after an appeal by Gustave 
Ador, President of the ICRC in 1921. Ador pointed out that close to two 
million Russians were scattered across Europe, without status and protection
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(Kulischer, 1948, p.54).1 The figure given by various European countries in 
August 1921 to the League of Nations was lower -  around one and a half 
million (Kulischer, 1948, p.54). According to Hope Simpson's calculations, 
there were 863 000 Russian refugees in 1922 (1938, p.78-80).2 Opinions 
differed sharply about the implications of further involvement in matters 
concerning population displacement. In postwar Europe, some states felt 
there were more urgent matters than humanitarian assistance. France and 
Britain, however, had a stake in advocating a 'burden-sharing' approach. 
Likewise, the new states in Eastern Europe were eager to adopt measures to 
control the presence of Russians in their territories.
When the League took up the issue of refugees, only the Russians were of 
concern. Thus, it did not bother to define term 'refugee'. As requests for 
assistance widened, the League accepted responsibilities for other groups of 
displaced persons and labeled them as refugees. Between 1922 and 1946, 
international agreements adopted a group category approach to the 
definition of refugees. The instruments that determined the status of refugees 
were based on national origins and not a general definition of the concept or 
an abstract notion of individual persecution. The idea of a universal 
definition of a refugee was proposed by the Institute for International Law in 
1936, but failed to receive support. Goran Melander (1988, p.7) noted that
1 After 1922 very few refugees came from the Soviet Union because the authorities prohibited 
emigration. Meanwhile, mass deportations took place within the country. Populations from 
the mountains, steppes, peninsula, and Volga (the southwestern border region of the Soviet 
Union) were transferred to eastern and central Siberia. The groups deported included 
Chechens, Ingushi, Karachai, Balkars, Ossetians, Kirgiz, Crimean Tartars, Cossacks, 
Meskhetians, and mountain tribes of Daghestan. See R. Conquest, (1990) The Great Terror: A 
Reassessment, New York: Oxford University Press, and (1960) The Soviet Deportation of 
Nationalities, London: Macmillan.
2 The controversy over numbers was overshadowed by the problem of managing this 
dispersed group of people, which included former prisoners of war who were unwilling to 
return, civilians who had fled the Bolshevik revolution, members of various defeated armies 
who opposed the revolution, and later, people whose Russian citizenship were revoked by 
the two decrees of October and December 1921.
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1936, but failed to receive support. Goran Melander (1988, p.7) noted that 
between the two world wars, international instruments on refugees contained 
ad hoc definitions of the term. International agreements on refugee status 
changed according to political circumstances.
In the beginning, the League of Nations only gave attention to those refugees 
from regions that were considered most volatile and disruptive to the new 
European order. The refugees protected by legal instruments were the 
Russian refugees and refugees from the defunct Ottoman Empire. A Russian 
refugee was 'any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or no longer 
enjoy the protection of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet 
Republics and who has not acquired another nationality'.3 Presence outside 
the country of origin was not an explicit requirement (Goodwin-Gill, 1996, 
p.4). An Armenian refugee was 'any person of Armenian origins formerly a 
subject of the Ottoman Empire who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys 
the protection of the Government of the Turkish Republic and who has not 
acquired another nationality'.4 Armenians found themselves in precarious 
circumstances after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Their bid for 
statehood had failed, and they became minorities in the new and fervently 
nationalistic Turkish state. The Arrangement of 30 June 1928 concerning the 
Extension to Other Categories of Refugees of Certain Measures taken in Favour of 
Russian and Armenian Refugees extended assistance to those people defined as 
'Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean and assimilated refugee' and 'any person of 
Turkish origin previously a subject of the Ottoman empire'.5 The 1933
3 For a full definition of the Russian refugee see, 1926 Arrangement, paragraph (2) 89 L N T S  
47.
4 For a full definition of the Armenian refugee see, 1926 Arrangement, paragraph (2) 89 L N T S
47.
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Refugee Convention applied to Russian, Armenian, Turkish, Assyrian, and 
Assyro-Chaldean refugees, but provided states with an opportunity to 
modify their interpretation and application of the concepts of 'Russian 
refugee' and 'Armenian refugee'.5 6 The League of Nations expanded its 
protection activities for refugees from Nazi Germany in 1936 with the 
Provisional Arrangement of 1936 concerning the Status of Refugees coming from 
Germany and the 1938 Convention for refugees from the Saar and Germany.
Due to the international economic crisis, the refugees of the thirties faced 
tight immigration restrictions. This was a time when many European 
countries were asked to accept Jewish refugees.7 With high unemployment 
and inflation, the welfare resources of many states were stretched to their 
limits. States were increasingly reluctant to accord special treatment to 
refugees, because they would further drain resources and compete with their 
citizens for employment opportunities. To counter the obligations under the 
refugee regime, many European states did not distinguish between refugees 
and other categories of aliens in their national legislation. Expulsion and 
forcible return were also common practices (Holborn, 1975, p.15).
Before the 1930s, the League and the bodies in charge of the management of 
refugees did not have a clear policy on expulsion or non-refoulement. Indeed, 
the concept of non-refoulement did not exist in international law. The general 
stance was that Russian refugees should not be forcibly repatriated. The
5 For a full definition of categories of refugees see, Paragraph (2) of the Arrangement of 30 June 
1928 concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugees of Certain Measures taken in Favour 
of Russian and Armenian Refugees, 89 LNTS 47.
6 See, Convention of 1933 Relating to the Status of Refugees, 199 LNTS 159.
7 For a background to Britain's reluctance to become a party to the 1933 Refugee Convention 
and its role in the Jewish immigration to Palestine, which was under its mandatory control 
see, R. Beck (2000) 'Britain and the 1933 Refugee Convention: National or State Sovereignty?', 
International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol.ll, No.4, pp. 597-624.
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instruments of 1933, 1936, 1938, and 1939 introduced a vague idea that 
receiving states had an obligation not to forcibly return refugees under 
certain circumstances. For example, the 1933 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees attempted to restrict the practice of expulsion and to ensure that 
refugees had access to the courts, education, employment, and welfare in 
countries in which they found themselves. Most countries were reluctant to 
expand their obligations to refugees, and did not accede to these conditions 
(Stenberg, 1989, p.45). These states were also opposed to the originally 
proposed rule of non-refoulement, which allowed no exceptions.8 
Subsequently, the idea of non-refoulement in the ratified version of the 1933 
Convention did not preclude the removal of a refugee where she had not 
succeeded in obtaining admission into another state.9
When the 1938 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from 
Germany replaced the 1933 provisional agreement, the national group criteria 
for determining status was qualified by an exclusion clause.10 Persons who 
left 'for reasons of purely personal convenience' were excluded from refugee 
status. Reasons for flight had to be political and not personal, forced and not 
voluntary.* 11 The changes had significant consequences for the process of 
determining refugee status. To question the underlying reason for a person's 
flight meant that it became necessary to determine refugee status on an 
individual basis (Melander, 1988, p. 7). Moreover, the introduction of an 
exclusion clause based on 'motive' brought an element of 'individual'
8 The principle of non-refoulment in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, however, contained 
grounds for expulsion based on concepts of national security and public order.
9 Czechoslovakia and Italy were adamant that the provisions of Article 3 did not affect 
expulsions by order of the courts, or obligations deriving from extradition treaties.
10 See, 1938 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany: 191 LNTS 4461.
11 The change was intended to be a criticism of the government of the Reich, which was 
expelling groups of people from its territories.
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psychology into the refugee question. Authenticity became a legal domain of 
investigation.
When the League of Nations defined refugees according to group (national) 
affiliation, large numbers of displaced persons received assistance. Whether 
they were displaced by famine, civil war, or interstate conflict was not an 
important concern. Being physically outside one's country of origin or 
country of habitual residence was not a categorical criterion. Rather, the basis 
of refugeehood was the absence of the protection of the state in which she 
was a national. This characterization of refugees changed by the late 1930s. In 
the opening page of his extremely influential study on refugees, Sir John 
Hope Simpson (1938, p.l) asserted that the 'essential quality' of the refugee 
was that she was a person 'who has sought refuge in a territory other than 
that in which he was formerly resident as a result of political events which 
rendered his continued residence in his former territory impossible or 
intolerable'. Informed by the political circumstances of the time, the 
characteristic of alienage became a way to define the limits of obligations and 
assistance.
Refugee protection was reviewed at the Bermuda Conference in April 1943. It 
was decided that 'all persons, wherever they may be, who, as a result of 
events in Europe, have had to leave, or may have to leave, their countries of 
residence because of the danger to their lives or liberties on account of their 
race, religious or political beliefs' would be granted protection' (Goodwin- 
Gill, 1996, p.5). What appeared to be a progressive step in refugee protection 
was actually a rather shrewd response to the problem of Jewish refugees. The 
Allies were reluctant to lift their restrictive immigration policies but had to 
appear to be doing something. They expanded the protection mandate but 
did not supply the machinery or assistance necessary to fulfill it. According to
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Marrus (1985, p.284), 'the [Bermuda] meeting was not to propose drastic 
solutions; the principal goal, it became plain, was to relieve the pressure of 
pro-rescue opinion'. Near the end of the Second World War, however, 
responses to the plight of Jewish refugees shifted. For example, Jews were 
classified as a priori eligible for international protection and assistance in the 
absence of proof to the contrary, while non-Jews had to produce 'concrete 
evidence' of the persecution, which they claimed to have suffered 
(Woodbridge, 1950, p. 510).
Since the military or strategic agenda was of the highest priority during the 
Second World War, responses to population displacement were based on 
political calculations and operational exigencies. As 'liberation' by the 
Western Allies was underway, a distinction was made between displaced 
persons and refugees. The aim was to separate civilians who could come 
under local jurisdictions from those who were outsiders (Marrus, 1985, 
p.300). However, two definitions of refugees were in circulation. The Inter­
governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) used the definition derived 
from the Bermuda Conference. The Supreme Headquarters, Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) -  a division of the military - which in fact was 
in charge of the government of population displacement, used their own 
definitions of displacement and refugees. The SHAEF Outline Plan for Refugees 
and Displaced Persons characterized refugees as civilians not outside the 
national boundaries of their country, who desired to return to their homes, 
but required assistance to do so, and displaced persons as civilians outside the 
national boundaries of their country by reason of war, who required 
repatriation or resettlement.12
12 For details of the distinction between displaced person and refugee see, SHAEF, G-5 
Division, Displaced Persons Branch, Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons (4.6.1944).
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Although Displaced Persons (DPs) were identified in terms of nationalities, 
further attempts to order population displacement resulted in the creation of 
categories of displaced persons. The main classifications were: evacuees, war 
or political fugitives, political prisoners, forced labourers, deportees, civilian 
internees, ex-prisoners of war, and stateless persons. This method of 
organizing persons into calculable condition allowed the formulation of 
'targeted' solutions. It also functioned to exclude some people from 
assistance. It was intentional that the Volksdeutsche and Reichdeutsche who had 
been living in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe before the war 
would be denied both refugee and DP status, and therefore, did not qualify 
for assistance (Salomon, 1990, p.161).13 Ethnic Germans expelled from Poland, 
Hungry, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia were the responsibility of 
the German authorities. The suspicion that German nationals and worse still, 
German spies were disguising themselves as DPs lead to tight controls on the 
movement, reception and distribution of German nationals across Europe 
(Schechtman, 1947, p.262). Nationality screenings and eligibility checks at 
borders and assembly centers also operated as exclusionary procedures. 
When the movement became out of control, the Potsdam agreement 
authorized a program of compulsory transfer or removal of Volksdeutsche 
remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungry.
When the wartime coalition between Western states and the Soviet Union 
began to fracture, the government of displaced populations became a 
contentious issue between the two parties. The distinction between displaced 
persons and refugees became ambiguous when displaced persons who were 
unwilling to be repatriated became nominal refugees. After the Nazi collapse, 
the Soviet Union and the Western Allies began discussions over the
13 For a table that clearly defines UNRRA and Military assistance eligibility criteria for 
displaced persons, see M. Proudfoot (1957) European Refugees, 1939-52. A study in Forced 
Population Movement, London: Faber and Faber, pp. 243-247.
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repatriation of over three million displaced Soviet nationals in the British and 
American zones (Marrus, 1985, p.316). Forced repatriation to the Soviet Union 
was the agreed plan of action for displaced persons until the power struggle 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, with British support, became 
transparent.14 As a consequence of the strained relationship, American policy 
shifted away from forcible repatriation and the British reluctantly followed. 
The Soviet Union, however, demanded that all of its displaced persons 
should be repatriated.
T h e  T e r m  ‘R e f u g e e ’ -  p o s t  1945
After the Second World War, the definition of refugees in Europe continued 
to be ad hoc and group specific. The term referred to victims of the Nazi, 
Fascist, or Quisling regimes, certain persons of Jewish origins, and foreigners 
or stateless persons who had been victims of Nazi persecution, as well as 
persons considered as refugees before Second World War for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality and public opinion (Goodwin-Gill, 1996, p.6).15 But there 
was an innovation in the new definition of 'refugee'. A person could refuse 
repatriation, if she was unable or unwilling to avail herself of the protection 
of the government of her country of nationality or former residence. If a 
refugee had Valid objections' to returning to her country of origin, she would 
not be forcibly repatriated (Goodwin-Gill, 1996, p.6). 'Valid objections' were 
'persecution or fear based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of 
race, religion, nationality or political opinion', and objections 'of a political 
nature judged to be valid' by the International Refugee Organization (the
14 See M. R. Elliott (1982) Pawns of Yalta: Soviet refugees and America's role in their repatriation, 
Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press.
15 'Displaced persons' were persons deported from, or obliged to leave their country of 
nationality, and who were compelled to undertake forced labour or persons deported for 
racial, religious or political reasons.
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new refugee agency of the immediate postwar period). This was the first time 
that the criterion of 'persecution' was used to characterize refugees in an 
international instrument. The push for a refugee definition based on the well- 
founded fear of persecution was a political attack by the West and in 
particular, the United States on the Communist states. This meaning was not 
lost on the Soviet Union and its supporters.
The debate on refugees was highly charged in the immediate postwar 
period.16 By now, there were two refugee situations in Europe: the refugee 
condition created by the war; and the flight of persons from Eastern Europe. 
The Soviet Union and Eastern European states continued to push for 
repatriation for both groups and accused Western states of frustrating the 
task and of endangering good relations between states by protecting 'political 
dissidents'. They also argued that issue of refugee had become an instrument 
of foreign policy intended to increase the Western sphere of influence. In 
response, the US representative to the United Nations, Eleanor Roosevelt, 
advanced human rights arguments of free choice and freedom of speech as 
reasons why repatriation was not the preferred policy. The United Nations 
had adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945 on the 
premise that human rights were intrinsic and neutral attributes of every 
human. To base her objection to repatriation on the universality of human 
rights was an attempt to depoliticize the US policy while simultaneously to 
politicize the state of affairs in Communist countries.
16 For a brief but insightful account of the debate see, G. Goodwin-Gill (1990) 'Different Types 
of Forced Migration Movements as an International and National Problem', in G. Rystad ed., 
The Uprooted: Forced Migration as an International Problem in the Post-War Era, Lund: Lund 
University Press.
115
GOVERNING POPULATION DISPLACEMENT 1919-1951
While East-West dispute on refugees was being played out at the United 
Nations, the Western alliance also became divided over the issue (Salomon, 
1990, p. 163). The debate on refugees was definitional and functional. The 
questions were who should benefit from international action and what 
should be done for them. The central issue was to what extent and in what 
ways international organizations should engaged in refugee relief. The 
United States favoured a narrow definition and argued that the provision of 
'legal protection' pending integration in countries of refuge should be the 
principal form of international assistance.
Greece, India, and Pakistan questioned whether legal protection adequately 
addressed the conditions faced by refugees. Pakistan, which had to resettle 
seven million Muslims refugees without international relief from the United 
Nations, strongly opposed the proposed definition (Salomon, 1990, p.176). 
But the United States was determined to limit its own involvement in wider 
issues of population displacement. It maintained that 'national refugees' and 
refugee categories created by population transfers were entitled to rights 
afforded by their national governments or countries of residence and 
therefore, did not require international protection. The debate concluded with 
the decision to exclude stateless persons and persons displaced within their 
own countries from the scope of international legal protection.
The achievement of the post-World War Two period was the crystallization 
of the refugee as a symbol of persecution. Unlike previous agreements, the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees contains a general 
definition of who was to be considered a refugee. The Convention applies to 
refugees covered by various earlier treaties and arrangements. It is also 
applicable to any person who:
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As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well- 
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is able or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return 
to it.17
This definition sets out three important conditions of refugehood.18 The first 
condition is alienage. Persons qualifying for refugee status must have left the 
territory of the state where they were nationals, or habitually resided. The 
second condition is persecution. Political events that led to flight from the 
country of origin must be accompanied by genuine risk of serious harm 
against her, or at least against a section of the population with which she 
identified herself. Persecution applies to acts perpetrated by state and its 
various agencies. The third condition is failure of state protection. The root- 
cause of a person becoming a refugee has to do with the broken bond of trust, 
protection, and assistance between the national citizen and the state.
There are also two conditions in the 1951 Convention that are worth noting. 
First, Article 33 states that 'international protection' involved the principle of 
non-refoulement. The formal institutionalization of non-refoulement as a practice 
of protection marks a departure from previous refugee conventions. This
171951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150. The UNHCR Handbook 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status discusses in detail the interpretation 
of terms in the general definition.
18 For analyses on the definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention and its status in 
international law see G. Goodwin-Gill, (1996) The Refugee in International Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: 
Clarendon Press; A. Grahl-Madsen, (1966-72) The Status of Refugees in International Law, 2 vols, 
Leyden: A.W.Sijthoff; and J. Hathaway, (1991) The Law of Refugee Status, Toronto: 
Butterworths.
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does not give the person a right to be granted asylum though. The granting of 
asylum is the prerogative of states. Non-refoulement simply prohibits the 
return of refugees to their country of origin, which could be translated into a 
sort of temporary asylum until the political situation in the country of origin 
improved so as to allow return. Non-refoulement is also qualified by Article 32, 
which pronounces that states may expel a refugee on grounds of national 
security and public order.
In the 1951 Convention, the words 'events occurring before 1 January 1951' 
meant (a) 'events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951' or (b) 'events 
occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951'. But states had a 
choice as to which of these meanings they wanted to apply for the purpose of 
their obligations under the Convention.19States becoming parties to the 
Convention chose to restrict their commitment to events in Europe. Their 
action sent a clear message as to who could be a refugee. The temporal and 
geographical limitations suggested that 'international protection' of the kind 
offered by gaining refugee status were directed at refugees from Communist 
states. Indeed, the historical studies by Holborn (1956), Salomon (1990,1991), 
and Melander (1988) on the refugee regime confirm that the 
intergovernmental relief effort and the legal instruments developed after 
World War Two were sponsored and dominated by Western states, and 
exclusively geared to assisting refugees from Eastern Europe. Melander 
(1988, p.9) observed that the definition was worked at a time when the Cold 
War had reached its height and when the Eastern Bloc boycotted the United 
Nations. Due to the boycott, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1950 
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
19 The Convention clearly stated that contracting states had a choice as to when or if they 
wished to extend their obligation by adopting (b).
118
GOVERNING POPULATION DISPLACEMENT 1919-1951
(UNHCR) were drafted by predominately Western states.20 Even then, the 
extent to which assistance was offered to Eastern European refugees 
depended on the intensity of the Cold war.
Between 1921 and 1950, population displacement outside Europe was 
peripheral to the inventors of international treaties and arrangements on 
refugees. The 'refugee problem' was seen as a European phenomenon. After 
the Second World War, there were approximately twenty million Chinese in 
other parts of Asia and twelve million displaced persons in Japan (Holborn 
1975, p. 138). But they were outside the mandate of refugee agencies and no 
international agreements had been drafted and signed on behalf of these 
people. 'Good Offices' were established for them but they received very 
limited emergency assistance. The story was different for the 16 000 European 
refugees in China. The Europeans (Russians, German Jews and Jews from 
neighboring countries) were of concern to the IRO (Holborn, 1956, p.186). The 
partition of India and the creation of Pakistan, which caused mass population 
displacement, did not arouse the same level of international concern and 
assistance as instances of displacement in Europe. The population did not 
qualify as refugees requiring international protection because their 
predicament was perceived to be the result of de facto population transfers 
rather than war or deportation.21 Likewise, the response to the mass 
displacement of the Palestinians after the war between Israel and its Arab
20 The 1951 Convention was drafted by twenty-six states -  most of which were Western. But it 
did not come into force until 1954 when Australia became the required sixth signatory.
21 For historical analyses of the partition see for example, M. N. Das (1982) Partition and 
Independence of India: inside story of the Mountbatten days, New Delhi: Vision Books; W. Khan 
(1987), translation by S. S. Hameed, Facts are facts: the untold story of India's partition, New 
Delhi: Vikas Publishing House; P. Moon (1998) Divide and quit: an eye-witness account of the 
partition of India, Delhi and Oxford: Oxford University Press; and R. M. Ramakant ed. (1998) 
India's partition: preludes and legacies, Jaipur: Rawat Publications.
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neighbors in 1948 was unenthusiastic.22 Palestinian refugees were subject to a 
United Nations agency distinct from the new international refugee agency -  
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
G o v e r n i n g  B o d i e s
Holbom (1956, 75), Proudfoot (1957), Macartney (1930), Hope Simpson (1939), 
Vernant (1953) and Woodbridge (1950) have written institutional histories of 
refugees and displaced persons between 1921-1950. My task is to expand on 
their inform ative studies by suggesting that the m andates of these 
international governing bodies and their activities were constitutive of the 
m eaning of popu lation  displacem ent and the refugee problem  in 
international relations. I also propose that the m andates and regulatory 
activities of these organizations served to affirm the significance of an 
international order of states as a mechanism to govern hum an populations 
and to realize peace and stability. These organizations generated 
representations of displacement and institutionalized the phenomenon as an 
issue of concern. Their mandates and constitutions set the limits of operation; 
that is, who received assistance, what forms of assistance were offered, who 
participated in the decision-making process, and who carried out the 
programs. International governmental agencies, therefore, functioned to co­
ordinate and harm onize the activities of states and various agents, to 
redistribute of cost and allocate burdens, and to act as a forum for consensus­
building and collective action. These institutions also allowed states to pursue
22 See M. J. Cohen, (1982) Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, B. J. Evensen, (1992) Truman, Palestine, and the Press: shaping conventional 
wisdom at the beginning of the Cold War, New York: Greenwood Press; S. Flapan (1987) The birth 
of Israel: myths and realities, London : Croom Helm; R. Ovendale, (1989) Britain, the United 
States, and the end of the Palestine mandate,1942-1948, Royal Historical Society: Woodbridge, 
Suffolk.
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'national interests' and implement policies that otherwise would appear 
dubious and threatening to other states.
When the League of Nations created agencies to manage refugees, its primary 
concern was to stabilize the new European order. The characterization of the 
refugee problem reflected the political concerns of the time -  how to create 
and maintain a national citizenship and what to do with minorities within the 
national body. But the problems of nationality, minority and refugees were 
seen as transitional or temporary, and solvable through population transfers 
or exchanges, repatriation, integration, and resettlement. The transitional 
character of the problem meant that the key management bodies responsible 
for refugees were temporary and dealt only with specific groups of people. 
When the United Nations began to create refugee agencies, these new 
institutions continued the many functions of their predecessors - with some 
additional innovations. But they too were considered as temporary 
instruments addressing transitory conditions in international relations.
The League Period 1921-1946
The key institutional body of the refugee regime was the League of Nations 
rather than the refugee agencies. The League gave consent to their 
establishment. The refugee agencies had to turn to the Council and Assembly 
of the League for funding and approval, and to the Secretariat for expertise. 
Both the Council and the Assembly received reports from the High 
Commissioner for Refugees, and provided a forum for League members to 
discuss refugee issues (Skran, 1995, p. 77). The Council was designed 
originally to consist of representatives from the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers, and four non-permanent members selected by the 
Assembly. Despite the facts that the United States did not join the League and
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that membership of the permanent Council varied, the Great Powers exerted 
strong influence over refugee matters.23To compensate the elitism of the 
Council, the Assembly adopted a 'democratic' structure whereby each 
member-state had one vote. The Assembly controlled the budget of the 
League and the creation of new agencies. The Office of the League Secretariat 
provided technical and administrative expertise to the political bodies of the 
League and acted as the primary liaison between staff, agencies, 
representatives of member-states, and outside organizations. The various 
sections of the League bureaucracy were also involved in the management of 
refugee issues. The Economic and Financial Section managed loans raised for 
refugee settlement. The Legal Section concentrated on the situation of 
refugees under international law. The Political Section analyzed the political 
consequences of refugee movements. The Health Section was in charge of 
addressing epidemics in refugee areas. The Social Section focused on the 
situation of women and children.
When the League of Nations created the first international agency for 
refugees in 1921, the mandate of the High Commission of Refugees applied 
only to displaced persons of Russian origins. At the time, the Russian 
refugees constituted only one of the many groups needing assistance after the 
First World War, but states were reluctant to cooperate in any international 
'humanitarian' exercise. Nevertheless, the strict limitation on the forms of 
assistance offered and the exclusion of other groups made the proposal 
acceptable to states.
23 For a complete list of members of the League of Nations see, F. P. Walters (1960) History of 
the League of Nations, London: Oxford University Press. Only Great Britain and France were 
members from 1920 until 1946. Japan and Italy were members but withdrew respectively in 
1933 and 1937. Germany joined in 1926 but left in 1933. The Soviet Union was a member for 
six years.
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Foreign policy concerns undoubtedly swayed the decision to assist the 
Russians. Both the Great Powers and the newly created states of Eastern 
Europe took an interest in the Russian refugees. Britain and France shared an 
antagonism  against the Communists and supported the White Russians 
during the Civil War. W ith the Com munist victory, both states found 
themselves burdened with a Russian refugee problem. According to Skran's 
historical investigation, by 1921 France and Britain had spent approximately 
3.8 million pounds and 1 million pounds respectively on assisting Russian 
refugees (1995, p.89). Britain tried to persuade Eastern European countries to 
settle refugees in their territory. But the idea was prom ptly rejected. 
Furtherm ore, Britain and France failed in their a ttem pt to organize 
repatriation agreements with the Soviet Union. The cost and inadequacy of a 
unilateral approach to the Russian refugee problem prom pted Britain and 
France to turn to the League for assistance. Similarly, states playing host to 
Russian refugees were also keen to ease their financial burden. Clearly, a 
number of states had interests in internationalizing the Russian refugee issue 
and in encouraging international cooperation. They also figured that if 
refugees were to be an item on the League's agenda, they would have to 
represent refugees in terms of their connection to 'international peace and 
security'.
The League of Nations appointed an Office of the Fligh Commission of 
Refugees to address the problem of Russian refugees. With the opinion that 
the problem would be resolved in ten years, the High Commission had a 
limited time-span and specific terms of operation. Its primary tasks were to 
define the legal status of the refugees, reach an agreement on the issue of 
identity certificates for refugees, and to organize either their repatriation or 
employment. Due to the failure of the repatriation program s, the main 
problem became the procurem ent of work for the refugees. The League 
attended only to administrative expenses. The rest came from contributions
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from governments, private donations, and the sale of Nansen stamps. When 
its mandate was extended to include new categories of refugees, Armenians, 
Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldeans and Turks, funding became a continuously 
pressing problem.
A function of the refugee regime was the management of population as a 
human resource. The initial failure of the Russian repatriation program 
marked the beginning of the involvement of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) in the management of refugees.24 In 1924, Nansen 
persuaded the ILO to assist in the technical problems of employment, 
settlement, and migration. The Refugee Service of the ILO made inquiries in 
all European countries into the conditions of refugees, their occupations, and 
whether they were employed, or employable (Simpson, 1939, p. 203). The 
Service conducted investigations about the possibilities of settlement of large 
numbers of refugees in South America.25 It was also responsible for the 
vocational training of refugees. Refugees were different from workers. They 
were considered to be less skillful but nonetheless useful in the post-war 
economies of Europe.
Another goal was to ensure the displaced was self-supporting as soon as 
possible. The purpose of work was more complex than just meeting economic 
imperatives. The significance of employment was linked to a belief about the 
intrinsic value of work for the development of positive qualities such as 
autonomy and sobriety. Comments by Hope Simpson (1935) on refugee 
conditions reflected the general belief that work was a defense against the 
'social evil of idleness'. The psychological benefits of work were the remedies
24 The High Commissioner worked with the ILO from 1925 tol929.
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for 'dependency syndrome', which would lead to a sense of helplessness and 
a m ultitude of undesirable social behaviors. Such developments would 
hinder the chances of refugees to live 'normal' lives.
The establishm ent of a specialized agency for refugees also facilitated 
international cooperation. The agency coordinated activities of governments 
and non-governm ental agencies, provided adm inistrative support, and 
designed legal institutions. A part from organizing inter-governm ental 
conferences where government representatives and voluntary agencies came 
together, the Office of the High Commissioner served as a clearing house for 
information (Holborn, 1975, p4). The governance of refugees required a 
complex netw ork of adm inistrative procedures and data collection. The 
division of labour was as follows: the High Commissioner concentrated on 
legal and political issues, the ILO as mentioned above, found employment for 
the displaced/refugees and made the necessary emigration and settlement 
arrangem ents, w hile voluntary  agencies organized and d istributed  
humanitarian relief.
The H igh Com m issioner set up an advisory com m ittee of private 
organizations which operated on the international and national level.26 Its 
sixteen members sent reports on their aid programs to the League committee 
charged with the responsibility of organizing refugee assistance. Voluntary, 
philanthropic or non-government organizations were responsible for the 
d istribution of basic relief, health  services, em ploym ent placem ents, 
education, vocational training, tracing services and resettlement programs
25 The ILO's efforts to expand employment arrangements for refugees were met with 
unwillingness on the part of governments and became even more difficult with the onset of 
the economic crisis.
26 For a description of the role of these organizations see, J. H.Simpson (1939) The Refugee 
Problem: Report of a Survey. London: Oxford University Press, pp.172-90.
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(Holborn, 1975, p.25). Since many private organizations assisting refugees 
were community-based, their 'local' knowledge and networks were 
considered valuable resources for the management of refugees. Governments 
contributed funds to private organizations performing tasks that either they 
could not perform as efficiently themselves or which would be imprudent to 
perform in a 'political' capacity. The characterization of non-government 
agencies as humanitarian organizations allowed states to pursue their goals 
in a 'non-political' context amidst often intensely political situations.
Gradually, the activities undertaken by the High Commission for Refugees 
expanded. The Inter-governmental Arrangement of 1922-28 authorized the 
High Commission to carry out consular functions - 'services' that were 
normally the tasks of the national governments. Its responsibilities now 
included:
certifying the identity of the position of the refugees; their family position 
and civil status, ... ; testifying to the regularity, validity, and conformity with 
the previous law of their country of origin, of documents issued in such 
countries; certifying the signature of refugees and copies and translations of 
documents drawn up in their own language; testifying before the authorities 
of the country to the good character and conduct of the individual refugee, to 
his previous record, to his professional qualifications and to his university or 
academic standing; recommending the individual refugee to competent 
authorities, particularly with a view to his obtaining visas, permits to reside 
in the country, admission to school, libraries, etc (Holborn, 1975, p.ll)
Such 'services' allowed refugees to be documented and to be 'assimilated' or 
'integrated' into their countries of refuge. If refugees could not be repatriated 
to their countries of origin, then it was important for the High Commission to 
facilitate the creation of a new bond between the refugee and the country of 
refuge. Since being a refugee was an anomalous state in the regulatory
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citizen-state arrangement, the task was to convince the host state that the 
refugee had the necessary temperament to become a good citizen.
The Nansen International Office replaced the High Commission in 1930. It 
was an agency under the direction of the League of Nations (Holborn, 1975, 
p.12). Its task was to settle the remaining refugees in a ten-year period. But 
the objectives of the Office were complicated by the economic depression, the 
declining influence of the League of Nations, and the advent of new 
displaced populations due to the domestic and foreign policies of Germany.27
The refugees from Germany, although small in number compared to the 
Russians and Armenians presented new problems to the governing bodies. 
They were scattered throughout Europe at a time and many countries were 
experiencing economic depression. The refugees also faced anti-Semitism and 
anti-immigration sentiments. At the ILO conference in June 1933, 
representatives from Holland, France and Belgium argued that the influx of 
refugees threatened to disturb the labour markets in their countries. The issue 
was raised before the Assembly of the League of Nations, but Germany 
opposed direct intervention by the League in this matter. The result was the 
creation of the High Commissioner's Office for Refugees coming from 
Germany -  an autonomous organization that was not responsible to the 
League Council. Its mandate, like that of the High Commission for Russian 
and Armenian Refugees, was the legal and political protection of refugees.
27 For an outline of the National Socialist government's policies towards its Jewish 
populations and the responses from Western European countries see, J.P. Fox (1988) 'German 
and European Jewish Refugees, 1933-1945: reflection on the Jewish condition under Hitler 
and the Western World's responses to their expulsion and flight', in A. Bramwell ed. Refugees 
in the Age of Total War, London: Unwin Hyman.
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Similarly, the ILO was asked to 'study the means of settlement of refugees 
and submit resolutions to the League' (Holborn, 1956, p .7).
In 1939, the Nansen Office and the High Commissioner for Refugees from 
Germany were combined to create the Office of the High Commissioner for 
all Refugees under League of Nations Protection.28 The tacit understanding 
among governments was to avoid disturbing existing arrangements and to 
resist any move that might suggest new obligations to refugees. 
Consequently, no proposal of international protection was made on behalf of 
refugees from the Spanish civil war. To further reduce the cost of 
international protection, the Office was not authorized to directly assist 
refugees. Its function was to process the paperwork associated with refugee 
conventions and certificates of identification, to coordinate humanitarian 
assistance among private organizations, and to promote resettlement. To 
ensure that the Office of the High Commissioner would be acquiescent, 
European governments chose a person who they believed would refrain from 
being 'unnecessarily critical' to head the new refugee agency (Marrus, 1985, 
p i66). With war imminent in Europe, governments were preoccupied with 
military strategies, and refugees did not rank high in their priorities.
This attitude towards refugees changed as the war progressed. The scale of 
population displacement caused by flight, expulsion, and organized 
population transfers across Europe during the Second World War, as well as 
the specific character of the conflict shifted the issue from the margins to the 
center of politics.29 The previously impotent Inter-Governmental Committee
28 The new Office was responsible for refugees that had been under the protection of previous 
offices - Russians, Armenians, Assyrians, Saar Germans, Austrians, and Czechoslovakians 
from Sudetenland.
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on Refugees (IGCR) was revived and its mandate rewritten to serve new 
political conditions.30 The Committee expanded to thirty-six members, and its 
administrative budget was increased. The British and American governments 
funded the operational expenditure of the IGCR. This was a departure from 
previous practices under the League when governments expected private, 
voluntary agencies to finance humanitarian relief for refugees (Holborn, 1956, 
p.12). In fact, the IGCR began to subsidize the relief programs of voluntary 
agencies. In an effort to coordinate the work of voluntary relief and welfare 
organizations during and after the war, the British and American 
governments introduced innovative administrative measures to the 
organizational structure of the Committee. Its mandate was broadened to 
include the Spanish refugees. In practice, however, the Committee would not 
include in its activities the nationals of member governments, unless it has 
been requested to do so (Vernant, 1953, p.28).
As the war continued, the role of IGCR was enlarged from a diplomatic one 
of coordinating the efforts of governments to include operational tasks. The 
Committee's new function was 'to undertake negotiations with neutral or 
Allied States or with organizations, and take steps as may be necessary to 
preserve, maintain and transport' refugees within its mandate (Sjöberg, 1991, 
p.16). It coordinated its activities with those of the High Commissioner of the 
League of Nations, the ILO, and later the War Refugee Board of the US and 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Holborn, 1975, 
p.18). It devised an orderly migration program for the thousands of refugees, 
and thereby laid the foundation for the massive international migration 
scheme of the International Refugee Organization (IRO).
29 Kulischer (1948), Marrus (1985) and Proudfoot (1957) offer concise accounts of the 
magnitude of populations displaced during the war.
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Before World War Two, only International Committee of the Red Cross and 
its British and American branches worked alongside military authorities. 
After the war, voluntary agencies were used much more vigorously. 
Consultative bodies of voluntary agencies were formed in Britain and 
America: the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad (COBSBRA) and 
the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Services (ACVAFS). 
Governments relied on these agencies to carry the distribution of relief to 
refugees.
From 1943 to  1951
While the IGCR dealt primarily with refugees of the inter-war period, the 
problem of displaced populations as a result of World War Two came under 
the charge of an operational and temporary UN Specialized Agency, the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1943.31 
Its main task was to assist 'displaced persons', defined as 'victims of war in 
any area under control of any of the United Nations' to return to his or her 
countries of origin. The mandate of the organization stated its function as:
assistance in caring for, and maintaining records of, persons found in any 
area under the control of any United Nations who by reason of war have 
been displaced from their homes and, in agreement w ith the appropriate 
governments, m ilitary authorities or other agencies, in securing their 
repatriation or return (UNRRA Council Resolution No.l. Part II, para. 2, in 
Woodbridge, 1950, Vol. 3, p. 43).
30 Based on an American initiative, the IGCR was set up in 1938 as an independent 
intergovernmental refugee organization outside the League of Nations framework.
31 For a detailed history of UNRRA see, G. Woodbridge (1950) The History of the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Vols. 1-3, New York: Columbia University 
Press.
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The government of refugees and displaced persons was considered primarily 
as a military operation. The Displaced Persons Branch of SHAEF (Supreme 
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) headed operations to govern 
refugees and displaced persons. UNRRA, a civilian organization was 
subordinate to the military command (Woodbridge, 1950). Resolution No. 1 
of UNRRA clearly stated that the work of the organization depended on the 
consent of the military authorities. UNRRA operations were to be compatible 
with military goals or 'necessities'. The military authority in the form of 
SHAEF and the UNRRA collaborated in many areas of refugee and displaced 
persons management -  from the control of infectious diseases and related 
public health issues to the maintenance of statistical records and reports 
(Proudfoot, 1957, ppl02-3).32
The prospect of a large-scale uncontrolled movement of people near the end 
of the war was a major concern. It was feared that spontaneous repatriation 
of displaced persons may result in 'roving bands of vengeful pillaging looters 
on trek (sic) to their homes' (Proudfoot, 1957, p.117). A numbers of methods 
were deployed to discipline the refugees and the displaced. They were 
instructed by means of leaflets dropped from the air, radio broadcasts, and 
through resistance groups to stay put until the route for their movement 
could be organized by the military (Proudfoot, 1957, p.117). The military 
police made sure their movement did not congest main routes required for 
military purposes. Collecting points were locations from which displaced 
persons would be moved under police escort to transit areas or camps. From
32 A comprehensive category of responsibility and its division between the military and 
UNRRA was outlined in the three Zone-UNRRA Agreements. A table that sets out the 
division of labour can be found in M. Proudfoot (1957) European Refugees: 1939-52, A study in 
Forced Population Movement, London: Faber and Faber, pp. 231-234. For the details of the 
agreements (including the texts), see G. Woodbridge (1950) The History of the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Vol. 3, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 185- 
201.
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there, they moved to assembly centers for medical examination and for a 
"comprehensive dusting of DDT powder'. After medical clearance, the person 
would be registered for repatriation. To ease the task of administration, DPs 
were segregated into nationality groups. They were given meal cards while 
their cases were being processed. Some DPs were employed in the war effort 
- largely in manual tasks. Border control stations were set up to further 
regulate the movement of returnees, while information and reception centers 
received them and assisted in their assimilation.
Since the initial purpose of UNRRA was to cooperate with the military in 
repatriation operations, it did not have the authority to resettle the displaced 
or to deal with or find solutions for refugees. The military was responsible for 
the coordination of all repatriation and resettlement movements, which 
included the tasks of collection, transportation, administration, welfare, 
medical services, and arrangements for reception at each phase of the 
movement. But new concerns arose around 1945 that allowed a greater role 
for UNRRA in the government of refugees and displaced persons. The 
problem of non-repatriable persons and the appearance of new refugees from 
Eastern Europe in Western zones added to the already immense task of 
overseeing postwar population movement. When political differences 
between the Western allied states and the Soviet Union turned repatriation 
into a cause for further suspicion and tension, UNRRA sometimes provided 
relief without the consent of Eastern European countries (Vernant, 1953, 
p.32). It was also called upon to work with the IGRC and the military relating 
to issues of resettlement.
The United States and Britain had assumed much of the cost of refugee relief 
activities during the war. After the war, however, Britain was reluctant to 
bear further financial burdens. When the UNRAA and IGCR were dissolved
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at the end of 1948 and 1947 respectively, Britain sought to create a new 
refugee organization within the United Nations framework, so that the cost 
would be shared by all member states (Salomon, 1990, p.172). Although the 
US preferred the establishment of an agency independent of the United 
Nations system, in the end, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) - a 
non-permanent agency was created.33 The new body was an integrated part of 
the UN machinery, similar to the situation of previous refugee agencies 
under the authority of the League of Nations.
The aim of the IRO was to bring about 'a rapid and positive solution of the 
problem of bona fide refugees and displaced persons'.34 It dealt with all the 
categories of refugees that had been the concern of previous international 
instruments and organizations. Like previous refugee organizations, it 
functioned as a diplomatic representative on behalf of refugees and displaced 
persons to other states and by offering legal and political protection. But the 
duties of the IRO were more comprehensive than previous organizations. It 
was responsible for monitoring the movement of refugees, as well as their 
identification, registration, classification, repatriation, or resettlement 
(Holborn, 1975, p.31). It operated an international tracing service for persons 
of UN nationalities.35 The refugees were distinguished into three types with 
each receiving slightly different forms of assistance. Those living in camps 
received care and maintenance, those living outside camps received aid for 
resettlement and legal protection, and those who were de jure or de facto 
stateless received only legal protection (Holborn, 1975, p.31). Until such time 
as their repatriation or resettlement and reestablishment was completed, the
33 For a history of the IRO see, L. Holborn (1956) The International Refugee Organization. A 
specialized agency of the United Nations: Its history and work 1946-1952, London: Oxford 
University Press.
34 See Preamble of the Constitution of the IRO, 18 UNTS 3.
35 The IRO took over this task from UNRAA and SHAEF.
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view, as stated in the Preamble of the IRO Constitution, was that refugees 
and displaced persons 'should be put to useful employment in order to avoid 
the evil and antisocial consequences of continued idleness'.
The human resources required for European reconstruction and for economic 
development in other countries, made resettlement an appealing solution to 
the refugee problem. The IRO participated in planned emigration programs 
of three kinds: emigration under government selection schemes, emigration 
through personal nomination initiated by known sponsors in the resettlement 
country, and placement of individuals with prospective employers (Holbom, 
1975, p32). The organization developed training and socialization programs. 
The objective was to 'rehabilitate' these people so that they would become 
useful citizens in whatever country they were destined to live. The 'hard­
core' individuals who could neither be repatriated to their country of origin 
nor resettled in a third country were subjected to intensive counseling and 
more rehabilitation programs. Hard core cases were those who represented 
an economic burden to any states or were of 'suspicious moral' character. 
They included unmarried mothers with children under 17, unmarried 
couples with or without children, those widowed, separated or divorced, 
those with personal or occupational problems or a criminal record, 
professional or specialist workers over the age of 35, clerical, sales or other 
white-collar workers over the age of 40, and families considered too large for 
self-support (Holborn, 1975, p.45).
The acceptance of resettlement as a solution to the refugee problem was also 
linked to Cold War tensions. Organized repatriation remained a politically 
charged issue. The Soviet Union demanded that the Organization should 
only be given the mandate to repatriate refugees and displaced persons. But 
the United States and Britain had shifted their position on the policy of forced
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repatriation. Those who did not wish to be repatriated were to be candidates 
for resettlement under the auspices of the IRO. This proposal was 
unacceptable to Eastern European states and the Soviet Union and they 
responded by declining membership to the IRO (Salomon, 1990, p.162).36 In 
the absence of a strong opposing voice in the IRO, the organization 
implemented the policy of the powerful Western states unobstructed.
There was unprecedented collaboration between the principal refugee 
governing organization, the IRO, and non-government voluntary agencies 
after 1946. The latter played a fundamental role in the implementation of 
many resettlement and integration programs. At times, voluntary agencies 
gained access to people and locations that were denied to the IRO. In order to 
maximize their utility and to co-ordinate the activities of the IRO and the 
agencies, their relationship was formally institutionalized through 
agreements. The Division of Voluntary Societies - a special administrative 
unit of the IRO was formed. In 1949, the Vice-Chairman of the Standing 
Conference of Voluntary Agencies declared non-government organizations 
the 'agents of the private conscience' (Holborn, 1975, p.39). This declaration 
was a self-characterization of non-government voluntary agencies as the 
administrator of spiritual care to the victims of war and as the moral voice of 
the world.
The IRO, in collaboration with governments and voluntary agencies managed 
the refugee problem in Europe but did not resolve it. Cold War politics were 
transforming explanations of refugee issues and representations of refugees. 
With the termination of the IRO at the end of 1950, the establishment of 
another refugee governing body was the subject of fierce debate. The discord
36 Only eighteen states out of fifty-four UN member states became IRO members.
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was not simply an East-West one, the US and Western European states 
differed on the character and capacity of any future international 
organization for refugees.
Whereas European states preferred to establish an agency with the United 
Nations, America favored an agency outside the system. America sought to 
maximize its control over the management and representation of refugees. It 
also wanted to reduce the international effort in favour of more bilateral and 
regional arrangements (Salomon, 1990, p. 163). The US registered its 
disapproval with the creation of a specialized refugee agency within the UN 
system by refusing to sign the 1951 UN refugee Convention.37 It also 
implemented an independent refugee policy outside the UN system and 
established its own refugee institution. America created the Escapee Program 
and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) for 
new refugees from Eastern Europe. The ICEM organized flights for Eastern 
European refugees to the United States.38 Salomon (1990, p. 163) notes that the 
ICEM also provided migration assistance for 'unemployed people in Western 
Europe who, in the US view, otherwise threatened to become a potential 
recruitment pool for Communism'.
When the UN General Assembly created the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950, its planning of reflected the 
Cold War tension and strained relationships of the time, as well as the
37 The US refused to fund UNHCR programs until 1955. While it invested $43 million in 
ICEM between 1950 andl955, the UNHCR had a budget of $3 million.
38 The ICEM underwent two name changes. It became the Intergovernmental Committee for 
Migration (ICM) when it expanded its operations outside Europe. ICM became the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the early 1980s. The IOM is a key 
organization working in partnership with the UNHCR managing refugees. Its main function 
is to transport refugees in repatriation and resettlement operations.
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institutional precedents set by past offices. As a subsidiary of the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), UNHCR had to 
follow the policy directives of its 'parent' offices.39 It received a budget of only 
300 000 US dollars in its first year of operation (Holborn, 1975, p.1399). The 
agency was not allowed to ask governments for additional funds, or make a 
direct appeal without the authorization by the General Assembly (Marrus, 
1985, p.356). Initially, it was established for a period of three years as a non- 
operational agency.
UNHCR was to be an organization of a 'non-political' character. According to 
its Statute, the work of the office was to be 'humanitarian' and 'social'. The 
approach depoliticized the refugee issue at a time when politics was all 
consuming. As a political strategy, it provided the condition of possibility to 
characterize the refugee question as a humanitarian issue based on a set of 
transcendent and universal principles termed 'human rights'. In this manner, 
UNHCR was able to claim impartiality in the way it carried out its function of 
'international protection'.
The scope of UNHCR activities comes under the categories of 'international 
protection' and 'assistance'. Its protection function requires the agency to 
coordinate, direct, and supervise governments in the protection of refugees -  
as the ultimate capacity for international protection rest with receiving states. 
UNHCR also promotes and creates instruments that would enhance the 
commitment and legal obligations of governments to offer protection. Its 
assistance activities are perceived in terms of the search for durable solutions 
for refugees.
39 This requirement is laid down in paragraph 3 of the Statute of UNHCR.
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Unlike previous refugee organizations, the description of refugees in the 
Statute of the UNHCR did not contain temporal and geographical limitations. 
The agency extended assistance to any person who is outside the country of 
her nationality, or if she has no nationality, the country of her former habitual 
residence, because she has a well-founded fear of persecution. States, 
however, were reluctant to assume obligations to future refugees or those 
outside Europe. Their response was to invent a definition of refugee that 
contained both temporal and geographical conditions for refugee status. The 
1951 Refugee Convention was the outcome. Consequently, the UNHCR 
worked with contradictory refugee definitions.
The initial and primary task of UNHCR was to deal with European refugees. 
Palestinian refugees were excluded from the competence of UNHCR and 
from the purview of the 1951 Convention.40 The Palestinians refugees were 
the responsibility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
and not the UNHCR.41 Similarly, Korean refugees were excluded because 
they received aid from the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency 
(UNKRA).42 Later as new refugee movements occurred, the General 
Assembly authorized the extension of assistance to 'other persons' who did 
not come within the competence of the UNHCR by the introduction of High 
Commissioner 'good offices'.
As we can see from the study above, the mandates of the key refugee 
governing bodies were not extended to the non-Western world. For example, 
Japanese refugees in Manchukuo (Manchuria) received assistance from only a
40 See UNHCR Statute paragraph 7,1 and 1951 Convention, article ID.
41 For an account of the complex politics of Palestinian refugees and how the issue was used 
by the Arab states -  especially Egypt, see B. Morris (1987) The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee 
Problem 1947-1949, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
42 The United States heavily supported the UNRWA and UNKRA.
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few non-government organizations. They were the responsibility of the 
Japanese government. Similarly, the territorial division of India and the 
subsequent unmixing of population attracted little attention and support. The 
new governments of India and Pakistan had to deal with the resettlement of 
fourteen million people with little assistance from the 'international 
community'. In contrast, there was a collective response to the displaced 
Palestinians. In 1948, the United Nations created a separate governing body 
(with its distinct mandate) for Palestinian refugees -  United Nations Relief for 
Palestinian Refugees (UNRPR), which was replaced in 1949 by the UNRWA.43 
The attention accorded to the Palestinians was attributable to the advent of 
the 'Palestinian problem' on the United Nations' political agenda.44 According 
to Zolberg (1990, p.89), these organizations were by-products of UN 
intervention in the Israel-Arab conflict and largely instruments of US foreign 
policy. Likewise, the establishment of the United Nations Korean 
Reconstruction Agency (1950-1958) was influenced on Cold War political 
calculations.
G o v e r n m e n t a l  P r o g r a m s
So far, I have suggested that population displacement in Europe from 1919 to 
1951 was managed by creating 'an ordered multiplicity out of multitudes'.45 
In the process of ordering, a previously bewildering conglomeration of 
bodies has been named, categorized, arranged, and regulated through
43 The UNRWA, designed to solve the Palestinian refugee problem by promoting individual 
refugee families to economic viability while in exile, in effect, contributed to the creation and 
consolidation of a Palestinian political consciousness.
44 The plight of the Palestinians was a pawn in a wider conflict between Arab states and 
Israel. Most Arab countries prevented or limited efforts to resettle Palestinian refugees. The 
result was the internment of refugees in large camps, which became towns in themselves. 
The discourse of 'permanent exile' hardened Palestinian consciousness.
45 Thanks to Dipesh Chakrabarty for bringing this point to my attention.
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definitions, legal instruments, international agreements, institutions and their 
governing mandates. While these governmental techniques serve a diversity 
of ends, they share a common purpose, that is, to reproduce and normalize 
the state-citizen relationship and to reaffirm the merit of a society of states for 
international peace and order.
Population displacement is characterized as an anomalous condition on two 
ways. First, the social contract between a state and its citizen has been 
violated. The person is without the protection of her state and must seek 
protection in another state, where she is 'out of place'. Ultimately, 
'international protection' is conceivable because states have agreed to treat 
non-citizens in a particular way. Second, an international purpose of states is 
to enable the efficient government of the human population.
As I have argued in Chapter Two, the understanding between states is that 
each should manage its domestic affairs in a manner that will not harm other 
states. International order depends on the recognition of this tacit code of 
conduct, a code that acts to preserve state sovereignty. States that cause 
refugee movements are perceived to have failed in their obligations to other 
states to the extent that interactions between states constitute a degree of 
sociality. A fundamental purpose of a society of states, with its rules of 
engagement, principles of legitimacy, and diplomatic machinery is to 
preserve the liberty or autonomy of states. The observance of sovereignty 
between states involves an implicit recognition of accountability to other 
states in international relations. Refugees are signs that a transgression has 
occurred; certain states are neither serving their domestic nor international 
purpose. This assessment can be used as an indictment against particular 
states and their technique of governing. The rest of this chapter will explore 
some governmental activities that aim to restore the state-citizen bond and
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the perception of international order at the time. It is worth noting that the 
functioning of durable solutions for population displacement normalizes 
citizenship as a life form. That is, a permanent solution to refugees is one that 
reestablishes the bond between a person as a citizen and a state as her legal 
protector.
Repatriation
The initial answer to population displacement in Europe was repatriation. 
Except for the case for Jewish refugees, repatriation was the preferred 
permanent solution to deal with refugees. Immediately after World War One, 
repatriation was regarded as the most appropriate solution for most Russian 
refugees. The aim was to design repatriation schemes as an integral part of 
the European economic system. But the High Commissioner could not 
convince the Soviet Union to a general agreement on repatriation along 
similar lines to the population resettlement programs in the Balkans. The 
absence of agreement between countries of origins and countries of asylum 
also frustrated attempts to repatriate refugees. The nationalistic temperament 
of the time was unfavorable for Russian refugees, as their presence 
threatened the nationalizing tasks of newly formed states of Eastern Europe. 
According to Skran (1993, p.39), minorities already comprised at least fifteen 
percent of the populations in every state in the region, while the minority 
populations in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and Romania constituted 
thirty-three percent of the total population. From 1921 to 1939, the general 
attitude was that organized repatriation programs, as a solution to the 
refugee problem was unworkable. Hope Simpson (1939, p. 529) concluded 
that 'repatriation had not provided a complete solution of any of the 
important post-War refugee movements, and it could be ignored as an 
important element in any future program of international action aiming at the 
practical liquidation of the existing refugee problems'.
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At the end of World War Two, the repatriation of persons displaced in 
Western Europe was a relatively successful operation. But the repatriation of 
Eastern Europeans proved more challenging. UNRRA devised 'Operation 
Carrot', which pledged to provide 60-days food rations upon arrival to DPs 
and refugees who decide to return (Salomon, 1990, p.168). Division amongst 
the actors responsible for the government of the displaced also hindered 
repatriation. While UNRRA pursued a policy of repatriation, the military 
authorities formally in charge was less enthusiastic about the activity. Cold 
War politics had politicized repatriation. The West, and in particular, the 
United States and Britain polemically implied that the 'forcible' return of a 
person (usually used in reference to those from Soviet Union and Eastern 
European states) was to condemn her to the political oppression of 
Communist rule.
Resettlement
Besides repatriation, integration and resettlement were the other possible 
permanent solutions. Integration referred to the settlement in the country of 
refuge, while resettlement was the relocation of refugees to a 'third country'. 
The domestic labour requirements of receiving countries influenced the 
condition of possibility for integration and resettlement. Overall, resettlement 
schemes fitted into the increasingly regularized system of international 
migration. The reworking of international migration into a strategy of 
resettlement for refugees was a significant innovation.
Interestingly, little attention was paid on issues of 'absorption' in resettlement 
countries. Only Hope Simpson (1938) offered an impression of the possible 
four areas of concern -  legal, political, economic, and cultural. The major 
concern was 'refugee mentality', which portrayed the political attachment
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that refugees had with past communities. Such an attachment was considered 
destructive to the aims of naturalization, that is, nationalization to the new 
country of residence. Cultural differences, however, would not be a major 
source of discord because 'no cultural sacrifices [were] essential as a 
condition of final absorption' and experience showed that social assimilation 
would be complete in two or three generation (Simpson, 1938, p.540).
There were two types of resettlement schemes. One variety relocated refugees 
from densely populated cities and towns, where their presence was believed 
to be unsettling, to sparsely populated rural areas. The other form relocated 
refugees to 'under-populated' regions of the world. The assumption that 
population pressure lead to war was widely accepted and disseminated by 
politicians, scholars, and international public servants (Citroen, 1951).46 As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, Lebensraum was a powerful idea in Europe and 
geopolitical knowledge had been influential in shaping the relationship 
between territory and population. Themes of 'manpower equilibrium', 
'national health', and 'excess population' was part of the language used to 
promote organized migration. Add these ideas to the anxiety over peace in 
Europe and the need for human resource elsewhere in the world and 
resettlement schemes appeared to be an intelligent and practical solution.
The requirement of postwar reconstruction in some European states and the 
general demand for labour in settler states allowed resettlement to be a viable 
solution in the early and mid 1920s and again in the mid 1940s. The 
conditions in France indicated how resettlement was an acceptable and
46 See H.A. Citroen, (1951) European Emigration Overseas: Past and Future, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff; W. Thompson (1948) Plenty of People: the world's population pressures, 
problems and policies, and how they concern us, New York: Ronald Press; (1946) Population and 
Peace in the Pacific, Chicago, University of Chicago press; and (1942) Population problems, 3rd 
ed., New York: McGraw-Hill.
143
GOVERNING POPULATION DISPLACEMENT 1919-1951
successful solution to population displacement. The French government 
perceived the health and wealth of the country as dependent on the size of its 
population. During World War One, France suffered the loss about 1.5 
million members of its male population. This demographic situation 
prompted the government to encourage immigration, offer special incentives 
payments for large families, and outlaw birth control. From 1922-1925 France 
permitted the entry of about 1.5 million foreign workers, of which 400 000 
were Russian refugees willing to perform menial jobs (Marrus, 1985, p.96). 
Recruiters were sent to Sofia and Constantinople to persuade displaced 
Greeks and Macedonians to move to France (Marrus, 1985, p.114). Upon 
arrival in France, they were quickly deployed in the task of reconstruction.
Refugee governing bodies were central to the implementation of resettlement 
schemes. By late 1945, the task of UNRRA had shifted from the organization 
of repatriation programs for DPs to the coordination of their resettlement in 
European camps. After the termination of UNRAA, the IRO launched an 
even more ambitious resettlement program. It supervised the entire 
resettlement operation - from the moment when a displaced person or 
refugee applied to the organization for emigration assistance to the moment 
when she established herself in the immigration country.
The functioning of the IRO as an international employment/migration 
agency was extensive. The bureaucratic machinery of the organization 
collected useful data such as language proficiency, previous work experience, 
and vocational or professional training. The IRO carried out extensive 
vocational training programs for adolescents and older persons. It also 
introduced a vocational and professional certification system, which 
converted, after a series of assessment, the former skills and qualifications of 
refugees into certificates of merit (Proudfoot, 1957, p.419). After vocational
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training, language lessons, and skill elevations, the IRO counseled refugees 
on the most appropriate potential country of resettlement. In short, it 
prepared refugees for interviews by the various national selection or 
resettlement committees. Those selected were granted an immigration visa in 
their IRO passport, and those rejected were returned to a 'static camp' to wait 
for another chance (Proudfoot, 1957, p.424).
The marketing campaign, which involved the UN, UN Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and voluntary agencies emphasized 
the economic, technical and social values of these people as potential 
immigrants. The general shortage of skilled labour and technicians after the 
war provided considerable resettlement opportunities for refugees. 
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, 
Canada, the United States, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Australia, Switzerland, and Sweden made bilateral resettlement 
agreements with the ILO.47 In the four and a half years of the resettlement 
operation, over one million European refugees migrated to many parts of the 
world. Australia and Canada embarked on large-scale immigration 
programs. Australian government, under the slogan 'Populate or Perish', 
sought refugee-immigrants to increase the size of the total population, which 
was perceived to be critical for national economic viability (Boyle, Halfacre, 
and Robinson, 1998, p.155). Moreover, refugees were not seen as a security 
risk but as a defense against future military threats from Australia's 
aggressive Asian neighbours.
As noted before, political tension between 'East and West' marked the 
activities of the various refugee agencies. Just as repatriation was politicized,
47 See Holbom (1956) for the details of each bilateral agreement.
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the organized migration of refugees attracted criticism from the Soviet Union 
and Eastern European countries. They argued that the schemes were 
designed to recruit cheap labour to the West rather than to assist refugees. 
Salomon's (1990, 1991) research on refugee policy in the immediate post- 
World War Two period shows that this charge was valid. Immigration 
countries sent selection teams to camps and countries of refuge to choose 
refugee-applicants according age, health, and occupational qualification 
(Vernant, 1953, p.35). For example, Britain embarked on an extensive labour 
recruitment program dubbed 'Westward Ho' to 'skim the cream of the DPs -  
generally understood to be the Balts' (Salomon, 1990, p.173). Likewise, the 
Dutch government asserted that the admission of DPs and refugees should be 
in the interest of industry and commerce, and in sectors where labour 
shortage was an obstacle to national reconstruction.
Population Transfers and Exchanges
The territorial settlements after both wars had not reduced the scope or 
intensity of the minorities problem in Europe (Schechtman, 1962, p.4). The 
nationalization of populations produced the 'national minority problem' in 
post-1919 Europe. The 'unmixing of peoples' through the reorganization of 
political boundaries, however, did not completely achieve the desired result. 
Due to the territorial redistribution, some acquired new nationality, some 
refused their new nationality, some lost their nationality, and some found 
themselves in a vulnerable position at the frontier zones of new states. 
National minorities were perceived as one of the major obstacles to both the 
political unity of these states and the peace in Europe, but further revision of 
state boundaries to accommodate the claims of every national group was also 
untenable (Schechtman, 1946, p.4). Moreover, the unregulated mass 
movement of displaced populations as a result of reorganization of Europe
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intensified the danger represented by minorities to the international order. 
From this perspective, ethnic cleansing in the forms of population transfers 
and exchanges was an acceptable policy option.48
International agreements on population transfers and exchanges were based 
on ethno-national identification.49 The League of Nations viewed population 
transfers and exchanges as legitimate means of addressing the tension 
between the boundaries of national states and the ethnic composition of the 
population within them. It considered the practices as constitutive of the 
League's minority protection system.50 It was hope that the relocation of 
national minorities who were outside the boundaries of their national states 
would reduce disruptive claims of national self-determination, and thereby 
ease tensions between and within states (Preece, 1998, p. 823). Another belief 
was that the transfers transformed groups who were at one time minorities 
into self-determining populations in their own national states. While 
expulsions unilaterally carried out by governments were considered an 
unacceptable practice, deportations based on agreements between sovereign 
states were legitimate. The reality that population transfers and exchanges 
had the effect of compelling people to leave their place of residence was seen 
by League members as a short-term costs that must be suffered for long-term 
gains.
48 A. Bell-Fialkoff and J. J. Preece have explored population cleansing as an instrument of 
national state creation and the various forms in which it has developed in European history. 
See A. Bell-Fialkoff (1996) Ethnic Cleansing, London: Macmillan; and J. J. Preece (1997) 
'Minority Rights in Europe: From Westphalia to Helsinki', Review of International Studies, Vol. 
75, No.l, pp. 75-92.
49 The first explicit exchange of population as part of a peace settlement in the twentieth 
century was the 1913 Treaty of Peace between Turkey and Bulgaria. Under the agreement, 
Muslims in the territories ceded to Bulgaria had the option to either remain and pledge 
loyalty to the new sovereign, or to leave for their national state.
50 A transfer may or may not be an exchange. 'Population exchange' refers to the process 
whereby populations are exchanged, in total or in part and with or without a treaty, between 
territories or States, whereas transfer refers to a policy of removing people away from their 
places of origin and repopulating that locality with other populations (Meindersma, 1997, 
p.336).
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So strong was the belief that the 'mixing' of populations would undermine 
the integrity of the national state that the decision to formalize and 
implement compulsory exchanges was not controversial.51 Compulsory 
population exchange was not seen in terms of forced migration. Indeed, it 
was praised as a legal innovation intended to manage relations between 
states and settle internal disturbances. It had international respectability as 'a 
solution to the troublesome minority problem' (de Zayas, 1988, p.20). For its 
supporters, compulsory exchange was necessary to ensure the 'orderly and 
humane' movement of populations.52
The most notable examples of the transfer of minorities included the Treaty of 
Lausanne of 1923 between Greece and Turkey, and the Convention on 
Reciprocal Voluntary Emigration between Greece and Bulgaria signed at the 
same time as the Treaty of Neuilly.53The Treaty of Lausanne involved the 
compulsory removal of 1.5 million Greeks and 400 000 Turks, while the 
arrangement between Greece and Bulgaria involved the transfer of 100 000 
Bulgarian and 35 000 Greeks (de Zayas, 1975, p.222-23). Indeed, the Treaty of 
Lausanne, often cited as an achievement in international law set the 
precedent for population cleansing in the form of the 'orderly and humane' 
transfer of populations during and after World War Two. Under the Treaty of 
Lausanne, the League established the Mixed Commission, which work under
51 The characterization of recent conflicts in the Balkans has revived the idea of exchanging 
populations as a potential solution.
52 See, K. K. Koufa and C. Svolopoulos, 'The Compulsory Exchange of Populations Between 
Greece and Turkey: the settlement of minority questions at the Conference of Lausanne, 1923, 
and its impact on Greek-Turkish Relations', in P. Smith, ed. (1990) Ethnic Groups in 
International Relations: Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in 
Europe, 1850-1940, Vol.V, New York: New York University Press.
53 Treaty of Lausanne, Convention Between Bulgaria and Greece Respecting Reciprocal 
Emigration of Minorities, and the Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers 
and Bulgaria, known as the Treaty of Neuilly can be found in Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, (1924) The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923, New York. For a historical analysis 
of these exchanges see, S. Ladas (1932) The Exchanges of Minorities Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, 
New York: Macmillan.
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its own definition of the term 'refugee'. It defined a refugee as a person 'who 
had left their country of origin in order to establish themselves in the country 
to which they were nationally akin on the occasion of war, a revolution, or a 
political movement, and who are in a state calling for assistance' (Ladas, 1932, 
p.134).
Since the transfers were designed to consolidate new boundaries, it was in 
the interest of states and the League to provide a wide range of assistance. 
The Mixed Commission facilitated the settlement of exchanged and 
transferred populations by providing loans and infrastructure, and by 
distributing seeds and cattle. The Greek Refuge Settlement Commission made 
up of Greek government officials, Greek refugees, and League of Nations 
representatives resettled Greek refugees by establishing villages, teaching 
agricultural techniques, and building infrastructure (Ladas, 1932, p.618). The 
Greek government strategically built villages and relocated the transferred 
populations onto recently won and therefore, contested territory. This 
strategy also sought to domesticate a previously displaced community. 
Similar programs were carried out for ethnic Bulgar refugees in Bulgaria, and 
for Armenian refugees in Greece and the Middle East, but they were not so 
extensive.54
During the Second World War, bilateral agreements on population transfers 
were numerous and mostly concerned the removal of German and non-
54 Germany's policy in the early 1940s also deployed its national population to colonize new 
territories and secure border zones. Israel (1948-49) also used this strategy of clearing borders 
of minorities and establishing frontier settlements with a transferred national population 
when it sought to secure conquered territories. According to historian Benny Morris, the fear 
of renewed war with Arab states along the border regions in the south, north and centre of 
the country, prompted an Israeli desire to achieve 'Arab-less' frontiers. See B. Morris (1993) 
Israel's border wars, 1949-1956: Arab infiltration, Israeli retaliation, and the countdown to the Suez 
War, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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German minorities as set out in Hitler's Reichstag speech of 6 October 1939 
(Schechtman, 1946, p. ix).55 After the war, bilateral transfer of minorities took 
place between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Hungary and Yugoslavia, 
Yugoslavia and Italy, the Soviet Union and Poland, and the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia (Preece, 1998, p.829). The Allies remained convinced of the 
value of the practice as the 'most constructive answer' to the problems of 
mixed populations and minorities in the danger zones of Europe 
(Schechtman, 1962, p. 390). Indeed, during the immediate post-war period, 
the sentiment towards population transfer was that it was a necessary 
practice for the prevention of future wars.56 In addition to the necessity 
argument, however, states were often eager to deploy population exchange as 
retribution against those identified as adversaries.
An element of retribution and a measure of political calculation unmistakably 
set the context in which the practice of transfers was carried out. The 
Potsdam Protocol of 1945 authorized the compulsory population transfer of 
fourteen million ethnic Germans 'in an orderly and humane manner' from 
East of the Oder-Neisse line - from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.57 
Close supervision of the movement of ethnic Germans was important as 
uncontrolled flow would hamper the occupying and controlling authorities
55 The most comprehensive study of the transfer of minorities in Europe between 1939 and 
1945 is J. Schechtman (1946) European Population Transfers 1939-1945, New York: Oxford 
University Press. The survey includes a list of transfers according to ethnic nationality, area 
of residence and place of resettlement. See also A. C. Bramwell (1988) 'The re-settlement of 
ethnic Germans, 1939-41', in A. C. Bramwell ed., Refugees in the Age of Total War, London: 
Unwin Hyman.
56 In the mind of a former director of the Pan-European Union, population transfers 'cut the 
cancer from a sick body' (Quoted in Schechtman, 1962, p.375).
57 For accounts of the treatment of the German expellees and refugees see, A. de Zayas (1979) 
Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans from the East, Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press; E. M. Kulischer (1948) Europe on the Move: War and Population 
Changes 1917-1947, New York: Columbia University Press; M. Proudfoot (1957) European 
Refugees: 1939-52, A study in Forced Population Movement, London: Faber and Faber; and 
especially, J. Schechtm an (1962) Postwar Population Transfers in Europe 1945-1955, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
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in their main tasks of disarming German armed forces and repatriating 
displaced persons (Persson, 1988, p.171). Ironically, the inexpensive labour of 
the expellees was a valuable resource to the postwar reconstruction of 
Germany.
Passports and Travel Documents
The passport system is essentially an arrangement between states, which 
effects inter-state relations in three ways: the passport's role as an identity 
document, the issue of nationality, and the diplomatic protection of citizens 
abroad (Goodwin-Gill, 1978, p. 24). The passport has come to mean a 
document of identity, which a state generally requires alien travelers to have 
in their possession. In other words, the possession of a passport is the most 
fundamental condition of entry or admission. Two qualifications are needed 
though. First, the municipal law of the state determines the form of the 
passport or visa it requires of the alien. Second, in international law, the 
accepted view on protection relates protection to the status of the bearer, and 
not to the possession of a passport. By institutionalizing the state-citizen bond 
in this way, the passport also allows an alien to be returned to her 'country of 
origin'. The 'returnability' of an alien is a crucial matter in the determination 
of whether she is to be permitted to enter another state.58 If passports or 
similar such documents are to be recognized by states, a guarantee of 
returnability is essential; this is customary international law. Stateless 
persons, therefore, represent particularly difficult problem to states.59
58 The fact of possessing a passport, however, in no way assures the entry of the holder into 
the state of issue. The guarantee of returnability demands by the rule of customary 
international law relates to obligations owed between states alone.
59 See P. Weis, (1956) Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, London: Stevens.
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The introduction of a tentative passport system by states was an attempt to 
facilitate the work of police and of other state authorities in preventing 
internal revolutions and counter-revolutions (Molony, 1934, p.24). The system 
was a police measure calculated to prevent the relatively free movement of 
political activists rather than to identify nationality. The passport system in 
its modern form developed during the First World War, when states were 
eager to curb the emigration of persons of military age and the immigration 
of 'suspicious7 persons. Consequently, the passport came into use as a way of 
regulating the flows of population and for certifying nationality (Marrus, 
1985, p.92). The Resolution of the League of Nations on Passports, Customs 
Formalities and Through Tickets on 21 October 1920 and the Convention of 
Gratz on Passports on 27 January 1921 confirmed the significance of the 
passport as a measure that governed the movement of population across state 
boundaries. In the immediate postwar years, many states were keen to 
establish mechanisms that delivered a sense of predictability and control.
The nascent international agreements on refugees centered on the issue of 
identification papers rather than the construction of a legal definition of 
refugees or the scope of legal protection. The first legal instruments were 
identity papers that allowed Russian refugees a degree of regulated 
movement. Those registered as refugees were issued certificates of 
identification for one year, which enabled them to travel within and between 
states in search of employment. The travel documents were issued by the 
police departments of European countries rather than by foreign offices. The 
'Nansen passport' was renewable but became invalid if the bearer returned to 
the country of origin. It was important that refugees were able to travel to 
find work because at the time, concentrations of refugees in Poland and 
Germany were becoming an economic burden and a political risk to the 
governments of these countries. Of course, the recognition of such a travel
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document required agreement among states.60 The understanding was that no 
states was obliged to receive refugees bearing such certificates, but that all 
parties agreed to recognize them as valid identity papers (Marrus 1985, p.94). 
The 1922 certificates gave refugees the right to return to the issuing state. 
Subsequent certificates were not valid for return unless they contained special 
statement to that effect (Holborn, 1972, p.10). Initially applicable to the 
problem of Russian refugees, the Nansen passport was later expanded to 
include Armenians, Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldeans, and Turkish and Saar 
refugees.61
Travel documents issued to refugees and stateless persons provide evidence 
of identity and status, but they do not substitute for passports or affect the 
holder's nationality. States have agreed to issue travel and identity 
documents to refugees and stateless persons because the practice allows them 
to monitor and regulate the movement of people. 'Nationality' is a legal 
identification and a category of belonging that tells states who belongs in 
which state. In this system, stateless persons as those without nationality 
represent practical difficulties for states. The dilemma remains unresolved, as 
states have yet to reach an agreement on the most effective way to overcome 
statelessness. In international law, the 'country of origin' for stateless person 
is the 'country of habitual residence'. In short, refugee identification papers 
and travel documents are constitutive of the characterization of the refugee as 
a specific category of person. They are devices that distinguish the refugee 
condition as one where the contractual bond between the state and its citizen 
has been broken.
60 Fifty-four states agreed in principle to accept the 'Nansen passport' for Russian refugees 
(Holborn, 1975, p.9).
61 But the attempt to have governments accept the creation of a common travel document for 
stateless persons and refugees was a failure.
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C o n c l u d i n g  R e m a r k s
The purpose of this historical retrospective has been to demonstrate the 
connections between mode of thought, governmental activity, and flexibility 
in the use of the term 'refugee'. From 1919 to 1951, the approach to refugee 
definition moved from a basis in national group category to a more legalistic, 
individualistic, and abstract one. Despite the definitional shifts, the term 
'refugee' is organized around the relationship between a person and a state -  
whether it is the state of domicile or the asylum state. Refugee agencies and 
their mandates, travel documents, population exchanges, and repatriation 
and resettlement programs all seek to reestablish the contractual relationship 
between a person and a state. Indeed, the purpose of international protection 
is to provide a surrogate state-citizen condition until an authentic one can be 
established through one of its durable solutions. Like the minorities 
protection regime, then, the refugee regime (re)produces the value of the 
national state as the location of belonging. In turn, the functioning of the 
refugee regime normalizes the disorder of refugees and displaced 
populations. The various governing activities produce a regime of truth about 
refugees as anomalous beings in a world organized into political 
communities comprised of national citizenry, who are potentially disruptive 
to national and international order.
This chapter also points out that between 1919 and 1951, efforts to address 
population displacement had largely been limited to Europe and reflected 
Western concerns. Displaced non-Europeans had yet to become 'persons of 
concern' for the refugee regime. Displacement is a condition experienced by 
people who are compelled to move for diverse reasons. Yet, from this density 
of movement, only certain groups acquire the characteristics of being 
refugees. The next chapter will inquire into the incorporation of non- 
Europeans into the refugee regime. It will tell a story of how the
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characterization of the non-European refugee experience as som ething 
distinctive from the W estern experience has (re)produced eurocentric 
assumptions about life worlds. The representations of the refugee problem 
outside Europe and the interventions made in the name of international 
protection reflect a particular configuration of power relations.
155
W o r l d  V i s i o n
the international relations o f  development and displacement
We are the miracles that God made 
To taste the bitter fruit of Time.
We are precious. 
And one day our suffering 
Will turn into the wonders of the earth.
Ben Okri, 
An African Elegy
As we have seen, there are two aspects to the 'problem' of refugees. On one 
level, the problem of refugees is the result of a territorial-based system of 
population governance, namely, sovereign states. Practices of nationalizing 
populations within states have produced national or ethnic minorities -  
categories of persons distinct from the nation. These persons have constituted 
the bulk of displaced persons in Europe between 1919 andl951. On another 
level, the characterization of refugees is not fixed and the governing activities 
are diverse. From this perspective, the meaning and government of refugees 
are reflections of particular understandings of the social world. Chapter Four
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'unpacked7 some of the self-evident features of the government of refugees 
and of the power relations that underpin the issue of refugees as a domain of 
intervention. It also noted the exclusion of non-Western populations from the 
legal and political protection of the leading refugee organizations.
This chapter continues with the objectives of the thesis to question the 
normalized conceptualizations of refugees and to analyze the power relations 
that produce 'tru th ' about the refugee problem. It does this by examining the 
inclusion of non-Western refugees into the calculation of refugee governance 
circa 1950. There have been two distinct characterizations of the refugee 
question in international relations in the post-1951 period. The East-West 
divide provided the grid of intelligibility for 'political' refugees who were 
mostly Europeans fleeing Com munist regimes. The North-South divide 
framed the 'reality ' of non-European refugees who live in the shadow of 
'underdevelopm ent'. While historical accounts of the international refugee 
regime have considered the effects of the East-West conflict on the 'evolution' 
of regime practices, the consequences of constructing a North-South world 
for the government of refugees have received less attention. The tasks of the 
chapter are to inquire into how perceptions of the South have shaped 
governmental practices for refugee and to disclose the power relations that 
underpin the representation of some people as Third World refugees.1
Borrowing from the critical histories of development by Cowen and Shenton 
(1996), Crush (1996), Escobar (1995 and 1988), Esteva (1992), Ferguson (1990),
1 Admittedly, the term Third World' is indeterminate and problematic but for current 
purposes, it refers to countries in Africa, Central America, Western Asia, South Asia and 
Southeast Asia. For analyses of the idea of 'Third World' see, H.W. Arndt (1981) 'Economic 
Development: A Semantic History', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 29, No. 3, 
pp. 457-466; S. W. Mintz (1976) 'On the Concept of a Third World', Dialectical Anthropology, 
Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 377-382; and P. Worsley (1984) The Three Worlds: Culture and World 
Development, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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and Rist (1997), the argument is that 'development7 has been a crucial 
strategy in the government of non-Western refugees. While I acknowledge 
the specificity of each refugee movement, my present task is to consider the 
inscription of power relations and the mode of thought (in)forming practices 
towards non-Western refugees in international relations rather than to offer 
narratives of specific incident. At stake is the representation of non-Western 
refugees as subjects of development. This view, I suggest, reflects a 
Eurocentric set of ideas about how the world should be understood, ordered, 
and governed.
I am not suggesting that development projects have brought no benefits to 
parts of the world. On the contrary, some development strategies have been 
successful in increasing Gross National Product (GNP), addressing 
infrastructure needs, and promoting industrialization. This has been the case 
for the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). Furthermore, I am not 
suggesting that the fieldworkers and architects of development projects are 
intentionally Eurocentric. Without doubt, their activities have contributed to 
the survival and welfare of many refugees. My intention to analyze the 
development-refugee link is to provoke a reflection on the habits of thought 
that has informed our action.
The chapter is organized into four sections. The first part outlines the broad 
changes in international relations that have influenced the discourse of 
refugees and the government of international relations. One of the most 
significant transformations was decolonization. The second part explores the 
shifting geography of displacement. The refugee question shifted from within 
Europe to outside Europe from around the 1960s. The third section looks at 
development as a distinctive realm of human experience and social relations. 
Development has become one of the most powerful ordering assemblages of
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thought and practice in the tw entieth  century. As a m etaphor for 
transformation towards growth and maturation, the development trajectory 
not only makes the idea of a T h ird  W orld' possible, it also locates the 
populations of this world as the 'not-yet' objects of constant improvement. 
The final section discusses the construction of Third W orld refugees as a 
problem of development, with special attention to the African experience. 
The link between refugees in Africa and problem s of developm ent has 
acquired a character of naturalness. I suggest, however, the invocation of 
developm ent has been a historical response to difficulties in crafting 
governmental practices.
Changing International Conditions
The purpose of this section is to provide a sum m ary of the historical 
conditions that transform ed understandings of the refugee question and 
enlarged the refugee regime. The common view claims the international 
refugee regime came into being with the 1951 Convention and the Statute of 
UNHCR. This is an oversim plification, w hich ignores the historical 
experiences of the non-West. One reason for the expansion of the regime has 
to do w ith a growing attentiveness tow ards population displacements 
outside the geographical confines of Europe. From the expansive writings on 
the history of international relations post 1945, we can identify six inter­
related developments that have affected the governm ent of international 
relations and created the conditions of possibility for the internationalization 
of the refugee regime.2
2 I use the term 'internationalization' to refer to the development and expansion of the 
agreement that refugees are of international concern at the level of diplomacy, international 
institutions and treaties.
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First, the process of decolonization in Asia and later Africa transformed the 
political map of the world and upheld the sovereign territorial state as the 
form of political organization.3 Hargreaves (1988), Grimal (1975), and 
Fieldhouse (1982) argue that the incentive to decolonize Asia and Africa was 
the colonial rulers' perceptions that their interest lay in such a policy, rather 
than to the decline of their power in an international order dominated by two 
'Superpowers'. The consequences of decolonization were many. The number 
of member-states of the United Nations increased from 51 in 1945 to 152 by 
1980 (Adams, 1994, p. 32). With the euphoria of post-independence, leaders of 
the new postcolonial states used the United Nations as a forum to push their 
interests and grievances. They formed the Non-Aligned Movement to 
distance themselves from the struggle between the Superpowers (Lundesrad, 
1997, p.291).4 In the 1970s, these states called for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) in a bid to pressure industrial countries to engage in 
a dialogue on restructuring international trade. Whether they were successful 
was not the issue, the point was that Western states had to deal with the ex­
colonies as nominal equals.
Second, the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union arising 
after the Second World War over the future of Eastern Europe triggered a 
major shift in the conduct of international relations (McWilliams and 
Piotrowski, 1993, p.32) Generally known as the Cold War, the antagonism 
intensified in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine. The declaration was the United 
States' commitment to contain -  by economic as well as military means -  all 
manifestations of Communist expansion wherever they occurred
3 Decolonization in Africa was not wholly confined to the post-World War Two period. South 
Africa and Egypt gained independence in 1910 and 1922 respectively.
4 The Non-Aligned Movement's attempt to extricate itself from the Cold War rivalry was 
largely unsuccessful as the post-colonial states found themselves drawn into the East-West 
conflict economically and politically -  often with detrimental results.
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(McWilliams and Piotrowski, 1993, p.40).5 This was American's global 
strategy. It designed the Marshall Plan for European recovery and the 
Colombo Plan for Asian economic and social development. Under the idiom 
of collective security, NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was 
formed to prevent the spread of communism to Western Europe. The Soviet 
Union responded with the creation of the Warsaw Pact. As Jim George (1994, 
p.69) observed, international Relations became 'a Cold War discipline' 
dominated by US foreign policy and 'security' concerns. The writings of 
Stanley Hoffman, George Kennan, and Reinhold Niebuhr6 provided the 
conceptual framework for thinking about international relations. Hans 
Morganthau's Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace (1949) was 
a particularly important text for the making of international relations and 
problematizing of international life post 1945.
The third development was the construction of the three worlds - each with 
its special domain of activities and concerns (Worsley, 1984). The 'North,
5 The history of the Cold War has inspired much scholarship since 1989 see C. G. Appy ed. 
(2000) Cold War Constructions: the political culture o f United States imperialism, Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press; S.J. Ball (1998) The Cold War: an international history, 1947- 
1991, New York: St. Martin's Press; P. Dukes (1989), The last great game: USA versus USSR: 
events, conjunctures, structures, London: Pinter; S. M. Gillon and D. B. Kunz (1993) America 
during the Cold War, Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; M. Kaldor (1990) The imaginary 
war: understanding the east-west conflict, Oxford: Blackwell; D. W. Larson (1997) Anatomy of 
mistrust: US-Soviet relations during the cold war, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; M. P. 
Leffler (1992) A preponderance of power: national security, the Truman administration, and the Cold 
War, Stanford: Stanford University Press; D. J. Macdonald (1992) Adventures in chaos: 
American intervention for reform in the Third World, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press; M. McCauley (1995) The origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949, London: Longman; M. 
Nincic (1989) Anatomy of hostility: The US-Soviet rivalry in perspective, San Diego: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich; M. Walker (1993) The Cold War and the making o f the modern world, London: 
Fourth Estate; and R. B. Woods and H. Jones (1991) Dawning o f the Cold War: the United States' 
quest for order, Athens: University of Georgia Press.
6 Niebuhr's combination of Christian ethics and political realism was especially appealing to 
the mission the United States gave itself to defend the free world from communism.. See 
(1954) Christian realism and political problems, London: Faber; (1948a) Christianity and power 
politics, New York: Scribner's; and (1948b) Moral man and immoral society: a study in ethics and 
politics, New York, Scribner's. A critique of Niebuhr's work has been provided by M. L. 
Kleinman (2000) A world of hope, a world of fear: Henry A. Wallace, Reinhold Niebuhr, and 
American liberalism, Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
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South, East, West' compass set the direction of international relations and 
mapped the content of interaction between states (Lundestad, 1997). The 
East-West world of the Soviet Union with its communist allies and the United 
States with its supporters was perceived largely as the domain of strategic 
power and security concerns. Superpower politics and the bipolar system 
became the central frames of reference for explanations of international affairs 
and policy prescriptions. The 'problem', from the perspective of the West, 
was communism as an economic and political system. The other conspicuous 
division was the socio-economic North-South division. The North was the 
'advanced' and industrial countries of the West and Japan -  the First World. 
The South consisted of the decolonized and economically weak states -  the 
Third World. The Second World was the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries. Countries were ordered accordingly as 'developed', 'developing' 
or 'underdeveloped'. The usage of acronyms LDCs (Least Developed 
Countries) and NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries) differentiated 
countries and reinforced the horizon of 'progress' to which all non-Western 
and non-capitalist countries were destined to travel.
This leads us to the fourth development, which Gill and Law (1988), Keohane 
and Nye (1977), and Kegley and Wittkopf (1993) identified as the 
institutionalization of a liberal international order. A range of international 
regimes and institutions were established under the name of 'integration' and 
'cooperation', and later, 'interdependence'. Such a move not only functioned 
to manage international relations, it also contributed to the normalization of 
liberal governmental norms and liberal mentality. The Bretton Woods regime, 
the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development - an institution that enabled private investors to make 
worldwide investments with state backing - the World Trade Organization, 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - all served to integrate states 
into a system of regulatory norms and practices. These enterprises were
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partly driven by the Cold War competition to establish spheres of influence 
and by the America's ambitions to order and manage the world according to 
its vision.
The fifth transformation that influenced the perception of refugees was the 
new pattern of international migration. Boyle, Halfacre, and Robinson (1998, 
p.17) argue that the character of international migration in the twentieth 
century was dominated by Europeans until the 1960s. However, he process of 
decolonization resulted in the flows of former colonial subjects to the 'centre' 
or 'metropole' (Grimal, 1975, p.417). In postwar Europe, there was no 
differentiation between 'economic' and 'political' refugees from non-Western 
countries as long as there was a need for cheap human resources. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, the politically persecuted Ibos of Nigeria, Tamils of Ceylon and 
Asians of Kenya and Uganda were 'economically invisible' in Britain because 
it needed workers (Sivanandan, 2000, p.ll). Castles (1989) and Cohen (1987) 
claim that the international movement of people from the 'satellites' to the 
'metrepoles', or 'South-North' migration, was acceptable due to the demand 
for the reconstruction and later, economic expansion of Western states.
The expansion of the welfare state and the economic decline of the 1970s 
shifted the representation of immigrants who came as laborers or 'guest 
workers' (Gastarbeiter). The claims of refugees started to be measured against 
the virtues of 'economic forces'. Governments began to emphasize the 
distinction between a migrant, who voluntarily moved because of economic 
motivation and a refugee, who was forced to move due to political reasons. 
The presence of migrants and refugees was cast as a problem for 
governments and a threat to social cohesion. Accompanying this 
development was the emergence of a migration research industry, which 
produced knowledge on problems of social cohesion, governing diversity,
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racism, ethnic identity and ethnic minorities for 'receiving' or 'host' countries 
in the West.
For the purpose of this chapter, the contradiction of hope and pessimism that 
arose in the late 1960s is the sixth and last influence in interpretations of 
international relations. 'Globalism' and 'One World' consciousness were 
ideas about human interconnectedness, which inspired the peace, anti­
nuclear, and environmental movements. Peace research and conflict 
resolution became academic enterprises, and a number of scholars began to 
reconceptualize international relations in global terms.7
According to Rist (1999, p.141), these shifts were the other side of gloom and 
doubt being experienced in the industrial countries. Economic thinking on 
scarcity also 'revealed' the proliferation of dangers facing 'humankind'. From 
the metaphor of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) to the Malthusian 
prophecy of the population bomb (Ehrlich, 1968), One Worldism announced 
shocking 'truths' too. In a world of risks and dangers, technology offered a 
way to rationalize and manage the anxieties induced by unpredictability and 
uncertainty. But Harrison (1984) and George (1977) insisted that the 
technological revolution had not solved problems of poverty and hunger.8
7 The World Order Model Project was the most notable advocate of a Value-based' approach 
to world or global politics. The move to deploy 'world' and 'global' rather than 
'international' as a condition of political relations was intended to be a criticism of the state- 
centricity of Realism. See, R. Falk, S. S. Kim, and S. H. Mendlovitz eds. (1982) Toward a just 
world order, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; S. S. Kim (1984) The quest for a just world 
order, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; R. Kothari (1975) Footsteps into the future: diagnosis 
of the present world and a design for an alternative, New York: Free Press; R Maghroori and B. 
Ramberg eds. (1982) Globalism versus realism: international relations' third debate, Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press; and S. FI. Mendlovitz (1975) On the creation of a just world order, 
New York: The Free Press.
8 The faith in the ability of technological innovation to solve poverty and inequality was the 
driving force behind the 'green revolution', which urged farmers to plant special high- 
yielding and insect resistant varieties of rice. Today, similar claims are being made about the 
internet as a facilitator for equality in developing countries.
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This schizophrenic character of 'One Worldism' shaped the refugee problem 
in two ways. First, the refugee issue was constructed within a global 
humanism that simultaneously emphasized and homogenized needs and 
values. Second, the problem of refugees was rendered solvable by way of a 
technical humanism that claimed a capacity to identify and rectify the causes 
and effects of social phenomena. These issues will be expanded upon in the 
following sections. For the moment, a brief overview of population 
displacement will contextualize these issues.
The Shifting Geography of D isplacement
Stoessinger (1950), Elliot (1982), Melander (1988), Rystad (1990), Salomon 
(1991), and Robinson (1995) have analyzed the connection between the Cold 
War and responses to refugees. Holborn (1975) and to an extent Loescher 
(1993) have recorded the work of the United Nations Fligh Commissioner's 
for Refugees - the principal international refugee organization after 1951. The 
findings of these studies could be summarized as follows.
In the beginning of the Cold War, the term 'refugee' implied those who fled 
Communism and sought 'freedom' in the West (Robinson, 1998, p.72). In the 
1950s and 1960s, the emphasis was on 'exile' as the appropriate solution for 
refugees from Eastern Europe. Resettlement in a third country and 
integration (or assimilation) in the country of refuge were the most acceptable 
policies.9 Robinson (1998, p.73) maintains that this policy was conceivable 
because the numbers of refugees were relatively modest and they were
9 US refugee policy was designed for those who had fled from 'Communist-dominated or 
Communist-occupied areas of Europe'. Indeed, until 1980, refugees from Communist 
countries automatically received refugee status under US refugee law (Salomon, 1991, p.14).
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mainly white, European, Christian and skilled. In view of the limits inscribed 
onto the legal instruments for refugees, this statement is correct.
The 1951 Convention and the Statute of UNHCR were designed to address 
political refugees from eastern Europe and not refugees outside of Europe. 
Non-Europeans were not officially included in the legal definition until the 
1967 Bellagio Protocol, which has yet to be signed by all UN members. Before 
the 1967 Protocol, the Good Offices of the High Commissioner for Refugees 
were established to offer very limited emergency relief and material 
assistance for non-European refugees. The General Assembly authorized the 
UNHCR to assist refugees who did not come within the statutory definition 
for the first time in 1957 for Chinese refugees in Elong Kong. Subsequently, 
other groups who did not come within the defined competence of the agency, 
but who nevertheless required attention also came under the care of the Good 
Offices. In time, as incidents of population displacement continued to arise, 
the activities of the UNHCR responded according to the significance 
attributed to them and to the stipulations of the General Assembly and 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
From the late 1960s, Europe was no longer the main source of refugees. 
Instead, it began to receive non-European and Third World' refugees. The 
situation was perceived to be manageable until the late 1970s when the West 
felt it no longer had the capacity to regulate the flow by selecting refugees 
through its 'off-shore' programs (Widgen, 1989). The 'irregular movement' of 
refugees raised concerns that a great number of 'new' asylum seekers were 
reaching the borders of Western countries in an 'illicit' manner, namely, by
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boat or by plane.10 The arrival of the Vietnamese refugees in the late 1970s on 
the shores of South-east Asian countries and Australia was the most obvious 
instance of irregular movement. According to Dennis McNamara (1989) and 
Arthur Helton (1989) a number of countries had adopted a policy of 'humane 
deterrence' to keep the new asylum seekers out. Two notable practices of 
deterrence were detention and restrictions on social services available for 
asylum seekers.
By the early 1980s, voluntary repatriation had replaced resettlement as the 
most desirable and durable solution to problems of refugees and displaced 
persons (Chimni, 1999, p.3). Asylum, considered fundamental to international 
protection during the Cold War in Europe, was now a problematic practice. 
The question of whether a person was a bona fide asylum seeker or economic 
migrant also emerged from this context of the apparent increase in 
spontaneous refugee movement. A refugee status determination process 
based on individual assessment was thought to be unsuitable to the new 
condition of mass displacement. The administration of a large number of 
asylum applicants was considered too costly and time-consuming. Moreover, 
the racialization of migrants and refugees in Western countries shaped 
governmental activities. In other words, Western governments resisted the 
presence of predominantly non-Europeans asylum seekers who were seen as 
threats to their cultural and political integrity.
In light of these international developments, the characterization of the 
refugee question and governmental strategies underwent significant
10 Technological advancement and the appearance of relatively cheap air travel had been 
blamed for the upsurge in 'irregular movement'. These 'jet-age refugees' represents new 
problems and the governments of the West had responded by establishing a variety of 
regulatory practices and by calling for further cooperation and coordination in terms of 
refugee policy.
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transformation. Crisp and Nettleson (1984), D'Souza and Crisp (1985), and 
Loescher (1993) contended that by the 1960s, mass population displacement 
in many parts of Asia and Africa created the sense of a new 'global' refugee 
crisis. Proxy wars conducted by the US and the Soviet Union in Africa, 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Central America, also 
contributed to population displacement. With the exception of refugees 
admitted from Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, and Chile, nearly all 'Third World' 
refugees remained in their regions of origin (Loescher, 1993, p. 75). The 
coordination of humanitarian relief and emergency assistance, rather than 
international protection, became the main task of the UNHCR. Numerous 
NGOs worked alongside the UNHCR to control the displaced populations in 
the huge refugee camps of the Third World. Foreign aid and development 
assistance redefined the refugee question. The choreography of a state of 
emergency became 'truths' about the conditions and problems in Third 
World countries. Indeed, from the 1970s, the refugee problem was 
reconceptualized as a Third World dilemma.
The rest of the chapter examines some aspects of the Third World refugee 
problem. It considers the link between refugees and development thinking 
and the implications of this mode of thought for practice. The effects of the 
refugee-development conjunction appears most starkly in the 'African 
refugee problem', and I will, therefore, use this case to illustrate how the 
deployment of development in the government of non-Western refugees 
(re)produces some Eurocentric views about the world. To appreciate the 
issues at stake, we first need to inquire into the power of development.
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D e v e l o p m e n t a l i t y
Development is an idea, process, and goal that alludes to efforts aimed at 
assisting certain countries to address the various problems of economic 
growth and modernization. Since 1945, the discourse of development and 
underdevelopment has been an important strategy in ordering relationships 
between states, particularly between those states organized by the North- 
South compass. The process of development has been a site of contention. But 
until recently, the idea and goals of development have not been challenged.
The Language o f Development
After World War Two, economic development became both a universal goal 
and a measure by which states were classified. According to Colin Leys (1996, 
p.5-6), the notion of development was inspired by a desire to do something 
for the people of the ex-colonies and by an anxiety over the spread of 
communism. The Truman doctrine of 1949 was a turning point for the 
emergence of 'development'.11 His 'fair deal' for the world included an 
agenda to solve the problems of the 'underdeveloped' regions. Point four of 
the doctrine introduced the concept, outlined a particular vision of world 
order, and justified policies to achieve that order.
[Wje must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement 
and growth of underdeveloped areas.... What we envisage is a program of
11 The origin of the idea of development is not at issue here but one could claim that modem 
ideas of development can be traced to the rise of industrial capitalism in Europe, the history 
of modernity, and the globalization of Western state institutions, discipline and cultures. The 
modem idea of development is present in Marxist and liberal thought. See S. Latouche (1996) 
The Westernization of the World, translated by R. Morris, Cambridge: Polity Press; and ]. 
Nederveen Pieterse and B. Parekh eds. (1995) The decolonization of imagination: culture, 
knowledge and power, London and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books.
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development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing. Democracy 
alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir peoples of the world into 
triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against 
their ancient enemies -  hunger, misery, and despair (Truman, 1949).
Underdevelopment became the identifiable characteristic of colonies and later 
postcolonial states. But the fervent speech was not followed immediately by 
keen involvement in the region. America's priority was postwar 
reconstruction in Europe.
Development involved a conviction that economic forces could be controlled 
and that economic and social development could be planned. Western 
policymakers and social scientists, along with the political leaders of Africa 
and Asia believed that with meticulous planning they could reshape society. 
At the international level, the United Nations organized a series of expert 
groups to study the problems of underdevelopment in 1951 (Meier and Seers, 
1984, p.12). The United Nations created a number of short-lived economic 
development funds in the 1950s before setting up the United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1966. Regional development 
banks were created for Africa in 1964 and Asia in 1966. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development or World Bank gave out loans and advised on restructuring 
programs.
At the same time, the language of development was also an important 
legitimizing project and self-identification mechanism for non-Western states. 
Indeed, the states that were categorized as the Third World began to define
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themselves as developing states within the international system.12 Since 
developed countries were establishing international development assistance 
agencies, it was pragmatic to be as identified a 'developing' country in order 
to access material and technical assistance. This is reflected in the dramatic 
expansion of development assistance and loans. Most economists believed 
that with significant investment, developing countries could 'take-off'. The 
Stages of Economic Growth (1960) by Rostow clearly expressed this view. In the 
50s and 60s, 'the goal of development was growth; the agent of development 
was the state' and the means of development were macroeconomic policies' 
(Leys, 1996, p. 7). 'Development economics' became a major academic 
industry. But macroeconomic policies yielded uneven results. Signs of 
industrialization and growth could be seen in some countries in Asia but not 
in many parts of Africa and South America (McWilliams and Piotrowski, 
1993, p.247-8). This success and failure of development planning raised the 
question of conditions for development and growth.
A different form of development thinking attempted to unravel this 
development puzzle in developing countries. 'Modernization theory' 
reaffirmed the goals of development, economic growth and progress, and the 
framework for these political and sociological inquiries was the 
transformation of 'traditional' societies to 'modern' ones. According to 
Weiner (1966) and Huntington (1968), the road to modernization depended 
on the complex interplay between forms of political and social organization, 
the dynamics of social and political change, and the conditions for order and 
institutional design. The features of 'traditional societies' and transitional 
societies, the role of the state, the mechanisms of change, and the sequences of 
political development, industrialization, and urbanization were the main
12 The demand for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s was an example of states 
organizing themselves for common interests under the category of the 'Third World'.
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research themes. For modernization theorists, economic growth and political 
development would lead to the creation of democratic institutions that would 
resist the spread of communism.
Another set of explanations for the obstacles to development came from neo- 
Marxist Dependency School. Dependency theorists like Frank (1967), Cardoso 
and Faletto (1979) argued that the development of underdevelopment was 
the core condition of many developing states. But the School did not question 
the goals of modernization. Indeed, dependency thinking shared 
modernization's goals of development. Its objective of dependency thinking 
was to explain why growth and progress were slow and distorted in some 
countries, especially countries in South America. It pointed out the historical 
conditions or processes that 'had stripped colonies of resources, reorganized 
their lands, pauperized the labour, and created compradore elites' (Sylvester, 
1999, p.706). In short, colonization had disturbed the potential of these 
countries to industrialize, grow, and modernize.
By the 1970s, development strategies had brought positive results to some 
countries. As a result, the representation of the 'Third World' altered in the 
mid 1970s. The category no longer described the same countries as before. 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico, and Brazil all 
experienced rapid growth in the manufacturing sector during the 1970s.13 
These countries constituted the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). The 
countries that did not experience even modest growth acquired the least 
developed countries (LDCs) label from the United Nations' new classification 
arrangement. Over half of the counties in Africa, according to the UN 
classification, were LDCs. Thus, the transformation of the 'Third World' had
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two significant consequences. First, the fragmentation put an end to the 
'common interest' between these countries, which was based more on their 
colonial past than on a collective project (Rist, 1999, p.153). Second, the idea of 
the Third World became a normalized characterization of the conditions in 
Africa.
The recession in the industrialized countries and falling commodities prices 
changed the international economic environment in the 1970s and had a 
tremendous impact on development thinking and practices. As the debt crisis 
in South America and the economic problems in Africa worsened, the goals 
of growth gave way to basic needs for a time.14 But the most significant shift 
was the ascendancy of neo-liberal thought or the revival of neo-classical 
economics in managing development. By the 1980s, 'market mechanisms' 
were seen as the key to development, not the activities of states.
During this period, the relationship between the Third World and 
international financial institutions also changed. To assist in the 'recovery' of 
Third World states, the IMF and the World Bank coordinated 'rescue' 
packages and structural adjustment loans that guaranteed funding in 
exchange for economic reform (Mosley and Weeks, 1993). The structural 
adjustment program was a market-based development model with an 
emphasis on economic prudence. Liberalizing the economy and reducing 
public expenditure were the two key tasks for the governments of sub- 
Saharan Africa. Leys (1996), Stewart (1991), and Toye (1987) claim that
13 The success of Taiwan and South Korea was aided by the Cold War tension. They both 
enjoyed American aid and trade concessions from the late 1940s.
14 According to Neil Smith (1997, p.181), the 'Third World debt crisis' was a South America 
event; sub-Sahara Africa did not have the 'luxury' for this sort of indebtedness. See N. Smith 
(1997) 'The Satanic Geographies of Globalization: Uneven Development in the 1990s', Public 
Culture, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 169-189.
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generally the poor in Africa carried the burden of wholesale economic 
liberalization. The World Bank's own assessment of the structural adjustment 
program, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Result, the Road Ahead (1994), was less 
condemnatory. The disappointing results of structural adjustment, according 
to the report, were due to the lack of sustained reform and the lack of 
institutional capacity, but were not a failure due to the reforms themselves. 
The identification of lack of institutional capacity as an obstacle to sustained 
growth brought back the state as a significant actor in market reforms.
A 'People-Centred'Approach ?
By the late 1980s, according to David Williams (1997, p.236), the key 
challenge for 'sustainable development' was capacity building at the 
institutional and individual levels. Transformation was geared now at the 
micro-level. Concepts like 'participation' and 'partnership' were used to urge 
the establishment of relationships that recognized agency and responsibility. 
To become participants and partners in development was to 'own' the 
process and therefore, to be responsible for the outcome of development 
programs.15 The language of human development and civil society became 
part of the development agenda. The human development indicator (HDI) 
was seen as a much more sophisticated and 'people-centred' approach to 
development than GNP. In 1990, the United Nations Development Program
15 For example see, Alan Fowler on partnership and NGOs. A. Fowler (1998) Authentic 
Partnerships in the New Policy Agenda for International Aid: Dead End or Light Ahead?' 
Development and Change, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 137-159; and (1991) 'Building Partnerships 
between Northern and Southern Developmental NGOs: Issues for the 1990s', Development in 
Practice, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.5-18. For other studies of 'partnership' see, L. Hately and L. 
Malhorta (1997) Between Rhetoric and Reality: Essays on Partnership and Development, Ottawa: 
North South Instiute; D. Muchungzuzi and S. Milne (1995) Perspectives from the South: a study 
of partnership, Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, NGO Division; and A. 
Van Roy ed. (1999) Civil Society and the Aid Industry, London: Earthscan.
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(UNDP) published the Human Development Report, its first assessment of the 
development performance of all countries. Since then, both NGOs and 
international development agencies have mobilized the idea of human 
development to legitimize their policies.16
Ostensibly, the road to development is moving away from the preoccupation 
with economic growth and toward alternative practices of participatory and 
people-centred development. Friedmann (1992), Henderson (1996), Kothari, 
(1988), and Shelth (1987) contend that the 'alternative development' 
framework is concerned with defining new goals of development, which 
critique mainstream developmentalism.17 The most notable changes, they 
suggest, are the expansion of NGOs and their capacity as key players, and the 
primacy of social issues such as gender, environment, AIDS and education on 
development policy agendas.
The project to 'humanize' development appears to be a positive step. But how 
different is alternative development to conventional development? 
Nederveen Pieterse (1998, p.345) suggests that alternative development 
broadly shares the same goals as mainstream development but uses different 
means.
16 For example, in 2000 the theme for the annual forum of Australian Council for Overseas 
Aid (ACFOA) was 'Partnership for Human Development'.
17 For analyses of the 'paradigmatic' debate within development studies see, F. Schuurman 
(2000) 'Paradigm lost, paradigm regained? Development studies in the twenty-first century', 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 7-20; J. Nederveen Pieterse (2000) 'After post­
development', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 175-191; and (1998) 'My Paradigm or 
Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, Reflexive Development', Development 
and Change, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 343-373.
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At a time when there is widespread admission that several decades have 
brought many failures, ... there is continuous and heightened self-criticism in 
development circles, a constant search for alternatives, a tendency towards 
self-correction and a persistent pattern of co-optation of whatever attractive 
alternatives present themselves. Accordingly the turn-over of alternatives 
becoming mainstream has speeded up;.... (Nederveen Pieterse, 1998, pp.349- 
50).
Since the language of capacity-building, participation and partnership are 
shared by advocacy groups, research institutions, national governments and 
international organizations, the representation of opposition can be 
understood as largely a political strategy by "stakeholders' to justify their 
particular claims.
The continuity is deeper. The current focus on capacity building and micro 
transformation is not unique. Modernization theorists have sought to explain 
lack of development in terms of the traditional character of developing 
societies. They too, have proposed that personal transformation18 along with 
political and social change as necessary for development. The continuities in 
development thinking have been noted by Leys (1996, p.26). His account of 
the history of development thinking summarized the 1970s as 'redistribution 
with growth', and the 1980s as the structural adjustment path to growth. 
Furthermore, the current discourse of 'social transformation' contains beliefs
18 Aptitudes and attitudes in the Third World were perceived also as causes of 
underdevelopment. See G. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr. (1966) Comparative Politics: A 
Developmental Approach, Boston: Little, Brown and Company; B. F. Hoselitz (1957) 'Economic 
Growth and Development: Noneconomic Factors in Economic Development7, American 
Economic Review, Vo. 47, No. 1, pp. 28-41; J.H. Kaustsky ed. (1962) Political Change in 
Underdeveloped Countries, New York: Wiley; D. McClelland (1961) The Achieving Society, 
Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand; M. Nash (1959) 'Some Social and Cultural Aspects of 
Economic Development', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 7, No. 7, pp.137-150; 
and L. Pye (1965) 'The Concept of Political Development', The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, No. 358, pp. 1-13.
176
WORLD VISION
about the malleability of social world and progress that were also evident in 
earlier development thinking.
Disputing Development
At first, it seems difficult to dispute the goals of development. But two issues 
need to be taken seriously. First, the discourse of development is (and has 
always been) a way to conduct international relations. At the core of 
developm entality is a transform ative aspiration tow ards those who are 
characterized as in need. From the historical studies of the discourse of 
development by Rist (1997), Sachs (1992) and Cowen and Shenton (1996), it is 
clear that developm ent has as its principal focus the First W orld 's 
relationship w ith the Third World. The imaginaries of development have 
m apped relations betw een 'developed ' and 'developing ' states, and by 
extension have marked the difference between 'developed' and 'developing' 
populations. It is no coincidence that former colonies become 'developing 
nations'. The move from a discourse of growth to hum an development has 
obscured this m entality of developm ent and it ancillary concepts of 
transform ation  and progress. A long w ith the discourse of social 
tran sfo rm ation , the hum an  developm ent fram ew ork  norm alizes 
developmentality as a way to order North-South relations.
Development policies are interventionist practices aimed at improving life 
and life choices. Development, Sen (1999) claims, is best seen as a process of 
expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy. This is the same 
sentiment expressed forty years ago in Theory of Economic Growth (1955) by 
W.A. Lewis. He insists that the objective of development was to increase the 
range of hum an choices, which 'gives m an greater control over his 
environment, and thereby increases his freedom ' (1955, p.9-10). In other
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words, to be able to participate in the process of economic, social, political 
and cultural development is fundamental to the exercise one's liberty. 
'Underdevelopment' and resource constraints impose limitations on the 
exercise of such liberties, while development contributes to the expansion of 
the capabilities of persons to lead the kinds of lives they value (Sengupta, 
2000, pp. 569). Development activities are seeking to create the conditions 
that would enable the populations of these states to conduct themselves as 
liberal individuals.
Second, the trajectory of development follows the historical experiences of the 
West, and consequently has foreclosed any serious attempt to pluralize and 
expand the horizon of being. In Social Change and History: Aspects of the 
Western Theory of Development (1968), Robert Nisbet examines the metaphor of 
growth and development in Western thought on society and change and 
stresses that growth refers to directionality and purpose. In other words, 
development moves from one point in time to another and serves a human 
purpose, which may be a classless society as in Marxism or the exercise of 
liberty in liberalism. According to Crush (1995), Escobar (1995a), Latouche
(1996) , Mignolo (2000), Rahnema and Bawtree (1997), Sachs (1992) and Smith
(1997) , development, underdevelopment, progress, poverty, and growth are 
concepts that reproduce and reinforce a particular Western view of society 
and change. The 'chronopolitics' of development is similar to that articulated 
by the discipline of anthropology.19 Both modes of thought construct an 
'other' that is 'not yet' beings, according to Western sensibility. I have noted 
in Chapter Three the prevalence of evolutionary and developmental model of 
society in Western thought and the implications for the conduct of human
19 For a study of the conception of time in anthropology see J. Fabian (1983) Time and the 
other: how anthropology makes its object, New York: Columbia University Press.
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relations and the organization of political community. Development is a 
continuation of this mode of thought.
'Backwardness7 is a state of being on developmental horizon. In explaining 
inequalities among the world's population, the concept of development has 
replaced the condescending terms of 'race', 'primitive', 'tribal', and 'natives' 
in the official vocabulary. At the core of the concept of 'developed' and 
'underdeveloped' is a distinct philosophy of history.20 Underdevelopment is 
not the opposite of development; it is only lagging behind on the one 
continuous and linear path of development (Rist, 1996, p. 74). Development, 
Escobar (1995b, p.213) suggests, can be seen as a mechanism 'that links forms 
of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power 
and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World 
societies', where 'individuals, governments and communities are seen as 
"underdeveloped" and treated as such'.
This proposition cannot be reduced to a crude 'westernization of the world' 
argument. As we have seen, the current practices of development, with their 
emphasis on participation and partnership have mobilized agency on the part 
of developing subjects to achieve developmental goals. Populations of the
20 The debate within development studies has produced numerous inquiries that question the 
foundational premises of development thinking. One of the earliest critique of development 
is R. Nisbet (1969) Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development, New 
York: Oxford University Press. In addition to the writers mentioned in the text, for critiques 
of development see, R. Arthorpe and D. Gasper eds. (1996) Arguing Development Policy: 
Frames and Discourses, London: Frank Cass; D. Booth ed. (1994) Rethinking Social Development, 
Harlow: Longman; J. Brohman (1996) Popular Development. Rethinking the Theory and Practice of 
Development, Oxford: Blackwell; C. Leys (1996) The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, 
London: James Currey; J. Ferguson (1990) The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', 
Depoliticisation and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For 
studies critical of 'anti-development' see, J. Nederveen Pieterse (2000) 'After post­
development', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No.2, pp. 175-191; and (1998) 'My paradigm or 
yours? Alternative development, post development, reflexive development', Development and 
Change, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 343-373.
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Third World7 are no longer simply recipients; they are now responsible 
agents of their own development. This strategy obscures both the power 
relations that have produced their capacity and the cultural values that are 
being (re)produced. The point is still valid that the discourse of development 
has produced a unique field of human experience for most of the world's 
population. My proposition is that, although the project of development has 
undergone significant changes in terms of form, underlying assumptions 
about the need to develop many of the world's people have remained. The 
current development practices indicate a dispersal of developmental 
processes and technique rather than a reconceptualization of the life world 
into one does not contain a notion of development.
Thus, the power of development lies in its amorphous character that 
nevertheless, suggests the best of intentions. The term has become the ground 
on which right and left, elites and grassroots fight their battles -  with each 
justifying their action in the name of a higher goal (Sachs 1992, p.4). The 
promises of development, growth, and modernization are seductive and 
appear most reasonable. Development, however, involves much more than 
economics, it is concerned with the transformation of political and social 
institutions, of hearts and minds. Who wants to live in poverty? Who wants 
to be illiterate? Who wants to be unenlightened and miserable? As 
'underdevelopment' becomes a domain of experience, strategies for dealing 
with the 'problem' resulted in the subjection of people, who in turn subjected 
themselves to systematic and comprehensive intervention.
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A C r i s i s  in  D u r a b le  So l u t i o n s
A central claim of this thesis is that the government of refugees (re)produces 
certain cultural values. This section will show that the (re)production of 
Western cultural values is most evident in the characterization of the 
relationship between development and 'Third World' refugees. The 
proposition is that the insertion of development into the discourse of refugees 
marks the emergence of an extremely potent assessment of the refugee 
problem. The representation of refugees as developmental subjects has 
become pivotal to the ways in which Western states have justified their 
activities and responses to refugee situations in the 'Third World'. Special 
reference is made to regime practices in Africa in the Cold War period 
because the discourse of 'African tragedy' dominates the imagination of those 
policymakers and scholars who seek to resolve and explain displacement in 
the 'Third World' . 21
For many refugee scholars, the development-refugee nexus is 
unproblematic.22 It is taken for granted that underdevelopment is a root cause 
of refugee problems in the Third World. Displaced populations in the 'Third 
World' are seen as victims of various forms of underdevelopment rather than 
as 'political' refugees. Indeed, the field of refugee studies has consolidated the 
link between refugee movement and development issues.23
21 The refugee regime continues to deploy development as a solution in the post-Cold War 
era and this is the subject of Chapter Seven.
22 A few examples of this vast work are, H. Adelman and J. Sorenson eds. (1994) African 
refugees: Development Aid and Repatriation, Boulder: Westview Press; R. F. Gorman (1993) 
Refugee Aid and Development: Theory and Practice, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press; 
and (1987) Coping with Africa's Refugee Burden: A time for Solutions, Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff; C. Keely, (1981) Global Refugee Policy: The Case for a Development-Oriented Strategy, 
Washington, D.C.: The Population Council.
23 For example, the Refugee Studies Program (now Centre) was established at the University 
of Oxford in 1982 with strong links with the Development Studies Program.
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Yet, popu lation  displacem ent outside Europe has not always been 
understood in terms of underdevelopm ent. Aristide Zolberg (1983) claims 
that refugees in the developing w orld have arisen from two historical 
processes: the form ation of new states out of colonial empires and 
confrontations over the social order in new states. According to Kibreab 
(1983), the struggle for national independence, the appropriation of colonial 
administrative structures by elites, and the struggle among elites to establish 
control in new states are at the core of the 'African refugee problem'. Astri 
Suhkre (1997) adds that the interventionist stance of the Soviet Union and the 
US during the Cold War internationalized regional and local conflicts and 
thereby, contributed to the flow of refugees in Asia, Africa and Central and 
South America.24 Cold War politics prolonged conflicts and contributed to 
mass population displacem ent in countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. According to Gallagher (1994, 
p. 433), W estern powers prolonged the attacks of Etritrean and Tigrean 
liberation struggles on the Ethiopian governm ent, by providing these 
liberation movements with relief aid transported from Sudan.
Ostensibly, the general explanation for population displacement outside 
Europe in the 1950s and early 1960s was that it was due to decolonization or 
struggles for national liberation.25 It was assumed that the displaced would 
return to their homes after the conflict. With the realization of statehood, 
national governments were to manage their countries and populations in 
such a way that the movement of people across boundaries would become a
24 The East-West conflict spread to many parts of the 'Third World' in the 1980s. The Soviet 
Union and the United states exploited the conditions in these countries by supplying arms to 
various parties and using humanitarian aid to those who professed to be aligned with their 
ideology. See K. A. Feste (1992) Expanding the frontiers: superpower intervention in the Cold 
War, New York: Praeger; and Z. Karabell (1999) Architects of intervention: the United States, the 
Third World, and the Cold War, 1946-1962, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
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regulated affair and flight would be an exceptional event. Indeed, in a recent 
interview, ex-president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere admitted that refugees 
from independent Burundi were seen as an aberration in the 'new' Africa 
(UNHCR, 1999c, p.14).
In 1969, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) approved the Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.26 The 
convention contained a broader definition of refugees than the 1951 UN 
Convention and included persons fleeing because of "external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order" 
in any part of their country of origin or nationality.27 This "generous" 
convention was a declaration of pan-Africanism in a rapidly decolonizing 
continent. The African leaders saw refugee movements as the consequence of 
the colonial struggle for independence. They expected the refugee situation to 
be a temporary one. The general assumption was that refugees would return 
to their homes after independent statehood has been achieved. To assist in 
the return of the displaced, Article V of the Convention outlined the 
conditions for voluntary repatriation. The Convention, therefore, was also a 
statement on the importance of the state as an organization and state 
sovereignty as the guiding principle of coexistence for the region.
At first, the UNHCR focused its efforts on providing and coordinating 
emergency assistance.28 Since the refugee movements had been characterized
25 Pan-Africanism reached a high point with the formation of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) in 1963. The founding of the organization was part of the Africanization of 
Africa project.
26 The Convention came into force on 20 June 1974.
27 See Article 1 of the OAU Convention for a full definition of the term 'refugee'. 1000 UNTS 
46.
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as the temporary consequence of decolonization, the international response 
was emergency relief. The adequacy of the relief approach came under 
scrutiny when the growing number of refugees began to impose an enormous 
burden on countries of asylum. In the 60s, the UNHCR expanded its 
operation by introducing resettlement schemes for refugees who could not be 
repatriated. During the 1970s, the answers for the refugee issue were 
resettlement schemes and repatriation programs.
As mass population displacement continued to occur in Africa in the late 
1960s, the impact of these movements and the search of durable solutions 
became important issues for the government of refugees. The traditional 
durable solutions for refugees: repatriation, local integration, and 
resettlement in a third country remained essential to the refugee discourse. 
But Western states dismissed third country resettlement as an unworkable 
solution for Third World' refugees. The claim was that most Third World 
refugees were from rural areas and would not easily be integrated into 
Western modern societies (Sorenson, 1994, p. 178). Louise Holbom's study of 
the UNHCR and refugees, considered one of the most detailed studies on the 
subject, portrayed the 'African refugee problem' in this manner:
African refugee groups have proved to be very different from those in 
Europe in size, character, and needs; .... They frequently have come in mass 
movement -  entire villages or tribes suddenly crossing historical, but 
artificially defined, borders, usually seeking asylum with ethnic kinfolk on 
tribal lands reaching across national frontiers. These rural refugees have had 
little contact with modern society; a number suffer from malnutrition or 
chronic illnesses; and very few are literate (1975, pp.825).
28 Since the majority of refugees were outside holding camps, many did not receive 
emergency material assistance.
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This view justified discriminatory practices towards African refugees. As 
Rogge (1985) notes, the rural argument was inconsistent with practice. 
Restrictive quotas were placed on African refugees, but many Southeast 
Asian refugees who had similar rural backgrounds were accepted. The 
African refugee problem, therefore, depended on the other two permanent 
solutions - integration into the country of first asylum and repatriation.
After almost two decades of refugee relief and humanitarian programs, the 
question in the international management of refugees was why the refugee 
problem seemed intractable in the 'Third World'. Indeed, in the view of 
many, the problem had attained crisis proportions. The gap between policy 
expectations and results was disappointing and frustrating. The institutional 
mechanisms of the international refugee regime, designed for European 
refugees, appeared to be inappropriate for the refugee situations in the 'Third 
World'. The nature of conflict generating population displacement created a 
large number of 'long-stayers', who could not be repatriated after a period of 
displacement. Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, Mozambicans in Malawi and 
other neighbouring countries, Saharawis in Algeria, and Angolans in Zambia 
and Zaire were just a few examples of 'long-staying' refugee populations. 
There was a general impression that the traditional durable solutions of 
resettlement, integration, and repatriation were incomplete. The link between 
refugees and development emerged from this predicament of practice. Once 
considered as largely separate and distinct activities, refugee assistance and 
development policy now merged to address 'refugee-related development 
issues' or 'development-related objectives in refugee-impacted areas' 
(Gorman, 1987, p.ll).
185
WORLD VISION
The idea of a relief-development continuum  emerged during this crisis of 
practice.29 'Development' provided a framework of analysis and a guide to 
activity on the refugee problem  in Africa. The inclusion of development 
practices is a major innovation in the management of refugees. Development 
is view ed as a strategy to secure the conditions for repatriation and 
integration as well as to prevent future flows. The appropriate response to 
refugee m anagem ent, beyond the initial d isaster relief activity, is 
development assistance to support both countries of origin and countries of 
first asylum.
By the 1960s, the p rofessionalization  and in stititu tionaliza tion  of 
developm ent through the rise of 'developm ent studies' experts and the 
network of development institutions had constructed a different imaginary of 
non-W estern populations and transform ed the character of the relations 
between the 'advanced' 'industrialized' countries and the poor undeveloped 
countries (Escobar, 1988, p. 430-1). M ultilateral, bilateral and voluntary 
development agencies were operating on international, regional, national and 
local levels. Their knowledge and practices were resources ready to be 
deployed for the new ends. Indeed, when the discourse of development was 
linked openly to the problem  of refugees in the late 1970s, development 
th inking and policies had  done m uch to order and norm alize the 
international relationship between 'developed' and 'developing' countries. 
Since most refugees were now in the 'underdeveloped' countries of the Third 
W orld, it appeared self-evident that developm ent was the key to the 
resolution of refugee problems in the region.
29 Joanne Macrae argues that the distinction between the unconditionality of relief aid and the 
conditionality of development assistance was the outcome of the Cold War and the rise of 
neo-liberal principles of economic management, which argued for a minimal state. See J. 
Macrae (1999) Aiding peace... and war: UNHCR, returnees reintegration, and the relief-development 
debate, UNHCR Working Papers, No. 14.
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The perception was that African states suffered many afflictions. First of all, 
African governments had very limited capacity to manage their societies and 
direct change. The lack of mastery in the art of government predisposed 
African states to political instability, authoritarian rule, conflict, and 
population displacement. Collier (1982), Jackson and Rosberg (1982), and 
Young (1982) insisted that among other things, the patrimonial systems of 
rule and the rudimentary administrative infrastructure and expertise 
contributed to the fragility of these states. Secondly, weak states had weak 
economies (Zolberg, 1990, p. 96). The general prospect for Africa was not 
good. Thirdly, as mentioned in the previous section, the international 
economy of the 1970s marginalized Africa together with the rest of the Third 
World'. The burden of debt, the worsening terms of trade, the corruption of 
economic and political managers, the unwillingness of foreign capital to 
invest into the region, the exploding population growth, and the decrease in 
food production, were signs of further deterioration in African states. Writing 
about social conflict and refugee movements in developing societies, Zolberg, 
Suhkre and Aguayo (1989, pp.223-1) offer a despairing prognosis of the 
situation.
[0]f the eight major concentrations of refugee today, five originated in states 
that fall within the World Bank's lowest category of low-income countries,... 
Most of the world's refugee camps are located in these countries, and a large 
proportion of the refugees that are resettled are in these countries.
The difficulties inherent in the integration of political communities and the 
achievement of sustained economic growth are compounded in many 
developing countries by low resource endowment, undeveloped human 
capital, and extreme ethnic heterogeneity.
These developmental problems were contributing to the African refugee 
crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s. Short-term humanitarian operations would
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not solve the refugee problem in Africa. The prescription was long-term 
projects that integrated with the country's development programs.
Institutionalizing the Development Strategy
The development strategy served the purposes of both North and South. For 
the North, development was a containment policy aimed at restricting the 
movement of people from the South. Western states had been alarmed at the 
prospect of substantial migration from the South and had implemented 
restrictive measures that affected migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. 
Advancing development programs, therefore, helped to preserve the 
restrictive asylum policies in Western states. For the South, the presence of 
large numbers of refugees was valuable in negotiations for development 
assistance and aid - given that most 'Third World' refugees remained within 
the region of conflict. The concept of 'burden-sharing' was an attempt to 
address this imbalance. The argument was that the stress on the economic 
and social infrastructure of 'developing' host countries must be matched by 
the financial and technical support of 'advanced' countries. The 1979 Pan- 
African Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa pointed to the need 
to link refugee assistance with development projects at the regional, national 
and local levels.30
Admittedly, the link between refugees and development was already evident 
in the 1960s when the UNFICR, UNDP, and the World Bank were encouraged 
to collaborate on activities that linked refugee programs with development 
plans. When 'development' was first raised as a relevant issue for refugees,
30 For the response of UNHCR to the Conference see, UHNCR, (1979) Report on the 
Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa. REF/AR/CONF/Rpt.I.
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attention was on the needs of countries of asylum. One concern was whether 
the presence of refugees contributed to or hindered the development of the 
host countries. Another concern was with the tension that could arise from 
providing aid to refugees when the host population was deprived of similar 
assistance. In other words, refugees were often seen as burdens on the host 
countries -  regardless of their actual impact. The task for policymakers was to 
create an 'integrated strategy7 that would refigure the refugee as a participant 
in the development of the host state.
The creation of refugee resettlement schemes arose out of the twin concern to 
reduce the burden on host governments and to foster among refugees as high 
a level of self-reliance and self-sufficiency as possible - in as short a time- 
frame as was practicable (Rogge, 1987, p. 86). Tanzania, Botswana, and Sudan 
experimented with rural refugee settlement schemes in the 1960s before these 
spread throughout Africa.31 The UNHCR, ILO, and national governments 
carried out the strategy of 'zonal development7 in Burundi and Zaire in 1963 
(Pitterman, 1985, p.75). The schemes expanded to other regions when the 
UNDP was established in 1966. The UNDP planned full-scale zonal 
development projects that incorporated refugee settlements. International 
voluntary agencies also gave their support to these schemes. The aim was to 
integrate rural schemes into broader national rural development strategies 
(Loescher, 1993, p. 82). Such schemes were also considered an effective way 
to integrate refugees into the country of asylum. In other words, the purpose 
of zonal development was to build and strengthen the economic and social
31 For assessments of the rural settlement schemes see, T. F. Betts (1984) 'Evolution and 
Promotion of the Integrated Rural Development Approach to Refugee Policy in Africa/ Africa 
Today, No. 31, pp. 7-24; R.Chambers, (1986) 'Hidden Losers? The Impact of Rural Refugees 
and Refugee Programs on Poorer Hosts', International Migration Review, Vol.20, No. 2, pp.245- 
63; and (1979) "Rural Refugees in Africa: What the eyes do not see', Disasters, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
pp. 381-92. For a general overview of the schemes see, L. Holbom (1975) Refugees: A Problem 
of Our Time: The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972, Vol. 2, 
Metuchen, N.J. Scarecrow Press.
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infrastructure of a region, which would lead to improvements in the local 
living conditions and contributing to the economic potential of the country as 
a whole (Holborn, 1975, p. 912). Proposals for the World Bank to fund large- 
scale, income-generating development projects were also among the 
recommendations to strengthen and stabilize the economies of host states 
with large refugee populations.
From the late 1970s, reflections and assessments on refugee practice arose out 
of concern over the 'pauperization' of host countries in Africa, the 'systems of 
dependence' often associated with the predominance of emergency relief in 
refugee assistance, and the need to invent new programs to tackle future 
refugee flows. The future direction of refugee policy in the 'Third World' was 
at stake. On the one hand, the identification of the root causes that produced 
refugees and the elimination of such factors were proposed as the future 
direction of refugee policy. On the other hand, an evaluation of methods and 
mechanisms used to cope with refugee situations was advocated as the 
starting point for reform. The power of development increased as 
policymakers, fieldworkers and academics began to mobilize the discourse to 
serve their goals.
The connection between refugee movement and development was validated 
authoritatively during the Pan-African Conference on the Situation of 
Refugees in Africa, convened in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1979.32 The concept of 
burden sharing was introduced to deal with capacity of host countries to deal 
with the mass refugee movements (Gorman, 1987, p.14). The 1981
32 The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the OAU, the UNHCR and the Dag 
Hammarskjöld Foundation organized a Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social 
Aspects of African Refugee Problems in 1967. The conference introduced the possible utility 
of the discourse of development to the management of refugees.
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International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I) 
introduced the concept of refugee-related development assistance, which was 
a response to dealing with refugees who remained in the country of asylum 
for a lengthy period, and who had little possibility of repatriation. In practice, 
the refugee-development schemes were large infrastructure development 
projects that involved the UNHCR and major organizations like the World 
Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
and the European Community (EC).
The UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee introduced the 'root 
cause' factor in a discussion of the future direction of international refugee 
policy in 1980. The report of the Committee pointed to the need to 
concentrate efforts on averting new flows of refugees. An Independent 
Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, formed in 1983, came to 
similar conclusions. Noting that the majority of refugee movements 
originated from developing countries, the reports from the Committee and 
the Commission linked economic condition in these countries to the political 
instability that compelled flight (Zolberg, Suhkre and Aguayo, 1989, p. 258).
Until the appearance of the root cause debate, the strategy of development 
was deployed to bolster the capacity of asylum countries to host refugees. But 
now development became an important activity for countries that generated 
refugee flows. The question was whether present refugee policies were 
satisfactory, when the root causes of deprivation and persecution that 'push' 
population movement were not also addressed. Those who advocated the 
root cause position argued that ignoring the political and economic causes of 
refugee movement had hindered the possible success of durable solutions in 
Africa. Since few refugees from the Third World are able to avail themselves 
of third country resettlement, pressure to resolve the problem depended on
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the other two permanent solutions, that is, integration into the country of first 
asylum or repatriation. The belief was that the lack of resources that 
contributed to refugee flow and inadequate relief assistance must be 
addressed if either solution was workable in the long run.
Further discussions on refugee aid and development took place among NGOs 
in November 1983 and among intergovernmental organizations in December 
of the same year (Cuenod, 1989, p. 233). The culmination of these 
undertakings was ICARA II in 1984.33 The themes of the international 
conference were based on the assumption that refugees imposed serious 
burdens on their countries of asylum. Twenty-two African countries were 
invited to submit proposals for infrastructure assistance (Gorman, 1987, p. 
26). 'Donor' countries and their development assistance agencies, host 
countries, representatives of international organization, NGOs, U.N. agencies, 
and experts attended the conference. Although Stein (1987, p.59) argued that 
the participants of the conference pursued different goals - the host countries 
stressed burden sharing, while the donors countries sought solution - the 
discussions was not a clash of worldviews. There was a consensus on the 
problem of refugees and the purpose of the refugee-development approach. 
The issue at stake was what kind of program would be most effective, not 
whether development was an appropriate strategy for African refugees.34
33 For analyses of ICARA II and the move towards refugee-development policies see, R. 
Gorman (1987) Coping with Africa's Refugee Burden: A time for Solutions, Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff; and B. Stein (1987) 'ICARA II: Burden Sharing and Durable Solutions' in J. Rogge, ed. 
Refugees. A Third World Dilemma, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 47-59.
34 In August 1984, a guideline for development approaches to refugee situations was created 
to ensure best practice'. 'Refugee Aid and Development: Principles for Action in Developing 
Countries' outlined four forms of activities: provision of immediate emergency relief, 
preparation for repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees if conditions allow, 
implementation of local settlement and development programs in asylum states, and design 
and implement development projects in host countries and countries of origin (Cuenod, 1989, 
p. 233. For full discussion of the principles see, UN Doc. A/AC.96/645 Annex 1.
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Debates over the future direction of international refugee management in 
developing countries are related to debates about the main functions of the 
international refugee regime and in particular, the UNHCR. The UNHCR is 
not authorized concern itself with reasons why people flee their countries. It 
is a humanitarian agency. Its mandated function is to facilitate measures to 
ensure refugees reestablish a legal relationship with a state through one of the 
traditional durable solutions and become self-supporting as soon as possible. 
The work of the UNHCR does not include devising measures to resolve the 
causes of refugee flow, which are seen to contravene its 'humanitarian' 
mandate. The emphasis on 'root cause' marks a divergence in priorities and 
operational function of the UNHCR. While the UNHCR is not a 
developmental agency, through collaboration with NGOs, UNDP, UNICEF, 
and WHO, it has become a participant in development projects.
The plethora of conferences, initiatives, and research on African refugees in 
the early 1980s should be viewed against the perception of generalized crisis 
in much of Africa, of which refugees were only a small part. The unfailing 
belief that underdevelopment was the self-evident condition of Africa 
inspired refugee specialists and agencies to concentrate their efforts on the 
problems of economic underdevelopment and poverty. Documents and 
research papers established development policies to be integral to the 
resolution of the refugee problem and reproduced an image of refugees and 
refugee producing countries as underdeveloped. Reports of international 
agencies, NGOs and the World Bank added legitimacy and in fact, 
reproduced the popular image of Africa as a continent confronted by civil 
wars, chronic food shortages, poverty and disease.35 The functioning of the
35 For a modem history of 'poverty' in the 'Third World' see A. Escobar (1995), Encountering 
Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, especially Chapter Two "The Problematization of Poverty: The tale of the Three Worlds 
and Development'; and M. Rahnema (1991) 'Global Poverty: A Pauperizing Myth', 
Interculture, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 4-51.
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UNHCR in the 'refugee aid and development' strategy entrenched the 
representation of Third World' refugees as an underdeveloped population. 
The strategy is a narrative about the North's relations with the South or the 
Third World.
The fact that the deployment of development was triggered by a predicament 
in the search for solutions has been obscured by another story about refugees 
as victims of underdevelopment. One academic participant of the 1983 
Symposium on the Problems and Consequences of Refugee Migration in the 
Developing World gave this advice to 'develop' refugees who included 
'many unskilled rural dwellers with little education'.
How might we transform fearful, undernourished hum an flotsam into 
energetic, capable workers and effective homemakers with high morale and a 
sense of purpose? ... Whatever the basis of the refugee flow, the people 
concerned need to be self-sustaining. Their ability to depend on themselves 
and upon each other is a vital part of both their self-respect and their 
effective functioning. Dependence is demoralizing; a program  of self- 
improvement and other educational options can foster hope and dignity and 
encourage the formation of a feeling of community (Smythe, 1987, p. 62).
This 'people-centred' approach to the African refugee problem disguises the 
relations of power between the developed' and developing states, and the 
'chronopolitics' that locate the populations of developing states as 
'backward'.
The conflation of the discourses of refugees and development has produced 
an object of intervention that suffers the double shame of displacement and 
underdevelopment. Refugees are constructed as burdens whose survival 
depends firstly, on the goodwill of others and secondly, on the opportunity to
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cultivate the self-determination to be a productive and autonomous subject. 
Thus, a vital aim of the refugee-development strategy was to reinvigorate the 
capacity of refugees to become self-sufficient so they could contribute to the 
overall economic development of 'developing' host countries or countries of 
origin. The human resource potential of refugees must be put into 
production. The objective is to transform refugees from a liability to an asset 
and through such processes, they would acquire the attributes of a 
functioning developed human being. The keywords for refugees are 'self- 
sufficiency', 'self-reliance', 'self-support', and 'self-help', which clearly relate 
to development's objective of enabling a person to exercise her liberty.
The discourse of development is not neutral. As a mode of thought and a 
program of action, development constructs reality. It legitimizes and 
reproduces certain power relations. To claim that the issue of refugees in the 
'Third World' represents a lack of development in countries of first asylum 
and countries of origin, condemns a large portion of the world's population 
to a normalized 'reality' of deficiency, despair, and dystopia. Having 
achieved independent statehood after colonialism, the historical task of these 
people is to 'catch up' to the 'advanced' countries and escape from the 
humiliating condition of underdevelopment. A motivation for change is the 
perception and the fear that one's existence is both lacking and incomplete. 
As Esteva remarks,
[Tjhe word 'development' -  profoundly rooted after centuries of its social 
construction -  is a remainder of what they are not. It is a reminder of an 
undesirable, undignified condition. To escape from it, they need to be 
enslaved to others' experiences and dreams (1992, p. 10).
For policymakers, one of the goals of development as a solution to 'Third 
World' refugees has been to enlarge the choices available for these people. 
But the refugee-development connection was also an art of constructing and
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deploying difference as a governmental strategy. Recall that the two 
important purposes of development are as a strategy to manage international 
relations by ranking states and populations in a hierarchy of wealth, power, 
and desirable human attributes, and as a justification for intervention. In the 
name of the displacement and development crisis, many lives have become 
the subject of discipline and improvement. The invention of the 
displacement-development nexus, therefore, has enabled the Western states 
to govern the non-Western refugees of postcolonial states through their 
notions of development, which reflect the particularities of Western cultural 
values.
C o n c l u d i n g  R e m a r k s
I began this chapter by suggesting that the inclusion of non-Western refugees 
into the calculations of the refugee regime connected with six international 
changes: the expansion of the international society of states after 
decolonization, the Cold War, the shifting pattern of migration, the 
institutionalization of an international liberal order, the division of the world 
into three distinct worlds, and the contradiction of hope and despair. The 
refugee problem outside Europe received little attention until the geography 
of displacement began to change. Then I considered the invention of 
development as a strategy for administering diverse and dispersed 
populations and territories, and the insertion of development into 
explanations of refugees.
The 'developmental refugee' represents a significant shift in the perception of 
the refugee problem and the practices designed to manage it. I suggested that 
this tale of Third World' refugees, set within the context of the 'North-South'
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relationship, has been a powerful mode of thinking about social, political, and 
economic realities. The significance of the tactic of development for the 
government of refugees is that the West and in particular Western Europe has 
able to distance itself from the question of mass displacement and to define 
the issue as essentially the problem of the Third World7. But as the following 
chapters will demonstrate, distancing became difficult for Western states, 
particularly Western Europe, when the issue of refugee came closer to 'home' 
again.
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P ost-1989 im aginaries o f  w o r ld  (d is) order
The new men of Empire are the ones who believe in fresh starts, new 
chapters, new pages; I struggle on with the old story, hoping that before it is 
finished it will reveal to me why it was that I thought it worth the trouble.
J. M. Coetzee, 
Waiting for the Barbarians
In Chapter Five, I expanded on the argument that the refugee problem in 
international relations is an effect of the system of territorial sovereign states 
by exploring the government of Third World' refugees as a cultural practice. 
If at a fundamental level, the disorder of refugees is a reflection of the order 
of states, then the disorder of non-Western refugees has been represented 
slightly differently. Their disorder has been characterized as a condition of 
underdevelopment. I have suggested also that this representation of Third 
World' refugees is an extension of the North-South distinction in 
international relations, which is a continuation of the West's relationship with 
the non-West. The governmental practices that seek to bring non-Western
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refugees into order (within their own states) are the various development 
projects, which are informed by W estern ideas about social change and 
human purpose.
The interplay between the symbolic and structural disorder of refugees is the 
theme of the next two chapters. It is commonly assum ed that the end of 
Communism has transformed the international political environment. The 
world is a different place. The following chapter discusses the government of 
refugees in this 'new  world order'. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
movement of refugees has been identified as one of key issues that threaten 
international security and world order. This chapter contextualizes the 
strategic responses to refugees in international relations by exploring the 
post-1989 imaginaries of world (dis)order. The objective is to examine the 
kinds of threats that refugees represent to contem porary politics. In the 
process of nam ing the new conditions and outlining possible futures, 
international relations was made knowable and manageable again.
This chapter begins by outlining some themes that have emerged in 
discussions of international relations in the post-Cold War period. Then it 
explores two influential interpretations of international conditions after the 
Cold War. I looks at Fukuyam a's 'The End of H isto ry ' (1989) and 
H untington 's The Clash of Civilizations (1996)1 to illustrate these views. The 
final part of the chapter examines the set of beliefs shared by both 
perspectives. The proposition is that the interpretations of international 
relations after the Cold War have tended to assume the uniqueness and 
superiority of Western values. One outcome of these interpretations is that
1 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is an expansion of an article 
published in Foreign Affairs in 1993. See, S. Huntington (1993) 'The Clash of Civilization?', 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 22-48.
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the conflation of the discourse of disorder with discourses of neo-racism and 
new barbarism.
The New W orld (D is)order
The collapse of communism ended a bipolar hegemonic system. The political 
map was redrawn and around twenty new sovereign states were created. The 
changes of territorial boundaries also involved a transformation in the 
composition of political communities. These events paralleled previous 
exercises of political geo-graphing and their consequences discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four.
The general agreement among scholars of international relations is that the 
Cold War political map, a map that once provided a framework of 
explanation in international relations is now inappropriate, if not obsolete. 
After the initial shock and the barrage of criticism directed at the sophistry of 
the discipline of international relations, the uncertain times have inspired 
disciplinary self-reflexivity and introduced a divergent set of issues for 
analysis.2 The theoretical debate overlaps the concern to deal with 'a world 
transformed' 3 and 'turbulence in world politics'. Transformations have taken
2 See, for example, J. Bartleson, (1995) A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; T. J. Biersteker and C. Weber eds. (1996) State Sovereignty as Social Construct, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; D. Campbell, (1992) Writing Security: United States 
Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; R. 
Devetek (1995a) 'The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory', Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp.27-51; (1995b) 'Incomplete States: Theories 
and Practices of Statecraft', in J. Macmillan and A. Linklater eds. Boundaries in Question: New 
Directions in International Relations, London: Pinter; G. O' Tuathail (1996) Critical Geopolitics, 
London: Routledge; and M. Shapiro, (1997) Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of Wars, 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
3 The 'World Transformed' was the subject of a series of essays in Foreign Affairs (1990) Vol. 
69, No.4.
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place in the international environment but there is no consensus on the 
significance of these changes or their consequences. It is within this 
(re)defining moment that distinct trajectories of international relations have 
emerged.
There have been several responses to the changes in the international 
environment and of which can be distinguished as either pessimistic or 
optimistic. One pessimistic response is a gloomy sobriety that sees the end of 
the Cold War bipolar stability as bringing a chaotic and fragmented 
international environment. Brzezinski (1993), Hoffman (1991), Kaplan (1994), 
Mearsheimer (1990), and Moynihan (1993) insist the world is an even more 
dangerous place than before as numerous new threats have arisen. Another 
version of pessimism perceives the new order as a new age of 'open' 
imperialism in the name of economic liberalization.4 The fear is that imposing 
economic liberalization onto developing countries will increase social and 
economic polarization and political instability. Halliday (1997) also suggests 
that the foreign policy interests of Western states have changed; they no 
longer have a strong interest in assisting developing countries. The optimistic 
perspective, in contrast, views the end of the Cold War as opening up new 
possibilities: international relations is no longer paralyzed by the superpower 
gridlock and as such, the prospect appears positive for progressive global 
social and political transformations like democracy, peace, and prosperity.5 
Some proponents of this view, like Beitz (1999), Cox (1999), Linklater (1999),
4 Essays in Third World Quarterly are examples of this perspective. See Volume 19, No. 4 
(1998) Special Issue: Rethinking Geographies: North-South Development and Volume 15, 
No.l (1994) Special Issue: The South in the New World (Dis)Order.
5 See D. Held and D. Archibugi eds. (1999) Citizenship, Sovereignty and Cosmopolitanism, 
Cambridge: Polity Press; D. Held (1995), Democracy and the Global Order: from the modern state 
to cosmopolitan governance, Cambridge: Polity Press; C. W. Kegley, Jr. (1993) 'The Neoidealist 
Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities', 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp.131-46; A. Linklater, (1998) The 
Transformation of Political Community: ethical foundations of the post-Westphalian era, Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
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and Falk (1995) propose a 'cosmopolites' based on notions about human 
interest, human security, international distributive justice, and global civil 
society.
But both optimists and pessimists believe that the most fundamental changes 
in international relations were the implications of globalization and their 
effects on the exercise of sovereignty. As Fred Halliday (1994, p.225) suggests, 
images of globalization are usually accompanied by a belief about the 
permeability, if not the erosion of state sovereignty, and about the changing 
nature of power in international relations - from being largely confined to 
military power to being based on economic and cultural factors. The world 
appears to be facing a new globalizing economic, political and moral order, in 
which the expansion of a liberal trade and financial regime occurs together 
with problems of overpopulation, ethnic conflict, environmental degradation, 
and poverty. The world is becoming simultaneously a global village and a 
dangerous neighborhood.
It is beyond the scope of the chapter to explore fully the significance of 
globalization on international relations. What should be noted here is that 
underpinning the divergent attempts to map and analyze the significance of 
the new condition is a common ambition to (re)interpret the nature of 
international order and the meaning of security. Indeed, at the core of the 
numerous debates between divergent and competing perspectives are the 
contrasting representations of international (dis)order in the post-Cold War 
era, and their implications for the government of international and national 
politics. The conclusion, we are led to believe - whether one adopts scenes of 
hope or dramas of dystopia - is that the world faces risks which require the 
(re)vision of security and the rethinking of the forms of governance.
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The demand for a new security agenda, since the end of the Cold war, has 
come from all sides of the political spectrum. The shift of emphasis from 
military to human security has enlarged the scope of international regimes to 
intervene in human affairs and redefined the idea of responsibility in the 
name of global governance.6 Lynn-Jones and Miller (1995, p.4) suggest that 
the demise of the East-West ideological contest has revealed a different set of 
dangers, not really new but previously overshadowed by Cold War 
preoccupations. Likewise Jessica Tuchman Matthew (1989, p.162), a former 
policy adviser to the US National Security Council argues that global 
developments suggest the need for national security to include issues related 
to resources, the environment and population movements.
The 'new' security agenda focuses on the international impact of 'sub-state', 
intra-state or micro dynamics. The apparent rise in the number of conflicts 
within the borders of a state has put the management of internal conflict onto 
the political agenda. There are, according to Rupesinghe (1996, p.141-2), new 
types of conflicts that are redefining the character of armed conflict and the 
boundaries of internal and external conflict. Often framed as ethnic rivalry 
between cultural groups in mostly Third World countries, these conflicts 
threaten national, regional, and international order. Such conflicts also cause 
refugee movements, which represent disorders in the order of states. But the 
meaning of 'threat' is far from self-evident. The notion of threat, I suggest, 
should be examined in terms of a form of political and cultural practice that 
functions to constitute and reproduce a particular international order. In
6 For the UNHCR, the idiom of human security is of high value. It gives a new spin on old 
issues like poverty and engenders the development of practices like in-country monitoring. 
The UN's 'Partnership in Development' programme is a call for greater participation by 
grassroots community organizations, NGOs and intergovernmental groups, and also 
functions to manage the operational roles of agencies. See UNHCR (1997) The State of the 
World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda, London: Oxford University Press. On global 
governance see: T. Weiss and L. Gordenker eds. (1996) NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
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other words, the threat posed by international migration and particularly 
refugees is linked to certain assumptions about the contemporary 'w orld ' 
order.
The End of H istory and The Order of Civilizations
The belief that fundamental transformations have taken place in international 
relations has lead to the development of two visions of international life. On 
the one hand, the end of superpower gridlock announces the dawn of a new 
era of engagement grounded on a form of liberal internationalism. On the 
other hand, the end of bipolarity hastens the developm ent of a world 
m ediaevalism  w here fragm entation and plurality  are believed to be 
undermining the international system.
Yet, the two images are connected. In the West, the end of the 'balance of 
terror' has lead to an anxiety about the position and purpose of the West in 
international relations. Subsequently, Western States, particularly US, have 
seized upon  the project to construct 'new ' regim es of tru th  about 
international life and the conduct of international affairs. Francis Fukuyama's 
'The End of History' and Samuel H untington's Clash of Civilizations are clear 
examples of the different but connected interpretations of the 'new times'. 
Both works are attempts to order the world. Fukuyama's form of Western 
liberal triumphalism is a narrative of hope, while Huntington's culture war is 
a narrative of dystopia. Both works, I contend, are articulations of parallel 
cultural codes, which seek to govern, and through governance, constitute an 
order. Both imaginaries of the present and the future have influenced the 
representation of the refugee question in international relations and the 
government of refugees.
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In spite of their weaknesses as historical and political analyses, both 
Fukuyama's proposition on the end of history and Huntington's thesis on the 
clash of civilizations illustrate the two influential perspectives international 
relations after 1989. For the purpose of the thesis, I approach these texts as 
cultural artefacts. That is, they are examined as works that normalize certain 
views of the social world and problematize certain phenomena. Such an 
approach will reveal the 'cosmological' order from which these texts emerge. 
It will reveal the tension between the urge to fulfill the manifest destiny of 
Western liberalism and the fear of the demise and contamination of liberalism 
by its opponents.
In 'The End of History' Fukuyama weaves a historical narrative that gives 
coherence and order to contingent events. He argues that the collapse of 
communism signaled the removal of the main competitor to liberalism as a 
form of government and installed liberalism as the only possible future. 
Fukuyama explains the changes in the world and events like the protest at 
Tiananmen Square, the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the breakup 
of the Soviet Union as part of a 'larger process'. This process is what 
Fukuyama calls 'democratic capitalism' - revitalized Western liberalism 
which is claiming for itself the necessary and inevitable path of Universal 
History. The presupposition is that there is only one legitimate and ethical 
regime of government -  liberal democracy. Other forms of rule are on the 
road to liberal democratic institutions, failed alternatives, or imperfect 
approximations to them.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the 
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as 
such: that is, the end point of m ankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of W estern liberal democracy as the final form of 
government (Fukuyama, 1989, p.4).
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There are striking similarities between the thinking about development 
discussed in Chapter Five and Fukuyama's historical narrative. Just as for the 
'take-off' modernization theorists of the 1960s, the historical trajectory of 
humankind is clear for Fukuyama. The absence of liberal democracy 
worldwide indicates two things: some societies are behind but will eventually 
catch up, and a few societies will be stuck in history. Most societies will 
experience the liberal democratic revolution - eventually. In The End of History 
and the Last Man, Fukuyama (1992) maps these claims onto a grand theory of 
human nature and universal history, and onto a philosophical anthropology 
that explains why some societies becomes 'posthistorical' while others remain 
in conflict in 'historical' time and space (Scott, 1996, p.13). By treating the 
historical experience of some as a guide to the future of the entire human 
population, his view is historically myopic.
While Fukuyama's story of Western liberalism explicitly inscribes the non- 
West into its privileged telos, 'postmodern' liberals like Richard Rorty, and 
radical democrats like Claude Lefort and Chantal Mouffe are more implicit 
about the superiority of liberal democratic ideals.7 In the particular story of 
'radical' democracy, the crude evolutionary schema may be absent but the 
'accomplishments' of modem democracy remain the regulatory norm that all 
other forms of political community will be compared and judged against. As 
David Scott (1996, p.17) argues, democracy has been naturalized to the extent 
that it has come to set the standard for the assessment of all political 
institutions, not only for those of Europe's own past, but also for those of the 
non-European, non-Western worlds 'whose political presence have been 
re/constructed in colonialism's wake'. Occupying the apex of human 
development, Western liberal ideals represent the models of both a well-
7 See R. Rorty (1983), 'Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 80; C. 
Lefort (1988) Democracy and Political Theory, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; and 
C. Mouffe (1993) The Return of the Political, New York: Verso.
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ordered society and moral subjectivity. Non-modern, non-liberal and non- 
democratic forms of government and political community are characterized 
as a past that is out of sync with the 'forces of history'. From this perspective, 
coming to the 'present' means embracing the thoughts, institutions, and 
practices of Western liberalism.
Indeed, the outstanding achievement of liberal progressivism is its 
universalizing energy. 'The rise of the West' in human history has allowed 
various forms of liberal internationalism to emerge and to dominate the 
political imagination.8 The effects of the liberal internationalist ambitions are 
many, but among two most significant are the universalization of liberal 
ideas and the erasure of alternatives. As Malkki (1998, p.440) points out, 'the 
exclusions built into universalizing visions of social progress and global 
solidarity' involve 'the asymmetrical and uneven ways in which people and 
societies are incorporated' into that vision. This is done by deploying 
democratic ideals to govern 'Others', by imposing policies that 'encourage' 
the development of conditions for liberal governance, and by embarking on a 
dispersed and multi-dimensional civilizing project. As a result, some cultural 
specificities of the West have achieved the status of normality.
But alongside the displays of self-confidence exhibited by liberals like 
Fukuyama, is a fear that in the face of global changes, liberal-democracies 
may not be the clear 'winners' after all.9 Universal consensus on values is 
absent and foreign policies that aim to make liberal values universal are
8 See W. H. McNeill (1963) The Rise of the West: a history of the human community. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
9 Paul Kennedy uses the concept of winners and loser to define the capacity of states to deal 
with the challenges raised by contemporary global transformations and to disclose his 
futurology of the coming century. See P. Kennedy (1993) Preparing for the Twenty-First 
Century, London: HarpersCollins.
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dubious and imprudent. Rather than embarking on the establishment of a 
liberal global order, the strategy should be to safeguard present liberal 
communities or Western civilization from attack and decay. This is the story 
told by Samuel Huntington (1998) in The Clash of Civilizations.
According to Huntington, the emerging pattern of conflict and cooperation in 
global politics will be based cultural difference. He claims that the most 
important distinctions among people are cultural and not political, economics 
or ideological. People and countries with similar cultures are coming 
together, while 'people and countries with different cultures are coming 
apart' (p.125). Local politics is the politics of ethnicity and global politics is 
the politics of civilizations. Civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and 
the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale (p.207). The 
civilizational fault lines that will be the cause of global conflict are between 
Islam and its Slavic-Orthodox, Hindu, African, Confucian, and Western 
Christian neighbours (p.183). In Huntington's view, there are no universals 
and attempts at universalization are dangerous, because what is universalism 
to the West is imperialism to the rest (p.184). But this gesture of cultural 
pluralism obscures another agenda. The discourse of cultural pluralism and 
uniqueness has been important in the attainment of rights for marginalized 
groups and is at the core of the politics of recognition. Yet, the contemporary 
politics of recognition has protected an anxious West from challenges from 
non-Western cultures too.10 William Connolly (1999) argues that the term 
civilization has become a tool for those 'who seek to cover cultural 
defensiveness with a veneer of large-mindedness'. At stake is the survival of 
the Western cultural identity.
10 Etienne Balibar has identified the appropriation of the language of cultural equality, 
formerly the idiom of anti-racist, in recent forms of racism. See E. Balibar, (1989) 'Is there a 
"Neo-Racism"?', in E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein Race, Nation and Class, London: Verso, pp. 17- 
28.
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Huntington's claim that the source of conflict will be cultural (re)produces an 
international political imagination that is filled with scenes of irrational 
tribalism.11 Tribalism is a threat to the West but not the other way around. As 
we shall see in the following section, versions of tribalism have become 
common themes in the discussion of world (dis)order. It is worth noting 
though that his anxieties emanate from the debate on multiculturalism in the 
United States. The hybridization of cultures, rather than expanding and 
reformulating notions of the good, signifies the decline and rejection of the 
virtues of Western Christian civilization. According to Huntington, 
multiculturalism threatens the United States and the West (p.318). In other 
words, the apparent civilizational faultlines within the national space inform 
Huntington's fear of Western degeneration on the international level. 
Moreover, as victims of denigration in Huntington's world order, the West is 
no longer active in the contemporary processes of marginalization.
Strong and weak versions of Huntington's world (dis)order can be found in 
international relations literature and in newspaper editorials. I have already 
mentioned the writings of Brzezinski, Hoffman, Kaplan, Mearsheimer, and 
Moynihan in the previous section and indeed, they express similar 
imaginaries of cultural violence. These works may be flawed, but they reflect 
a prevailing perception of the relationship between the West and the non- 
West.
11 The 'resurgence' of ethnicity as a source of conflict is associated with primitive or tribal 
rivalry, with people who are irrational and anti-modem. See D. P. Moynihan, (1993) 
Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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The main criticism of Huntington's thesis is its Ethnocentric assumptions.12 
Simon Bromley (1997), Sandra Buckley (1999), William Connolly (1999), and 
Michael Shapiro (1999) have all registered the chauvinistic disposition of a 
civilizational order. The idea of civilization conjures up imageries of 
belonging, civility, integrity, and achievement. Despite the arbitrariness of 
civilizational codes or standard of civilization, they perform important 
functions as regulative (and moralizing) ideals. These codes of civility as an 
influential basis for judgement and social conduct operate in the domestic 
and international environment. Shapiro (1999, p.14) notes that civilizational 
codes were initially employed within European societies as part of the 
process of domestic pacification, which became associated eventually with 
nationalism and thus, with national distinctiveness in the world of states.
Huntington feigns a non-hierarchy of civilizations, but the 'equal but 
different' stance falls apart when he articulates the difference in 'degrees' of 
assimilation between Hispanics and other immigrants to the United States 
(Buckley 1999, para.9). The 'equal but different' claim also crumbles in the 
international context when one examines the deployment of 'civilization', as 
it has been associated with the idea of international society. In The Standard of 
'Civilization' in International Society, Gerrit Gong (1984) writes about the 
dislocation, and accommodation that non-European countries have 
experienced when confronted with the imposition and later adaptation of 
European standard of civilization.
Buckley (1999) has described Huntington's moral geography as a strategy of 
'adversarial differentiation'. The fluency and authority with which he
12 See J. O'Hagan (1995) 'Civilizational Conflict? Looking For Cultural Enemies', Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 19-38; and A. Tarock (1995) 'Civilizational conflict? Fighting the 
enemy under a new banner', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp.5-18.
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interprets and translates the core values of 'the rest' have enabled him to 
maintain the distance and distinction essential to his civilizational order. In 
spite of his stance against universalism, his schema situates the West as 'the 
master grammar which can interpret all difference but itself exceeds and 
resists translation' (Buckley, 1999, para.21).
The 'clash of civilizations' argument also has the potential to become a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. As John Gray (1998, p.159) cautions 'in so far as such talk 
shapes the thinking of policy-makers it risks making cultural differences what 
they have been only rarely in the past -  causes of war'. The disturbing feature 
of such talk is the tendency to interpret conflicts in terms of a philosophical 
anthropology and a philosophy of history that universalize the culturally 
specific ideals of Western liberalism for all human beings. In effect, those who 
engage in ethnic/communal/tribal conflict are seen as backward or behind in 
the human evolutionary process and lacking the faculty of reason. Such a 
view, then, has the double effect of normalizing the violence within these 
populations and depoliticizing the interventions prescribed for them.
The grand theories of Fukuyama and Huntington, together other with 
versions of these perspectives, have had a significant impact on international 
relations thinking and policy formulation. Ostensibly, Huntington's thesis of 
intractable cultural conflict is antithetical to Fukuyama's grand design of 
liberal internationalism. The former focuses on the causes of conflict, while 
the latter attends to the conditions for peace. Fukuyama's vision pushes for a 
crusade. Huntington's anxieties seek seclusion. But they are similar on three 
counts. First, both treat the development of the West as a guide to the future 
of the humankind. Second, both transform historically contingent events into 
universal law. Third, they are reiterations of the persistent process of othering
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and of a deep-seated Western chauvinism in the conduct of international 
relations.
The New Racism and The New Barbarism
The writings of Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama can be said to 
reflect a wider perception of politics inside the state and between states. Both 
can be seen as forms of a 'new  racism ' that has been developing within 
Western liberal-democratic states since the early 1980s. According to Barker 
(1982), the 'new  racism ' has replaced the categories of hierarchy and 
superiority w ith those of culture. The core claim of neo-racism is the 
incom m ensurability of cultures and cultural differences m arking the 
boundaries of belonging and community, is natural among hum an groups. 
This racial discourse provides an explanation for the 'internal crisis' in 
W estern liberal-dem ocratic states, nam ely, social fragm entation and 
antagonism among various groups. The 'unreasonable' character of cultural 
identification and difference means that intercultural violence and social 
breakdown need to be managed through strategies that maintain cultural 
distance (Barker, 1982, p.13). In other words, this form of racism presents 
itself as a theory of the causes of social aggression and argues that to avoid 
racism, one has to respect the 'tolerance threshold' and maintain 'cultural 
distance' (Balibar, 1989, p.22).
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The other conspicuous way to govern pluralism is to order diversity through 
the policy of multiculturalism.13 But as Mark Duffield (1984, 1996) argues, 
multiculturalism shares the same terrain with 'new racism' in that the former 
mimics the same shifts in the structure of racial discourse from categories 
based on hierarchy to those based on difference -  cultural and/or ethnic 
difference. In multiculturalism, pluralism and possible violence can be 
managed by putting in place activities that 'educate' and 'promote' 
inter cultural understanding and tolerance. But the culture of tolerance in fact, 
obscures an antipathy towards those who need to be tolerated, because the 
very demand for tolerance already identifies or pronounces the presence of 
the deviant.
Similarly, the incisive works of Colette Guillaumin (1995) and Etienne Balibar 
(1989) have analyzed the logic of new racism and its ambiguous relationship 
with the politics of difference. Their works show that assertions of the right to 
be different and of cultural difference have the effect of de-historicizing 
culture and of locking people within a cultural expression, as well as ignoring 
the social relations that go into the creation of cultural forms.
Colette Guillaumin's history of racism and racial discourse draws attention to 
the 'changing face of race'. For her, the development of a mode of thought in 
anti-racist neo-individualism and cultural anthropology that uses as its 
central argument culture and the right to cultural identity obscured the 
strategies of power that produces such identities (1995, p.93). She stresses that 
categories and social groups do not exist of and by themselves. They are
13 Ghassan Hage has questioned the policy of multiculturalism in Australia as an attempt at 
promoting cultural pluralism and transcending the Anglocentric racism of the policies that 
preceded it. See, G. Hage (1998) White Nation: fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural 
society, Sydney: Pluto Press; and (1994) 'Locating Multiculturalism's Other: a critique of 
practical tolerance', New Formations, No. 24, pp. 19-34.
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constructed and can be empirically validated, but they are rooted in the 
context of social relations and not nature. While the reality of 'difference' is 
neither natural nor psychological, they exist as conceptual tools that organize 
explanations of the world. Social groups and categories, then, are effects of 
power relations and to demystify these relations is important task if we are to 
understand the extent to which certain relations and categories have been 
normalized in the social world.
The 'right to cultural difference' is a tool of racists and anti-racists. Cultural 
difference has come to inherit all the connotations linked to the arbitrary 
differentiation of human groups, which once came under the notion of race. 
The idea of difference may avoid the physical naturalization of race but in 
contemporary politics, the idea has become the tool for those who continue to 
think in racist terms, but no longer dare use the word 'race'.
Balibar (1989) also discerns a transformation of the mentalities and practices 
of racism from biology to culture as the regulatory mechanism of human 
populations. For him, neo-racism is racism without races. The phenomenon is 
linked to decolonization and the reversal of population movements from the 
ex-colonies to the empire. We now see the discourse of immigration 
functioning as a racial discourse. The 'immigration complex' is racism whose 
dominant theme is not biological heredity, but incommensurable cultural 
differences. It is a racism, Balibar (1989, p.21) argues, that does not postulate 
openly the superiority of certain groups over others, but asserts the 
harmfulness of abolishing boundaries that distance and control incompatible 
lifestyles and traditions. Culture functions like nature and behaviors of 
individuals and groups are explained in terms of their belonging to specific 
cultures (Balibar, 1989, p.22). According to Balibar (1989, p.19), the 
effectiveness of such thinking lies in its ability to provide explanations about
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what individuals are experiencing and also about who they are in the social 
world.
For Western liberal governments, ethnicization of identity is a phenomenon 
that disturbs the coherence of the imagined national society, and a strategy to 
be deployed to manage the population within and populations outside.14 The 
ethnicization or racialization of immigrants and refugees, for example, 
enables categories of difference to circumscribe the performance of difference 
and to justify governmental practices that are exclusionary and inclusionary. 
Governments invoke the idiom of difference to justify excluding and 
returning asylum seekers to their countries of origin where they will 
experience the joy of finding more fertile ground to express fully their 
remarkable difference. As I will show in next chapter, the speeches by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees illustrate the pervasiveness 
of cultural differentiation and the naturalization of 'home' as the place where 
one is born.
The new racism in Western liberal states is partly a result of the pattern of 
international migration of the 1960s and 1970s, discussed in the Chapter
14 On the one hand, multiculturalism is a tactic of liberal government that instrumentalizes 
difference and diversity for the purpose of governing the population of a state. See R. 
Baubock, A. Heller, and A. Zolberg eds. (1996) The Challenge of Diversity: integration and 
pluralism in societies of immigration, Aldershot: Avebury; C. Young ed. (1998) Ethnic diversity 
and public policy: a comparative inquiry, New York: St. Martin's Press; W. Kymlicka (1995) 
Multicultural Citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights; Oxford: Clarendon Press; M. Walzer 
(1997) On Toleration, New Haven: Yale University Press; and J. Horton ed., (1993) Liberalism, 
multiculturalism and toleration, Basingstoke: Macmillan. On the other hand, pluralism and in 
particular, 'ethnic/cultural minorities' - an issue for all states - is more acute in liberal- 
democratic states, because they are grounded on a specific relationship between the 
government and the individual and a doctrine of liberty and equality. See W. Kymlicka, ed. 
(1995) The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford: Oxford University Press; and M. Freeman 
(1995) 'Minority Rights in Liberal-Democratic Theory' in M. Freeman, D. Pantic and D. Janjic 
eds. Nationalism and Minorities, University of Essex: Centre for Human Rights.
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Five.15 This racial discourse is not limited to the national space. As I have 
argued throughout this thesis the government of a citizen population within 
a state simultaneously requires the government of the non-citizen population 
outside the state. Thus, neo-racist mode of thought is also evident on the 
international level. The international articulation of the new racism is the 
'new barbarism', which depicts events beyond the frontiers of the liberal- 
democratic world in terms of chaos and savagery. Likewise, the 
normalization of the multicultural state by Western liberal countries is 
constitutive of a liberal internationalism that pathologizes those non-Western 
governments that are dealing with internal instability and 'ethnopolitical' 
conflicts.16
The new barbarism talks about the innate, traditional and irrationality of 
cultural and ethnic identification. The new barbarism is an aspect of the 
contemporary racial discourse. In barbaric societies, the anarchic and 
destructive power of primordial feelings and hostilities are unleashed when 
forms of government and economic regulations collapse (Duffield, 1996, 
p.176). For example, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is held to have been 
the consequence of the 'deep-seated ethnic hatred' that is part of the 'Balkan 
mentality'. Balkan Ghosts (1993) by Robert Kaplan -  a book that has informed 
US policy towards the Balkans - portrays the region as divided by ancient 
ethnic rivalries.
15 In the Western 'multicultural' states, the assimilation and integration of immigrants and 
refugees as ethnic minorities into the national citizen body is achieved through the 
celebration of liberal toleration which claims to take cultural distinctiveness and minority 
rights seriously.
16 Tom Gurr uses the term 'ethnopolitical conflict' to describe the 'open' conflict between 
ethnic groups or national minorities within the states they reside. See T. Gurr and B. Harff, 
(1994) Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Boulder: Westview Press; and T. Gurr ed., Minorities at 
Risk: Origins and Outcomes of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute 
of Peace.
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The focus on ethnic conflicts in international relations also functions, among 
other things, as a strategy to distance the West from the non-West - to erase 
its own history of authoritarianism and barbarity. Ethnic conflict happens in 
non-Western and undemocratic states, but not in tolerant liberal Western 
societies. But W.E.B. Du Bois (1965, p.23) asserts that there was no Nazi 
atrocity, "which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been (sic) 
practising against colored folk in all parts of the world".
In the post-Cold War era, ethnic identity has replaced communism as one of 
the key threats to international peace and order.17 The literature that seeks to 
analyze the link between ethnic conflict and international security has the 
following elements. Those defined as national, ethnic and religious minorities 
are claiming various degrees of self-determination within existing states 
because their cultural distinctiveness is not in their view fully recognized 
and/or they experience discrimination and persecution due to their cultural
17 See Survival (1993) Special issue on 'Ethnic Conflict and International Security', Vol. 35, No. 
1, pp.3-170; M. Ayoob (1995) The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional 
Conflict, and the International System, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner; R. Betts ed. (1994) 
Conflict after the Cold War: arguments on causes of war and peace, New York: Macmillan; B. 
Boutros-Ghali (1992) An Agenda for Peace, New York, United Nations; M. Brown ed. (1996) 
The International Dimension of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; D. Carment (1994) 
'The ethnic dimension in world politics: theory, policy and earning warning', Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 551-582; N. Chazan ed. (1991) Irredentism and International 
Politics, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner; K.M. de Silva and R. May eds. (1991) 
Internationalisation of Ethnic Conflict, New York: St. Martin's Press; T. Gurr and B. Harff, (1994) 
Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Boulder: Westview Press; T. Gurr ed., Minorities at Risk: 
Origins and Outcomes of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace; V.S. Petersen, (1993) 'The politics of identity in international relations', The Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2; M. I. Midlarsky ed. (1992) The Internationalisation of 
Communal Conflict, London: Routledge; V. Moghadam (1993) Identity Politics: Cultural 
Reassertion and Feminisms in International Perspectives. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; N. 
Poku and D. T. Graham eds. (1998) Redefining Security: population movement and national 
security, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger; M. Weiner (1995) The Global Migration Crisis: 
Challenges to States and to Human Rights, New York: HarperCollins; (1994) 'Security, Stability 
and Migration', in R. Betts ed. (1994) Conflict after the Cold War: arguments on causes of war and 
peace, New York: Macmillan; ed. (1993) International Migration and Security, Boulder: 
Westview Press; (1992) 'Peoples and states in a new ethnic order?' Third World Quarterly, 
Vol.13, No. 2, pp.317-333; and O. Waever, B. Buzan et al. (1993) Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter.
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distinction. Such demands have the potential to become intra-state conflicts, 
which can generate international conflict and threaten international order in 
four related ways.
First of all, these ethnic groups seek allies outside the states in which they are 
located. Their allies may be their diasporas and other groups and states who 
have an adversary relationship with their government (Wiener, 1992, p.320- 
1). Secondly, these conflicts can generate refugee flows that threaten the 
internal security of host states. Refugees compete against national-citizens for 
employment and other social resources, change the demographic 
composition, and threaten the cultural integrity and national cohesion of 
receiving states. Governments, therefore, are particularly concerned with the 
prevention and containment of refugee flow, the kind of refugees they admit 
and the conditions of entry, and the fostering of repatriation as the primary 
durable solution. Thirdly, intra-state conflict can lead the fragmentation of a 
state and the creation of new states. Since state-making invariably involves 
bloodshed and triggers responses that upset regional and international order, 
various institutional arrangements and management techniques have been 
invented to mitigate separatism. These include constitutional arrangements 
such as consociationalism, federalism, and other guarantees that support the 
cultural autonomy of national/ethnic minorities, and representation in 
regional and international organizations.18 Finally, Tailed states' often compel 
various forms of 'international' intervention that restore or create the 
conditions for effective domestic government and to preserve the 
international order.
18 The regulation of ethnic difference is important to democratic and authoritarian 
government in Western and non-Westem states. This suggests that current concerns over 
ethnic politics are about forms of government rather than the value of states as political 
organisations. See J. McGarry and B. O'Leary eds. (1993) The Politics of Ethnic Conflict 
Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, London: Routledge.
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Underpinning the 'social theater of contemporary ethnic conflict' is a political 
imagination that is filled with anxieties about the encroachment of the rest of 
the world and the defilement and loss that attend such contact. There has 
been a redefinition of race as the threat of chaos wielded by 'failed' or 'rogue' 
states against powerful states. 'The coming anarchy' is the power of non- 
Western others to transform the world by virtue of their searing racial and 
ethnic hatreds. Indeed, the migrant and in particular the refugee, are signs of 
'the coming anarchy'. The first political task is to maintain the international 
segregation of a zone of peace from the zone of turmoil, which according to 
Singer and Wildavsky (1993) constitutes the real world order. The second 
task, the remedy - to discipline and transform chaos into order through the 
installation of institutions and practices of 'good government'. The promotion 
of human rights, democratization, and economic development within a states, 
are ways to govern otherwise dissatisfied groups who put state unity and 
thus, international peace at risk. Moreover, the deployment of humanitarian 
enterprises such as the international refugee regime should be seen as a 
disciplinary instrument.
Yet, the cure for the new barbarism reinforces the 'international' racial 
discourse. In The Law of Peoples (1999), Rawls provides a guideline for foreign 
policy for liberal democracies by setting out how they should relate to each 
other and to nonliberal peoples. He categorizes 'peoples' in five forms of 
societies: 'reasonable liberal peoples', nonliberal but 'decent hierarchical 
peoples' - both groups constituting 'well-ordered peoples' - outlaw states, 
burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms (1999, p. 4). Like Fukuyama, 
his position (re)produces the racial discourse that affirms the superiority of 
Western liberal-democracies and their version of humanity. If the nonliberal 
world wants to free itself from relentless suffering and conflict, it should 
follow the 'ideals of constitutional liberal democratic thought' and the virtues
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of tolerance and mutual respect that are cultivated among decent peoples. 
The present form of liberal internationalism, despite its claims to tolerance 
and universality, is blind to its inherent anti-pluralism, and this aspect of 
liberalism features strongly in the governing strategies of the international 
humanitarian system.
The double-duty of Western democratic states in relations to the non-Western 
and non-democratic states is at once a civilizing mission and a disciplinary 
subjugation. Their current policies and the policies of international 
organizations towards the non-Western, non-liberal democratic world are 
based on a belief that the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law is the 'best practice' for economic development and political 
management.19 This strategy involves the expansion of Western-style liberal 
institutions, which claims to foster international stability and peace as liberal 
democracies rarely go to war with one another.20 Despite the dubious casual 
connection between democracy and peace, and the contradictions generated 
by an alliance between liberal democracy and free markets, the general 
assumption is that 'perpetual peace' is possible when the world consists of 
liberal democratic (and free market) regimes. This mode of thought resonates 
with the 'democratic reform' agenda of post-1919 Europe, which was 
discussed in my chapter on the reordering of Europe and the minorities 
protection regime. Just like the architects of peace in 1919, the alignment of 
democracy with peace by today's peacemakers has enabled the operation of
19 In the 1990s, the 'good government' agenda - a cluster of ideas concerning economic and 
political management, set up by the World Bank - articulated what had been implicit in 
liberal thinking: economic development is best achieved when a state is well-managed 
through the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The 'failed states' are 
those unable to provide these conditions for economic development.
20 See M. Brown et al. eds. (1996) Debating the democratic peace, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 
B. Russett (1993) Grasping the democratic peace, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; M. 
Salla et al. (1995) Essays on Peace: paradigms of global order, Rockhampton, Qld.: Central 
Queensland University Press.
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new forms of humanitarian practices.21 For example, Boutro Ghali's (1992) An 
Agenda for Peace has translated the beliefs about the virtues of Western liberal 
democracy into international governmental strategies. With its action- 
orientated discourse of preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping, 
and peace-building, the report has been influential in defining the basis and 
scope of humanitarian activity in the 'new era'.
C o n c l u d i n g  R e m a r k s
This chapter has explored two significant images of (dis)order in 
international relations and the mode of thought that underpins both 
imaginaries. At the core of the representations of order and conflict are two 
issues: the place of the Western states in the contemporary international 
system and the relationship between the Western world(s) and the non- 
Western world(s). As beliefs about the causes of war and the conditions for 
peace are fundamental considerations in policy-making, both the end of 
history and the clash of civilizations have informed the practice of governing 
international relations and in particular, refugees. Policies of Western states 
towards refugees are an enmeshment of the internationalizing ambitions of 
Fukuyama and the distancing separatism of Huntington. The result, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, is an articulation of liberal internationalism that 
is also a form of global apartheid.
21 One must admit, however, that the restoration of the state is a precondition for stable and 
effective liberal democracy.
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G eopolitical H umanitariani sm
th e  d u r a b le  s o lu t io n  f o r  a  6n e w 9 w o r ld ?
Refugee issues are in many respects strategic issues.... The days of ad hoc 
reactions which concentrate on symptoms rather than on causes should 
belong to the past. The management and solution of humanitarian crises 
must be explored in the context of a system of global governance befitting 
the post Cold War era.
Sadako Ogata, 
'Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action'
In early euphoric days of the post Cold War period, there was an expansion 
of humanitarian activities based on principles of human rights. The role of the 
UN and its peacekeeping operations became a focal point. The enlargement 
of modern peacekeeping operations also meant an expansion of tasks 
undertaken. Yet, the 'new' humanitarianism must be set within the context of 
the apparent contradictions of the post Cold War world. The end of a bipolar 
international order had bequeathed many unanticipated events. The world 
fluctuated between a global community and zones of peace/zones of danger.
GEOPOLITICAL HUMANITARIAN ISM
The conduct of Western states, motivated by a mix of hope and anxiety, had 
been an attempt to give order to the world.
Western responses to refugees after the Cold War reflect this anxious state. 
The language of crisis and emergency dominates the contemporary discourse 
of refugee. Refugee flows are 'complex humanitarian emergencies'. The 
'global refugee crisis' is the outcome of ethnic conflicts, minorities at risk, 
unstable governments, and the erosion of asylum. The representation of the 
refugee problem to global and crisis dimensions has been crucial to the 
demand for a comprehensive approach to the refugees.
This chapter analyses the 'humanitarian crisis' of refugees and the regime 
practices designed to meet this challenge. I will examine the push for a 
'comprehensive and multidimensional' approach to the government of 
refugees, one which aims to rectify the perceived limitations of the 
international refugee regime. I will deal mainly with the disciplinary and 
regulatory effects of the UNHCR. Although the UNHCR is not the only actor 
in the regime, most discussions and criticisms of the refugee regime focus on 
this institution. For my purposes, its significance is a reflection of its capacity, 
not so much to coordinate refugee activities, but rather to set the agenda for 
refugee assistance and to define the refugee issue in international relations.
The first part of the chapter sketches the perception of the global refugee 
crisis. The following three sections examine some of the practices of a 
solution-oriented comprehensive approach to refugees. The UNHCR has 
defined prevention, protection, and solution as the three strategies of such an 
approach. The proposition is that the current discourse of refugee 
humanitarianism has engendered a differentiated program of response. The
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regime practices reinforce and reproduce the 'reality' of refugees as a danger 
to international order and the perception of the non-Westem world as chaotic 
and barbarism. The durable solutions constitute a form of geopolitical 
humanitarianism that reproduce a cartography of (dis)order.
Again, I want to emphasize that to examine refugee policies in terms of 
exclusion is too simple. The international refugee regime creates governable 
subjectivities; the productive and inclusive dimension cannot be taken for 
granted. As I have shown in Chapter Five, and consider further in this 
chapter, the government of refugees involves the creation of differentiated 
subjects such as internally displaced persons (IDPs), Third World refugees, 
refugee children, and refugee women. These subjects are subjected to various 
governmental tactics which incorporate them into the refugee regime. The 
effects may be exclusionary, but that is quite different from claiming the 
regime is not attentive to certain forms of displacement.
Governing the Global Refugee Crisis
The current 'global crisis' is a crisis of practice. A closer inspection reveals 
that the term 'global', more often than not, refers to the flow of refugees from 
developing 'South' and countries of eastern Europe to industrialized 
countries in Western Europe and United States, Canada, and Australia. The 
term 'crisis' is part of the well-rehearsed debate, which I referred to in 
Chapter Two, on the ethical conflict that arises out of using the state-citizen 
regulatory norm for the government of populations. The current crisis, then, 
refers to the general operational difficulties of the international refugee
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regime and the policy responses of Western liberal-democratic states.1 As 
Barutciski (1998, p.244) points out, sympathy for the victims of persecution 
involves a certain level of commitment, but admitting them to state territory 
involves another. Indeed, Western states have implemented restrictive 
policies and limited the provisions and services available to asylum seekers 
during the status determination process. The result is the search for 
'innovative responses' to the refugee problem.
In Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee (1993), Gil 
Loescher presents the current refugee issue in the context of the increase in 
the South-North movements and 'the perpetuation and growth of the refugee 
problem in the Third World', which have resulted in an increased number of 
asylum seekers in industrialized countries (p.4). He asserts that there is a 
growing concern in the industrialized world that these movements can no 
longer be handled adequately by uncoordinated responses on the part of 
individual receiving countries (p.6). The challenge for governments is to find 
formulas and mechanisms that will ensure an effective and humane approach 
without at the same time inviting instability, more movement, and resulting 
chaos (p.10). According to Loescher (p.10), it is insufficient to respond to the 
refugee crisis as a strictly humanitarian problem; 'there is a need for a 
comprehensive political response and solution to the problem of refugee 
generation'. Stability and growth in all parts of the world depend on 
controlling disruptive forced migration. Elsewhere Loescher (1992) advocates
1 The particular ethical dilemmas posed by refugees to liberal-democratic states are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Suffice to say that the central problems are conflicting norms and a 
resultant competition between obligations as exemplified by liberal-communitarian debate in 
Western political theory. For examples of this discourse see, B. Barry and R. Goodin, ed. 
(1992) Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Migration of People and Money, Hemel Hempstead, 
UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf; J. Carens (1992) 'Refugees and the Limits of Obligation', Public 
Affairs Quarterly, Vol.6, No. 1, pp. 31-44; M. Gibney (1999) 'Liberal Democratic States and 
Responsibilities to Refugees', American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 1, pp.169-181; 
and M. Wiener (1998), "The Clash of Norms: Dilemmas in Refugee Policies', Journal of Refugee 
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 433-453.
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early-warning mechanisms, which can address the root causes of forced 
migration.
Similarly, Suhrke (1994) has advanced a comprehensive refugee policy that is 
'multilevel, cooperative and integrative'. Such a policy, she claims, will need 
to establish a minimal agreement on the principles of international order and 
to emphasis the root causes of refugee movements and the processes of 
peacemaking and reconstruction. She identifies four challenges facing the 
refugee regime: the importance of aid, the problems of 'repressive 
governments or anarchic conditions in the developing world', the 
stabilization of emerging democracies in 'much of the developing world', and 
the disorder of militant nationalism (p. 33-34). The analyses of Suhrke and 
Loescher are indicative of a general trend in thoughts about and practices of 
forced migration. The perception is that repression and civil wars within 
states, rather than conditions in host and resettlement countries, are the 
causes of the refugee crisis. As Landgren (1993) argues, this emphasis on state 
responsibility for the causes and consequences of forced migration creates the 
need to control 'weak' states that produce refugees, when at the same time, 
'strong' states are implementing sophisticated regulatory measures. In other 
words, it is in the self-interest of Northern states to govern the South.
The notion of the refugee continuum has emerged from this context. The idea 
attempts to establish a logical chain of events that gives rise to refugee flows - 
what happens before, during, and after. The idea of a continuum also 
connotes a complexity that necessitates a comprehensive and multi­
dimensional approach to refugees. The political solutions that address the 
causes of refugees are now essential. The argument is that the prevention of 
and the lasting solution to the contemporary refugee problem require 
political settlements. In itself, this is hardly novel. But this line of reasoning,
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as part of a broader conflict prevention and crisis management mentality, has 
widened the scope of possible interventions in refugee situations.
In recent years, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has 
advocated a comprehensive refugee strategy. The UNHCR's biennial 
publication on the state of the world's refugees has described the various 
elements of this governmental program .2 The central argument for engaging 
in an 'enterprising humanitarianism' is the changing nature of conflict, which 
the organization claims, has affected its work and the perception of itself as a 
humanitarian agency. The UNHCR considers itself a part of the larger 
system of global governance.3 If international order is to be realized, then 
humanitarian activities must be linked to the protection of human rights, 
peace-making and peace-building activities and must involve a widening 
partnership of actors from civil society such as NGOs, businesses, community 
organizations and church groups.
Humanitarian crises such as refugee flows now require preventive strategies, 
which focus on the conditions of the countries of origin, or refugee sending 
countries. Since the perception is that internal conflicts mark a shift in 
international affairs and in the cause of refugees, the UNHCR and the refugee 
regime are redefining the meaning of international protection to allow a 
range of activities inside states. As the High Commissioner claims, the
2 So far, there have been four such publications -  each with a distinctive theme. See, UNHCR 
(2000) The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; 1997) The State of the World's Refugees: The Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; (1995) The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of Solution, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; and (1993) The State of the World's Refugees: The Challenge of 
Protection, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3 See S. Ogata, (1997) 'Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action'. Speech given at the Alastair 
Buchan Memorial Lecture at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 3 April.
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distinctive features of the contemporary refugee problem have brought 'a 
major transformation of UNHCR principles, policies and practices'.
Traditionally, UNHCR's activities have concentrated on the country of 
asylum. Today, the growing scale and complexity of the refugee problem 
makes clear the inadequacy of asylum as the whole response. We need to 
concentrate not only on the middle stage of the refugee flow, but also on the 
two ends of prevention and solutions. The entire continuum of refugee flows 
from its root causes and prevention, to emergency response, protection and 
eventual solution deserves our attention. Consequently, the focus of our 
activities is a shift gradually from the relatively stable conditions in the 
country of asylum to the more turbulent and often evolutionary process in 
the country of origin of refugees. We are moving into security situations from 
which we would have evacuated in the past. We are having to call upon 
m ilitary logistics more frequently. The inviolable nature of national 
sovereignty is being questioned (Ogata, 1992).
The primary tasks of the UNHCR are to receive, process, and protect refugees 
on the other side of an international border. But this form of humanitarian 
action is no longer seen as adequate because it treats the symptoms and not 
the disease. The UNHCR argues that it has an obligation to adapt its own 
systems and structure in such a way as to ensure maximum effectiveness in 
responding to the complex challenges that confront it (UNHCR, 1996, para. 
7). The belief is that the current challenge for the refugee regime is to tackle 
the conditions that compel people to flee. To meet this goal, the regime 
advocates three types of action: prevention diplomacy to defuse tensions, 
human rights measures to protect the minority groups for whom flight is the 
only option, and development strategies to promote better governance and to 
tackle poverty.4 Above all, international cooperation and international 
solidarity are vital if these strategies are to achieve the prescribed goals.
4 See S. Ogata, (1994) 'Prevention, protection and solution: elaborating a post-Cold War 
refugees strategy', Browns Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.203-15; and UNHCR 
(1995) The State of the World's Refugees: in search of solutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Of course, the UNHCR and the international refugee regime have always 
been multidimensional in terms of practice and actors. The regime functions 
on the international, regional, national and local levels. The actors are 
in ternational organizations, national governm ents, non-governm ent 
organizations of various levels, knowledge-m akers, policymakers, and 
refugees themselves. On the one hand, the request to develop a system of 
cooperation and coordination for dealing with refugee movements makes 
transparent w idespread practice. On the other hand, the comprehensive 
approach indicates a shift in the value of each constituent of the regime and 
of the relationships betw een them .5 Consequently, the current regime 
represents a widening array of the activities that govern refugees.
Recent co-operations between the UNHCR and peacemaking operations in 
Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo bring the hum anitarian, 
political and m ilitary elements of the UN system  into a very intense 
relationship. Indeed, a num ber of UN agencies are constitutive of the 
in ternational hum anitarian  system  for refugees. The Office for the 
C oordination of H um anitarian  Affairs (OCHA), w hich replaced the 
Department of Hum anitarian Affairs, the Office for the High Commissioner 
for Hum an Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
the United Nations Development Program  (UNDP) and the W orld Food 
Program (WFP) are the main agencies that work with the UNHCR to achieve 
its objectives. Moreover, the UNHCR is seeking ways to collaborate with the 
W orld Bank on post-conflict reconstruction, w hich is im portant for 
repatriation and in fact, prevention (UNHCR, 1998b; UNHCR and World 
Bank, 1999d).
5 The recent courtship of civil society in UNHCR's 'partnership-in-action' program is an 
example of the rising status of non-government organizations and community organizations 
in the government of refugees.
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Barutciski (1994a; 1994b; 1996a; 1996b), Cunliffe and Pugh (1997), and Warner 
(1998) have argued that this broadening of UNHCR's focus from protection to 
prevention and the redefinition of protection from asylum  to internal 
assistance underm ine its mandate of international protection. Although I 
agree with their assertions, they overlook the fact that UNHCR was a product 
of Cold War politics -  shaped by the East-W est and North-South 
international political divisions. Its 'hum anitarian' m andate is an outcome of 
politics. In this context, much of the debate over the future direction of 
UNHCR -  a debate between politics and humanitarianism - has obscured the 
function of humanitarian action to achieve political goals. The 'reinvention' of 
UNHCR is a reflection of the present imaginaries of world (dis)order, just as 
earlier the organization was a reflection of the Cold War order.
Furthermore, the current crisis of practice is hardly novel. Rather, it is a 
consequence of the contradiction within the regime, which I have examined 
in this thesis. That is, the regime seeks to address an effect of the states- 
system, namely, refugees, and yet, states ultimately represent the solution to 
the problem. They are the agents who hold prim ary responsibility for 
protecting refugees under the international legal regime, but it is the 
prerogative of states to determ ine w hether they perm it the entry and 
settlem ent of aliens. In this sense, the appearance of deterrent and 
in terventionist strategies confirm s this inherent tension w ithin the 
international refugee regime.
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P r e v e n t i o n
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a paradigmatic shift in the 
management of displacement. The concept of prevention, clearly influenced 
by Boutros-Ghali's idea of preventive diplomacy, is now a powerful 
discourse in the refugee regime. Prevention comes in four forms: protection, 
deterrence, interventionism, and pre-emptive warning system. The striking 
feature of the practices of prevention is that they are interventionist; they shift 
the focus from the issue of protection in asylum states to forms of internal 
assistance within refugee generating states.
The strategy of 'preventive protection' consists largely of activities designed 
to prevent or contain the flow of population across international borders. 
These practices are directed at the conditions within refugee generating 
states. The task is to identify and address 'the dynamics of displacement', that 
is, the root causes. The evolution of the refugee regime to the point where it 
considers the prevention of displacement sounds noble but the effect is a 
geopolitical humanitarianism that keeps would-be asylum seekers at a 
distance, and if possible, within their own state or region. As Jennifer 
Hyndman (1997, p. 7) suggests, the idea of preventive protection 'gives rise to 
a new set of political spaces and management practices for forcibly displaced 
people'. 'Safe havens', 'zones of tranquility', 'open relief centers' and 'safe 
corridors' are practices of containment that reinforce the policy of non-entree 
in Western states.6 The strategy of preventive protection claims to address the
6 For analyses of recent practice of non-entree, containment and preventive protection in the 
Balkan region see, M. Barutciski (1994a) 'Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Myth of 
Preventive Protection', Refuge, Vol.14, No. 3, pp. 27-29; (1994b) 'EU States and the Refugee 
Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia', Refiige, Vol.14, No. 3, pp. 32-35; (1996a) 'Refugee Flows and 
Humanitarian Intervention: Problems of Selectivity and Politicization', Refuge, Vol. 15, No. 3; 
and (1996b) 'The Reinforcement of Non-Admission Policies and the Subversion of UNHCR: 
Displacement and Internal Assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-94), International Journal 
of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, No.l and 2, pp. 49-110.
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challenge of protection, namely, increase in refugee numbers and decline in 
asylum opportunities. But for many Western states, preventive practices are 
deployed as barriers to asylum. In the current climate of cultural separatism, 
the possible integration of refugees into host countries appears to be more 
troublesome than ever.
The formulation of non-admission and deterrence mechanisms is most 
evident in the EU. The harmonization of national policy among European 
states with regard to the movement of people has resulted in freedom of 
movement among those designated as 'European' and a strengthening of 
barriers to entry for non-Europeans. In other words, the abolition of internal 
borders has translated into the harmonization of restrictive control of external 
borders and non-EU citizens (Bloch, Gavin and Schuster, 2000).
The Maastricht Treaty, the Schengen Agreements (on the elimination of 
internal border controls), the Amsterdam treaty and the Dublin Convention 
(which establishes the state responsible for examining an asylum claim) have 
created a 'Fortress Europe' with Eastern European countries as the buffer 
zone.7 These agreements impose visa requirements on the nationals of most 
migrant-producing countries and enforce a penalty on carriers that take 
asylum seekers and others who are without requisite visas (Barutciski, 1994, 
p. 32). They also deny refugees the possibility of choosing a state of 
protection. Karin Landgren (1999) insists that treaty agreements among 
Western European states, by creating conflicting international obligations
7 See A. Cruz, (1998) 'On the Borderline', Transitions, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 34-37; D. Joly and R. 
Cohen eds. (1989) Reluctant Hosts: Europe and its refugees, Aldershot, Hants: Avebury; M. 
King (1993), 'The impact of Western European border policies on the control of "refugees" in 
Eastern and Central Europe', New Community, Vol.19, No. 2, pp. 183-199; R. Miles and D. 
Thränhardt eds. (1995) Migration and European Integration: the dynamics of inclusion and 
exclusion, London: Pinter; and Transitions (1998) Special Issue: 'Jumping the Wall', Vol. 5, No. 
12.
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have enabled them to move beyond the traditional refugee convention. 
Likewise the idea of 'safe country', which once referred to a third country in 
which an asylum seeker was safe or found protection, now to refers to 'safe 
country of origin' (Bryne and Shacknove, 1996 and Hailbronner, 1993). An 
asylum application from a person who comes from an identified 'safe 
country' would be rejected on the ground that a safe country is seen as one 
where there is no serious danger of persecution. She is more likely to be seen 
as someone who is abusing the 'system' -  a bogus asylum seeker, an illegal 
immigrant - rather than a 'genuine' refugee Government policies tend to 
reinforce and reproduce the perception of asylum seekers as 'queue jumpers' 
and criminals who should be deported. Jens Vedsted-Hansen (1999) notes 
that, in addition to the draconian conditions of entry and mystification of 
refugee status, other deterrence and control tactics include detention upon 
arrival, detention camps, minimal assistance, penalties for 'undocumented' 
asylum seekers and criminialization of illegal arrivals, 'accelerated 
procedures' and interdiction in international waters. In short, the strategy of 
prevention has governed asylum seekers through practices that have the 
effect of exclusion.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the shifts in perceptions of 
international migration. Suffice to say that restrictive immigration policies, 
which seem to be the norm among former migration states, have had 
significant consequences for refugee policies (Collinson, 1999). The migration 
from the 'South' to the 'North' is, in fact, very limited. Migration policies of 
industrialized countries have shifted from focussing on family reunion 
category to business and skilled migrants. Unskilled cheap labour is less in 
demand, and they have two options -  move as documented and 
undocumented migrant workers and use the asylum route. As a result, 
refugees are increasingly perceived as part of a general voluntary international 
movement of people and human resource. Moreover, the racialization of
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refugees has identified them as ill-suited to the activities of democratic 
citizenship of receiving Western states. Add the discourses of national 
wellbeing and economic imperative, the governments of states can justify a 
range of deterrence and containment practices.
In Europe's case, one explanation for this shift of policy has to do with the 
reinvention of Europe, which has been underway since the end of the Cold 
War. Another explanation for current policies is the perception of a profound 
change in the geography of displacement.8 As I noted at the end of Chapter 
Five, by the early 1980s, the refugee problem had been constructed as a 'Third 
World' problem. This distancing has been interrupted by the movement of 
displaced populations from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to 
Western Europe. Two responses have been an intensification of anxieties over 
European citizenship /identity and a development of the 'refugee-security 
dilemma' in Europe (van Selm-Thorborn, 1997).9
In light of this shift in the perception of refugees and international migration, 
donor countries have urged UN agencies, like UNHCR to assist displaced 
peoples 'at home' -  before they cross international borders, or in first
8 There is an enormous amount of research on the politics of migration and refugees in 
Europe. For example see, A. Bloch and C. Levy (1999) Refugees, Citizenship and Social Policy 
in Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan; D. Joly (1997) Refugees in Europe: the New Hostile Agenda, 
London: Minority Rights Group; (1996) Haven or Hell? Asylum Policies and Refugees in Europe, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan; K. Koser and H. Lutz eds. (1999) The New Migration in Europe: Social 
Constructions and Social Relations, New York: St. Martin's Press; E. M. Ucarer and D. Puchala 
eds. (1997) Immigration and Western Societies: Problems and Policies. London: Pinter, and Journal 
of Refugee Studies (2000), Special Issue on Changing Asylum Policies in Europe.
9 For expositions on the consequences of connecting migration with racism, and the cultural 
landscape of 'New Europe' see, E. Balibar (1991), 'Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and 
Politics in Europe Today', New Left Review No. 186, pp.5-19; K. Bhavnani (1993), 'Towards a 
Multicultural Europe? "Race", Nation and Identity in 1992 and Beyond', Feminist Review, No. 
45, Autumn, pp.30-45; and J, Derrida (1992) The other heading: reflections on today's Europe, 
translated by P.-A. Brault and M. B. Naas, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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countries of asylum  nearby. Such tactics of containm ent serve to keep 
refugees and internally displaced people "over there', far from the borders of 
donor countries in the West. Western governments prefer interventions that 
provide assistance before potential refugees cross the borders. UNHCR is 
responding to the demands of its donor countries who wish to maintain 
'space and distance' where displacem ent rem ains a tragedy and the 
sym pathy for displaced peoples are as victims. As they encroach towards 
'o u r ' borders, the relationship changes. They become 'im m igrants', 
'foreigners' and suspicious 'asylum  seekers' who threaten the political, 
economic and social fabric of 'ou r' countries. The phenomenon of 'hum an 
trafficking' or smuggling only confirms fears about the rise of uncontrollable 
'irregular' migration and the 'dark side' of globalization .10
As mentioned before, Western governments and the UNHCR endorse tactics 
of containment like 'safe havens' and 'protective zones' over asylum. By 
having certain safe regions so that people would not have to leave in the first 
place, asylum  pressures are relieved, processes of repatriation are less 
arduous, and fewer aliens enter national societies. But there is another 
argum ent for preventive m easures. In the discourse of rights of the 
international refugee regime, 'the right to leave' no longer has as much 
purchase as 'the right to remain'.
At the heart of such a preventive and solution-oriented strategy must be the 
clear recognition of people (sic) to remain in safety in their own homes. ... In 
speaking of "the right to remain", I mean the basic right of the individual not 
to be forced into exile,... The right to remain is implicit in the right to leave
10 There is an emerging regime seeking to control such movement. Much of the discussion on 
the subject focuses on issues of human rights and particularly, the notion of slavery and the 
exploitative arrangement between the smugglers and the refugees. See J. Morrison (2000) The 
Trafficking and Smuggling of Reff gees: the end game in European asylum policy? Geneva: UNHCR 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit.
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one's country and to return .... [W]hen people are forced to leave their 
homes, a whole range of other rights are threatened.... I know that the 
international protection that my Office, in cooperation w ith countries of 
asylum, can offer to refugees is not an adequate substitute for the protection 
that they should have received from their own Governments in their own 
countries. The generosity of asylum countries cannot fully replace the loss of 
a homeland or relieve the pain of exile. (Ogata, 1993)
The promotion of 'the right to remain' aims to prevent refugee flows by 
emphasizing the right of the individual not to be forced into exile and 
therefore, to be homeless. Ogata (1993) pronounces that refugees have a 
'right to remain' in their countries of origins and not to be displaced because 
no humanitarian assistance can compensate for the loss of a homeland. The 
deployment of exile and home, in this context, further naturalizes the bond 
between territory, culture, citizen, and belonging, while affirming the 
anomalous state of refugees. The UNHCR, with the support of Western 
governments, is pushing for measures that will enable the 'choosing to 
remain' option. According to the UN High Commissioner, the UNHCR's 
protection mandate is threefold: right to asylum, right to return and right to 
remain (Ogata, 1993). This redefinition of protection expands its mandate and 
encourages containment and interventionist policies.11
Admittedly, all forms of internal assistance involve intervention in the strict 
sense. But recently, novel interventionist activities have been justified by 
positioning the conditions of internally displaced people and the need to be 
prepared for 'complex emergencies' as of utmost importance. The suggestion 
is that to adequately respond to complex emergencies, persons displaced
11 The expansion of UNHCR's activities and its relationship with other UN operations has 
lead to the recent 'humanitarian debate', which questions the relationship between 
humanitarianism and politics, and ask whether this connection jeopardizes the norms of 
neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian assistance.
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within their borders require the attention of the international refugee regime. 
This means going into potential refugee-generating situations in states and 
preventing international displacement.
In 1992 Francis Deng, as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General 
for Internally Displaced Persons began to formulate a legal framework for 
IDPs. He claims that there were between 20 and 25 million IDPs compared to 
12 million refugees in 1999 (1999, p.9). His Office has published Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement (1998), which expands the notion of 
protection beyond refugees to refugee-like situations. Managing IDPs is a 
preventive measure. The proposition is that prevention is the most effective 
form of protection for people in danger of becoming refugees (UNHCR, 1993, 
p.121). Assistance to victims of armed conflict, which include the internally 
displaced, has been the central responsibility of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) which acts under the Geneva Conventions. Recently, 
UNHCR has become increasingly involved in IDPs issues, although its 
mandate restricts activities to refugees.12 The agency has made IDPs the 'hot 
issue for a new millennium' and it has published a position paper to explain 
the reason for UNHCR's involvement with IDPs.13
This interest arises from the similarity between such internally displaced
persons and refugees, in terms of the causes and consequences of their
12 An argument against the intrusion of the IDP issue into the refugee regime is that to extend 
the current legal framework to IDPs will further erode the already precarious institution of 
asylum in host countries and invite interventionists practices that undermine the principle of 
state sovereignty. See M. Barutciski, (1998) 'Tensions between the refugee concept and the 
IDP debate', Forced Migration Review, No. 3, pp. 11-14.
13 For example see, UNHCR (2000) Internally Displaced Persons: the Role of the United Nations 
High Commission on Refugees, UNHCR position paper, Geneva: UNHCR EC/50/SC/INF.2; 
and UNHCR (1999) 'The Hot Issue for a new Millennium' Refugees, No. 117. The Global IDP 
Survey -  a project of the Norwegian Refugee Council is the key NGO that gathers and 
disseminates information on the issue. See J. Hampton ed., (1998) Internally Displaced People: a 
global survey, London: Earthscan.
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displacement and their humanitarian needs. Like refugees, many internally 
displaced (sic) have been forced to leave their homes because of fear of 
persecution, war, and violence. Again, like refugees, they are in need of 
protection and assistance, as well as a solution to their plight (UNHCR, 2000, 
EC/50/SC/INF.2).
The rationale for UNHCR involvement in IDPs has to do with its perception 
of the dynamics of mass displacement that can lead to refugee flows. Under 
the category 'others of concern', the UNHCR m anages the movement of 
refugees, as well as returnees, stateless persons, internally displaced persons, 
developm ent-induced displacem ent, and asylum  seekers. In fact, the 
international refugee regime governs all forms of population movement 
where the bond between the government of a state and certain groups of 
people is undetermined, and the relationship between a government and its 
citizens is tenuous.
The strategy of prevention relies on the argum ent that the types of mass 
displacem ent that have occurred over the past decade or so cannot be 
addressed solely by providing protection in countries of asylum. Whether 
this is true or false is not at issue, but the consequences are. The strategy of 
prevention legitimizes the practice of identifying certain states as problems 
and allows governmental practices to be exercised widely in 'high risk' 
countries or weak states, which are deemed to be potential refugee sending 
countries. As Sadako Ogata (1993) insists, maintaining peace and security 
am ong states m ust encompass the prevention and solution of internal 
conflicts that brings massive displacement of people. The acts of potential 
refugee-generating countries are harm ful to both their people and other 
states. Prevention, then, requires predictive mechanisms and pre-emptive 
action.
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The deployment of the discourse of human rights and the identification of 
human rights abuses as the fundamental root cause of displacement have 
enabled the international refugee regime to broaden its in-countries activities 
and to develop an 'early-warning' system. Principles of human rights 
establish obligations of governments towards their own citizens. At the 49th 
Session of the UNHCR's Executive Committee Meeting in 1988, the message 
was that the refugee experience, in all its stages, is closely linked to the 
degree of respect by states for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The 
observation of human rights is the benchmark of effective government. The 
appointment of a High Commissioner for National Minorities in the OSCE 
(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) strengthens the 
widespread view that the direct cause of displacement is the systematic 
violation of rights directed at the members of one ethnic, religious or national 
group. The OSCE is an increasingly important organization in the refugee 
regime. According to its mandate, the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities is an instrument of conflict prevention. The function is to provide 
'early warning' and 'early action' in regards to tension involving national 
minority issues that have the potential to affect peace, stability, or relations 
between its member states. Human rights monitoring missions are one of its 
central activities.
The similarities between the current scenario and that of post-1919 Europe 
are striking. The following quotes, for example, demonstrate the likeness in 
the representation of the refugee problem in post-1919 and in post-1989 
international relations.
Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world 
than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to 
minorities (Woodrow Wilson, 1919).
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Protection of minorities is something so important, especially if you want to 
put some order in this chaotic world - whether it is in the Soviet Union or 
other countries that are breaking up because of ethnic tension, like in Africa. 
How can you really protect minorities better? Because if the world's going to 
break into ethnically pure states, like in Bosnia, the countries won't be viable.
I think we should develop minority protection as an alternative (Sadako 
Ogata, 1994).
The characterization of ethnic conflict as a source of displacement and the 
identification of ethnic minorities as refugees highlight continuities in the 
problematization of refugees in international relations. That is, refugees are 
the effects of the national states-system and the regulatory norm  of national 
citizenship. With the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the Former 
Yugoslavia, and the formation of new states that seek to nationalize their 
populations, the issue of protecting minorities has returned to the political 
agenda.14 Today, as in 1919, the protection of minorities in new states through 
m onitoring activities is seen as an im portant way to prevent population 
displacement.
The developm ent of an early-warning system, consisting of a range of 
activities such as m onitoring hum an rights in 'h igh  risk ' countries, 
identifying 'danger signals', and gathering and analyzing observations, is 
considered essential for the anticipation and prevention of refugee flows.15 
Cooperation and coordination are the key words. The fact-finding and 
research activities of various agencies of UN system, as well as the OSCE, 
international NGOs, and academic institutions all contribute to an early- 
w arning system. Information and analysis are forms of prevention and
14 Western condemnation of ethnic or communal conflicts elsewhere in the world has been 
possible because Western democratic states have presented themselves as the model of 
tolerance and multicultural harmony. In Europe, the reactions to the rise of right-wing 
parties and the inclusion of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in the Austrian government are 
illustrations of the efforts by Western governments to disavow racism within.
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protection (UNHCR, 1993, p.51). However, the events in Rwanda and Kosovo 
have shown the limitations of the 'information-gathering enables appropriate 
action' formula for refugee management. These failures have not diminished 
the faith in early warning. Rather, they are seen as indicating the need for 
improvement. The evaluation of policies, operations, and failures is an 
important process that initiates reforms that can contribute to prevention. For 
example, UNHCR recently has established an Evaluation and Policy Analysis 
Unit, which assesses the management of refugee crisis by the UNHCR and 
suggests recommendations.16 These post-crisis assessments have become 
prevalent in the international humanitarian system. Such evaluations show 
transparency and accountability on the part of the actors, act as information­
gathering tools, and advance preparedness for future operations.
Yet, there is a belief that direct intervention into the domestic affairs of states 
is often the most productive form of prevention. This form of intervention is 
justifiable when citizens are deprived of protection because they live in 
countries where the state is ineffective, or when the state is in some kind of 
anarchy (Zolberg, 1994, p.344). In this context, direct intervention may indeed 
involve military intervention. Such interventions are justified on the grounds 
that they create the condition of possibility for democratic institutions, which 
make governments 'accountable' for the treatment of their own citizens.
The solution of democracy in international relations re-interprets the 
principle of sovereignty, which claims that the full recognition of sovereignty
15 The presence of human rights monitors and verification observers has become a common 
sight in some countries.
16 The first report from this unit concerns the recent events in Kosovo. See A. Suhrke, M. 
Barutciski, P. Sandison and R. Garlock, (2000) An independent evaluation of UNHCR's 
emergency preparedness and response. UNHCR: Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, 
EPAU/2000/001.
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only comes with the full recognition of human rights - since it is the activities 
of 'rogue' governments that threaten the international order. The UN Security 
Council has often cited refugee issues as grounds for authorizing military 
action (Roberts, 1998, p.375). This rises questions about the value of 
sovereignty in international relations and the consequences of its repeated 
subjugation. In practice, sovereignty has always been contextual, but the 
introduction of preventive strategies to the international refugee regime has 
the potential to legitimize conditional sovereignty as an international norm.17
P r o t e c t i o n
The Refugee Convention is specific on the condition of international 
protection. In international law, a refugee is someone who is outside the 
'country of origin', and who does not have the protection of her country of 
origin. The Convention limits international protection to persons who can 
demonstrate inability or legitimate unwillingness 'to avail himself of the 
protection of [the home] state' (Hathaway, 1991, p. 133). The key criterion for 
determining refugee status is persecution, which means a deliberate act of the 
government against individuals, and excludes victims of general insecurity and 
oppression, and people who have not crossed national frontiers to seek 
refuge.
17 The humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Kosovo, both carried out in the name of 
human rights, have raised many issues on the conduct of international relations. The latter 
operation, in particular, has intensified the debate on the political and normative implications 
of contemporary humanitarian interventions. See, T. Judah (1999) 'Kosovo's Road to War', 
Survival, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 5-18; A. Roberts (1999) 'NATO's "Humanitarian War" over 
Kosovo', Survival, Vol. 41, No.3, pp. 102-123; R. Skidelsky and M. Ignatieff (1999), 'Is Military 
intervention over Kosovo Justified?' Prospect (June), pp. 16-21, and Special Issue: 'Imperialism 
of Human Rights' (1999) New Left Review, No. 234.
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The crossing of international borders is central to refugeehood; it signifies a 
breakdown in the bond between a state and its citizen. The institution of 
international protection is a surrogate for the failure of the state's duty to 
protect its citizens. The core principles of non-refoulement and the right to 
asylum address this function of the refugee regime to locate some sort of 
commitment by states to manage refugee flows. But as I have argued 
throughout this thesis, refugees signify the malfunction of a state and the 
possible disturbance of the states-system. International refugee law provides 
states with a way to control their borders in the face of involuntary migration 
(Hathaway 1997b, p. 118). Given that the agents of persecution are states or 
institutions of states, international law also functions as a procedural and 
prescriptive mechanism that regulates the conduct of states and agents of 
states.
Since the end of the Cold War, the meaning of protection has been 
transformed and the activities of protection have been expanded.18 The 'old' 
practice of protection is seen as a 'reactive' and a 'short-term' response, while 
the present strategy of international protection is characterized as a form of 
durable solution. At the 51st EXCOM session in July 2000, various in-country 
activities such as establishing 'refugee security', particularly in refugee 
camps, generating the conditions for voluntary repatriation, monitoring 
returnees, designing post-conflict reconstruction activities and general 
presence in the country of origin were classified as protection activities. These 
protection activities have been promoted widely at previous EXCOM 
sessions, and the latest invocation confirms an ambition to develop practices 
of international protection that can govern all forms of population
18 For a concise overview of the perceived challenges of international protection see, UNHCR 
and International Refugee Protection, (1999) Refugee Studies Centre Working paper No. 2, 
Oxford: Refugees Studies Centre. The paper contains the speeches by Dennis MacNamara 
and Guy Goodwin-Gill at the Centre's 1998 Summer School.
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displacement.19 At the same session, the UNHCR outlined its intentions to 
broaden the strategy of refugee protection beyond the context of refugee law 
firstly, by linking up with international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, and secondly, by promoting harmonized regional 
approaches. According to Warner (1998, p.14), 'the increasing enmeshment of 
international human rights law with the refugee regime diminishes the 
capacity of international refugee law to provide international protection'. The 
protection of human rights as a form of refugee protection also anticipates 
interventionist activities.
'Safe havens', 'zones of tranquility', 'open relief centers', 'safe corridors', 
national minorities protection instruments and the protection of IDPs are 
further examples of the varying practices of protection. Again, we see that 
protection is no longer limited to those who have crossed international 
borders or those who suffer persecution at the hands of their own 
government. It is now applicable to those who are displaced because their 
governments cannot protect their rights and physical security. In-country 
protection programs for IDPs have emerged as important activities of the 
UNHCR. Given that Western states have misgivings about even temporary 
protection visas due to the fear of over-stayers and the difficulties associated 
with deportation, the development of different forms of 'internal' as oppose 
to 'international' protection seems to provide a solution for states and 
refugees.
Clearly internal protection requires the suspension of state sovereignty, 
which is the core principle for governing inter-state relations. The exception
19 The UNHCR's interpretation of international protection can be found in its Note on 
International Protection at the annual EXCOM sessions.
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to this general rule of co-existence is when a state is incapable of exercising its 
authority in ways that do not disturb the sovereignty of other states. In such 
instances, members of the 'international community' have a right and a duty 
to intervene in the affairs of the failed state. This kind of justification appeals 
to the brokers of liberal internationalism and the adherents of new barbarism. 
Refugee-generating countries are seen as incapable of exercising their 
autonomy in a responsible manner. In situations where the agents of 
persecution are ambiguous and multiple, the state remains responsible 
because it has allowed persecution to take place and failed in its function to 
manage the national population.
For the Western liberal world, the double imperative is to control and 
segregate these states and their populations from itself. As such, forms of 'in- 
country' protection have proliferated. The invocation of the Tight to remain' 
should be understood as a mechanism to confine would-be refugees within 
their countries, often in perilous situations where 'protection' is nothing more 
than containment in 'safe areas' . 20 These protection practices are preventive in 
character. Refugee camps, which offer a similitude of protection are also 
spatial mechanisms of population control. Likewise, regional 'problem- 
solving' initiatives and regional burden-sharing arrangements have been 
encouraged for this reason. The function of burden-sharing will be discussed 
in the section on solutions. For the moment, it is worth noting that two 
related purposes of the regional approach are to contain refugee flows and to 
keep the presence of refugees in Western states at a minimum.
20 For example, the Iraqi Kurds, the Bosnians and the Hutus all enjoyed the 'safe haven' 
option of international protection. UN peacekeepers 'protected' the Bosnians in the 'safe 
areas' of Srebrenica and Zepa. Likewise, French peacekeepers 'protected' the Hutus in camps 
in southwestern Rwanda. The Kurds enjoyed the safety of the 'no fly zone', which provided 
no protection against Iraqi ground assaults.
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Since any form of protection incurs cost, the selectivity of assistance is the 
norm rather than the exception in the government of refugees. The call to 
respect universal human rights among Western liberal states seems hollow 
when, in practice, resources are allocated to countries that have the strongest 
affinity with the donors. As mostly Western states - Japan being the exception 
- constitute the primary donor countries to the UN and UNHCR, they yield 
enormous influence in the allocation of resources. The world's largest current 
refugee problem is in Afghanistan, where 2.6 million Afghan refugees await 
their fate, but the lack of donor interest means that assistance is virtually 
nonexistence (UNHCR, 1999b). Meanwhile millions are poured into the 
Balkans, especially to 'frontline states' who assisted the NATO campaign and 
the humanitarian operation. B.S. Chimni (1998) has been critical of the 
geopolitics of the refugee regime. For him, the depoliticization of the refugee 
regime has obscured the Ethnocentrism in the treatment and representation 
of refugees from the developing countries.
But to draw attention to the regions of intense conflict may have an adverse 
effect on the response of the rich and powerful too. Acknowledging that the 
most brutal wars are in Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Eritrea may further 
condemn the people of the region to a normalized anarchy and barbarity. By 
reinforcing the impression that neither the region nor the people are 
redeemable, such information could be used to justify leaving Africa to 
exhaust itself in violence and poverty. The simplistic explanation of the 
Rwandan genocide as ethnic conflict, for example, only serves to reproduce 
the imaginaries of barbarism in the Western imagination.
If approaches to international protection are geared to specific geopolitical 
interests, protection arrangements are also considered to be temporary. 
International protection ceases when the refugee reestablishes the contractual
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bond with her state, or with another state. This point is vital for the 
supporters of temporary protection, which include governments and 
researchers who see this as the best option in this current climate of harsh 
asylum policies. Increasingly, temporary protection is seen as a pragmatic 
tool for meeting the immediate needs of refugees and the interests of Western 
states. The argument for temporary protection represents it as a prudent 
compromise that acknowledges the rights of states to control conditions of 
entry for aliens and yet, provide protection for people fleeing from their 
country of origin. In other words, temporary protection alleviates the 
pressure on asylum and halts the complete erosion of asylum. It offers 
interim protection until the risks in the state of origin no longer exist. Indeed, 
despite the cost of the controversial humanitarian evacuation program that 
granted temporary protection visa to Albanian Kosovar refugees, the 
program has had significant consequences for the subsequent government of 
mass population displacement. The Australian government has adopted a 
similar response to the plight of the East Timorese, who were evacuated from 
East Timor and granted temporary protection visas upon arrival in Australia.
Admittedly, temporary asylum is not a novelty of the post-Cold War period. 
The concept of 'provisional refugee' as a remedy against refoulement has been 
a topic of discussion since the 1980s. In the 1990s, European states have 
pursued the practice of temporary protection in response to the 'influx' of 
refugees caused by the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. These states have 
attempted to create a new and harmonized approach to temporary 
protection. Although the legal framework of temporary protection was 
originally underdeveloped, they moved to correct this with swift revision to 
their national legislations, altering categories and conditions of admission for
247
GEOPOLITICAL HUMANITARIAN ISM
asylum seekers.21 Until the crisis in the Former Yugoslavia, persons in need of 
protection who were not considered to meet the criteria of Convention status 
refugees were granted protection, for example, on humanitarian grounds 
(Vevstad, 1998, p.196). In national legislation, de facto refugees are referred to 
as B or C status refugees (UNHCR, 1993, p.41). By allowing people to stay in 
the host country at the discretion of the authorities, B status has been an 
important instrument in regulating the condition of stay for aliens. Following 
the refugee movements from the Former Yugoslavia, the governments of 
Western Europe have come to an agreement about the inadequacy of this 
instrument as a form of control. As a strategy of governing refugees, 
temporary protection is the emerging norm in instances of mass population 
displacement.
The UNHCR maintains that temporary protection meets the principle of 
international protection on the grounds that it is part of a comprehensive 
program of concerted international action that includes prevention and 
solution (UNHCR, 1994). Recent experience in the EU shows that once 
temporary protection no longer applies, very few have access to the refugee 
determination process and even fewer gain refugee status (Barutciski, 1994 p. 
35). This is a significant achievement. The emerging norm of temporary 
protection is preventing the permanent settlement of refugees in receiving 
Western states and complementing the preferred durable solution of 
repatriation or 'safe return'.
21 See J. van Selm-Thorbum (1998) Refugee protection in Europe: lessons of the Yugoslav crisis, The 
Hague, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
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The cessation clause in the 1951 Refugee Convention has been particularly 
useful in ending temporary protection and initiating moves towards 
repatriation. The clause allows host states to cease protection on the basis that 
the person has resumed the bond with her national government, availed 
herself to the protection to a country of asylum, or because the circumstances 
of flight have ceased to exist. Not surprisingly, with repatriation as the 
preferred durable solution, the 'ceased circumstances' is the clause that most 
supports such a goal.
S o l u t i o n s
The last aspect of the comprehensive approach to the government of refugees 
is the strategy of solution. Solution is the primary objective of the 
international refugee regime and one of the prescribed tasks of UNHCR - the 
other is international protection. Solutions are durable, that is, they seek to 
reestablish the state-citizen bond. The importance of this normalized 
governmental technology can be see in Gallagher's definition of durable 
solution. He (1994, p.429-430) proposes that the idea of durable solution 
indicates the restoration and maintenance of 'permanent relationships between 
individuals and states' (emphasis added). In this thesis, we have traced the 
historical conditions that enabled the durable solutions of local integration, 
third country resettlement, and repatriation to be put into practice. Having 
examined the shifts in the international political environment and in the 
political imagination in the Chapter Six, I have also rendered visible the 
condition of possibility for a 'redefinition' of durable solution in the post-1989 
world.
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Within the comprehensive governmental agenda, solution works in 
conjunction with prevention and protection to minimize the movement of 
displaced populations across international borders. Like international 
protection, the strategy of durable solutions has met with some significant 
changes. An important aspect of durable solution now includes programs of 
reeducation and reconstruction, which invoke the discourses of human rights 
development and democratic institution-building to achieve its objectives. 
The 'traditional' durable solutions continue to be invoked but the emphasis is 
on repatriation.
Repatriation in the name of 'the right to return' has become the most 
desirable durable solution, while the other durable solutions of integration 
into an asylum state or resettlement in a third country are much less 
attractive options. In this context, efforts to solve the refugee crisis now focus 
on the imperative of establishing the necessary conditions for effective 
government in 'offending' states. The emphasis is on the responsibility of the 
country of origin to establish the conditions permitting return of its nationals. 
If the temporary protection is becoming the norm, then, the support for 
repatriation is hardly surprising.
Organized repatriation programs for Cambodia and Mozambique, and 
'assisted' repatriation programs for Namibia, Angola, Eritrea, Liberia, and 
Guatemala had been major achievements of the refugee regime.22 During 1994 
and 1995, around three million refugees returned to their countries of origins. 
In 1996, the conclusion of regional initiatives such as the International 
Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) in Central America
22 In 1992, UNHCR declared the 1990s would be the decade of repatriation.
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and the CPA (Comprehensive Plan of Action) in South East Asia 
demonstrated the immense potential of mass return programs.
Repatriation can be either organized or spontaneous but it must be voluntary. 
Cuny, Stein and Reed (1992), and Rogge (1992) note that accelerated rates of 
repatriation raise questions about the voluntary character of return. In light of 
these concerns, the UNHCR has added the vocabulary of 'safe return' to the 
practice of 'voluntary repatriation'. The UNHCR plays a key role in the 
coordination of repatriation programs. It assesses conditions in the countries 
of origin and passes this information onto host governments. The point to 
repatriation as a permanent solution is that it needs to be sustainable. It is in 
the long-term interest of host states to ensure the success of repatriation 
operations since unsuccessful operations will lead to further displacements. 
Western governments are aware of this. Geographical distance from most of 
the countries of origin, however, allows them a zone of comfort from which 
the policy of repatriation can be pursued. Moreover, from a safe distance, 
Western states can indulge in the heroic practices of reeducation and 
criticism. Chimni's critical history of durable solutions is instructive on the 
evolving character of repatriation (1999). He suggests that the contemporary 
character of repatriation invokes nostalgia in an attempt to (re)establish the 
bond between country of origin and refugees, which serves to obscure the 
lack of willingness of asylum states in the West to be countries of 
resettlement.
An example of schemes that encourage repatriation was the Government 
Assisted Repatriation Program (GARP) for Bosnians in Germany, which was 
administered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and
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funded by the German Government and Federal States.23 The plan, which 
was an adjunct of the Reintegration and Emigration Program for Asylum- 
Seekers in Germany (REAG), offered a one-time payment of 450DM per adult 
and 225 DM per child paid on arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the 
presentation of travel documents at the IOM offices at Sarajevo, Bihac, or 
Tuzla, each family was to receive a maximum of 350DM. REAG covered the 
transport cost and provided 150DM per adult and 75 DM per child to cover 
expenses en route.
The normalization of repatriation has much to do with the deployment of 
discourses of community, home, and exile in describing the refugee 
experience. Repatriation is promoted as the end of the refugee cycle.24 By 
appealing to home and belonging, the practice of repatriation represents the 
refugee condition as a condition of lack in world of rootedness.25 The right to 
return has a seductive quality, particularly when the idiom of 'home' follows 
such a claim. Chimni calls this the 'nostalgia model' that assumes the refugee 
condition is, regardless of the cause and what transpires afterwards, to be 
viewed as a descent into human misery (1993, p.457). The pathway to self­
recovery includes the road home, which according to the international 
refugee regime, is one's state of origin. But Daniel Warner's (1994) 
phenomenological exploration of the notion of return suggests that if
23 The information on this program is from Information Notes on former Yugoslavia, No. 7-8 
1997, UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy -  External Relations Unit.
24 Richard Black and Khalid Koser question the contemporary discourse of repatriation and 
its connection to the idea of home. See R. Black and K. Koser eds., (1999) The End of the 
Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and reconstruction, Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books.
25 Our ideas of home, place, belonging, community and identity have important 
consequences for social relations. For examples of the politics of belonging see, W. Connolly 
(1991) The Ethos of Pluralization (esp. Chapter Five: Democracy and Territoriality), 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; L. Malkki (1992) 'National Geographic: Rooting 
of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees', 
Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.24-44; and J. Rutherford ed. (1990) Identity: 
Community, Culture, Difference, London: Lawrance & Wishart.
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communities evolve, then the meaning of return and home is far more 
complex than the simplistic invocation of voluntary repatriation would have 
one believe. The attachment of people to certain places and territories is taken 
as a given in the refugee discourse. One may indeed long for home, but the 
imaginary homeland may not be a territorial one. But the current deployment 
of the notion of home in the discourse on refugees is as a spatialized 
community of belonging. It is an important technology for managing 
populations and territories.
Likewise, spatial technologies such as regional solutions and burden-sharing 
have become approved practices. Even if one ignores the language of burden, 
which reinforces the popular representation of refugees as dependents, one 
cannot deny that regional solutions complement the preference of keeping 
refugees close to the region of origin, which would allow for an easier 
implementation of voluntary repatriation than otherwise be possible. As a 
practice of solution, burden-sharing facilitates returns, and at the same time 
legitimizes the concerns of Western states about asylum and resettlement as 
forms of protection and solution.
James Hathaway's reformulation (1997) of the international refugee law 
project, which identifies itself as 'a proposal for collectivized and solution- 
oriented protection' is a response to the anti-asylum climate in Western 
states. The project appeals to the rational choice explanation of cooperative 
action and suggests that 'common but differentiated responsibility' should be 
the new mode of operation for the refugee regime. Once the 'interest- 
convergence' between refugees and asylum states is identified, a system of 
'burden-sharing' based on 'solution-oriented temporary protection' comes 
into operation. 'Common but differentiated responsibility' has the 'North' 
paying the 'South' to host refugees. It is a design of an international division
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of labour in the government of refugees, which is not far from the popular 
perception of the refugee problem now. That is, Western states are paying for 
the problems created by inept states; governments are squandering their 
resources on other people when they should concentrate on the welfare of 
their own citizens.
As mentioned before, one possible outcome of drawing attention to 
conditions in the countries of origin, is disgust and disengagement. But the 
same conditions combined with faith in the progressive virtues of liberalism 
may motivate campaigns of liberal-democratic education. The liberal 
conscience, however, experiences the world as one in which some people are 
unable, or incapable of living the good life and organizing the good society. 
The progressive and civilizing program consists of among other things, a 
'spiritual7 education for these badly behaved states and, the guilty by 
association - their undisciplined 'children7. Post-conflict development and 
reconstruction projects are designed to facilitate the cultivation of Western 
liberal sensibilities.
Since refugee flows are seen as abnormal situations caused by the breakdown 
of effective government, one of the most important tasks of durable solution 
is to restore the normal functioning of the state and the states-system. That is, 
each state manages its affairs and population in such a way that it does not 
impinge on the security and stability of another state. Good government 
involves, among other things, granting a level of political, social and 
economic entitlement, to ensure a much more docile domestic population 
than would otherwise be possible. The 'real7 solutions to displacement are the 
observation of human rights, if possible in the form of democratic 
government, and the promotion of economic development. In other words, 
the truly permanent solution to refugees is Kant's Perpetual Peace of
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republican states with a rational and autonomous citizen population. Signs of 
progress are the conduct of free and fair elections, and some kind of 
constitutional reform. These displays are important in that they are tied to aid 
funding and other development and reconstruction assistance.
International aid is one way industrialized states can influence the economic 
and political developments in refugee-generating states and the link between 
displacement and development has been the subject of Chapter Five. For 
present purposes, I will refer to the continual affirmation of development 
assistance as a form of solution. Since the late 1980s, development aid has 
covered a wide range of activities because there is a strong belief that aid can 
reduce the need for people to leave their own country.26 Mainstay projects 
seek to provide farming, wage-earning and incoming-generating 
opportunities to both returnees and local people; projects to strengthen the 
physical and social infrastructure in areas where returnees have settled; and 
projects to combat the environmental damage resulting from the presence of 
displaced populations (UNHCR, 1995, p.158). Such strategies aim to 
reintegrate returnees to their country of origin, and to prevent further need 
for flight. Moreover, economic development is seen as a way of "rebuilding 
shattered societies' by restoring a sense of agency among the returnees and 
the local population. As promoting and building peace have also become 
goals of the UNHCR, activities conducted under the name of durable 
solutions are more likely to focus on country of origins rather then the 
countries of asylum. In short, as part of the strategy of solution, 'in-country' 
reforms overlap the aims of prevention in that both concentrate on the 'root 
causes' of displacement.
26 For an example of the debate on whether aid is an effective form of immigration control 
see, W. R. Bohrung and M.L. Schloeter-Paredes eds. (1994) Aid in place of Migration? Seclected 
contribution to an ILO-UNHCR meeting, Geneva: International Labour Office.
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At the 51st Session of the EXCOM, the discussion on solutions reaffirmed the 
importance of partnership building in the international refugee regime. The 
problem of refugees has never been solely the domain of the UNHCR, but the 
recent invocations of partnership and cooperation indicate efforts to widen 
the number of participants in the comprehensive refugee strategy. 
Considering that the tasks of governing refugees have multiplied, and the 
governing strategies have been reinterpreted for new ends, the call for 
increased participation and cooperation is hardly surprising. Indeed, even in 
the 47th EXCOM session in 1996, the call for a solution-oriented strategy was 
also a request for action and coordination.
Concerted action is needed in a whole range of areas, ...: the promotion of 
good governance and the rule of law, the protection of human rights, the 
maintenance of peace and security within and between States, the promotion 
of sustainable development and the management of mass migratory 
movements. Improved coordination with other humanitarian, human rights 
and development organizations must therefore be a critical objective 
(UNHCR, 1996, para.7).
The obvious partners are other UN agencies, the ICRC, and the IOM.27 But the 
UNHCR also invokes actors in civil society as its partners. The partnerships 
have widened considerably to include private enterprise.28 The most striking 
effort to mobilize civil society is the endorsement of non-government 
organizations as 'partners' in the task to provide immediate assistance to
27 The IOM is an important agency because it is the administrator of repatriation programs 
and assisted voluntary return of rejected asylum-seekers.
28 At the Meeting of the Business Humanitarian Forum in November 1999, Sadako Ogata, 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, invited the business community to be 
partners in humanitarianism. Advocacy organizations like Amnesty International and 
International Alert are also exploring ways to involve the business sector in their activities.
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refugee and to contribute to resolution of refugee movements.29 Through the 
Partnership in Action initiative, the activities of NGOs are seen to increase the 
effectiveness of the regime in three ways. They expand the governmental 
activities of the regime, enable transparency of activities and an exchange of 
knowledge through dialogical and consultative processes, and cultivate 
notions of empowerment and responsibility on many levels of governance. 
Indeed, the sense of empowerment through local 'community' programs has 
become a key strategy in the government of refugees.
The position of NGOs in the international refugee regime appears to be 
schizophrenic. On one hand, they function as pressure groups critical of both 
government and UNHCR policies. On the other hand, they are 'partners' in 
the management of the refugee problem. But there is a slightly different way 
to look at the status of NGOs in the international refugee regime. Liberal 
strategies of government rely on the power of freedom to govern and to 
achieve its goals.30 The participation of civil society is represented as the 
openness or democratic nature of the Western liberal regimes. Secondly, the 
critiques of NGOs, advocacy groups, and academics are constitutive of the 
international refugee regime. The critiques are mostly reformist in character, 
rarely questioning the fundamental assumptions of the system. In this sense, 
the actors from civil society contribute significantly to the government of 
refugees through their activities, which create regimes of truth about refugees 
and international relations.
29 Although the statutes of the UNHCR encouraged the establishment of links with and the 
coordination of activities by private organizations working in the area of refugees, the rise 
and rise of NGOs is a recent phenomenon. See UNHCR Statute, Article 8, para, (h) and (I).
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C o n c l u d i n g  R e m a r k s
The purpose of this chapter has been to draw attention to the effects of the 
characterizations of international relations for the refugee regime. To this end, 
three key features of the contemporary regime practices have been identified. 
Firstly, the idea of a global refugee crisis has functioned to mystify the 
relations of power that give effect to the significance of refugee issues in 
international relations. For the Western states that define much of the refugee 
agenda, the conditions and circumstances in countries of origin have became 
increasingly the location of governance. This tactic has allowed the West to be 
active in refugee humanitarianism within other states, while simultaneously 
exercising restrictive asylum policies. Secondly, the invention of some highly 
interventionist practices has been legitimatized by the discourses of rights, 
security, prevention, protection and cure, but has obscured the geopolitical 
interests of the West. Finally, the emphasis on comprehensive solutions has 
enabled the inclusion of a multiplicity of actors assembled in the name of 
solidarity, partnership, and burden-sharing.
At one level, the comprehensive approach continues to reinforce and 
reproduce the reality that the refugee experience is an anomalous state of 
being and a danger to the international order. The prevention-protection- 
solution strategy seeks to govern all forms of population displacement and 
the states that produced them. At another level, the imaginaries of (dis)order 
in international relations have influenced the representation and government 
of refugees. In short, through the construction of difference and 
exceptionalism geopolitical humanitarianism represents the durable solution 
for these 'new' times.
30 See N. Rose (1999) Powers of Freedom: Reframing political thought, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
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r e f l e c t i n g  on the  re fu g e e  q u e s t i o n
As the rivers flowing east and west 
Merge in the sea and become one with it, 
Forgetting they were ever separate rivers, 
So do all creatures lose their separateness 
When they merge at last into pure Being.
Chandogya Upanishad, 
Chapter VI, 10.1-3
This thesis has grown out of my sense of puzzlement over the contemporary 
'scandal' of refugees. Refugees matter. The US government sends patrol boats 
into international waters to prevent Haitian asylum seekers from entering US 
waters. The Australian government embarks on a regime of incarceration and 
an advertising campaign to deter 'boat people' landing on Australian shores. 
The British government implements the goods and services voucher system 
for its asylum seekers. Then there are a vast num ber of hum anitarian 
organizations working for refugees. Amnesty International, CARE, Caritas,
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the International Committee of the Red Cross, Hum an Rights Watch, the 
International Crisis Group, Medecins Sans Frontieres, the Minority Rights 
Group and Oxfam are just a few of these international agencies. There is also 
the UN machinery dealing with all aspects of the refugee problem. Who are 
refugees? How are they significant? How have we, in the West, related to 
them?
This thesis attempted to answer these questions by questioning some of the 
normalized and taken for granted assumptions about refugees, examining the 
relations of power that create and transform the meaning of refugees and the 
ways in which they have been governed, and exploring the universalizing 
claims of the West. It focused on the conditions that enabled refugees to 
become objects of governmental concern and, in particular, the habits of 
thought that informed Western practices on refugees. At stake was how we 
have come to think about who refugees are, how they are problematized and 
invested with meaning, and the consequences of this way of thinking.
In this concluding chapter, I trace the terrain covered by this thesis. I begin 
w ith a summary of the arguments and approach of the thesis. Then I will 
recollect the historical journey of refugees in the twentieth century. Since my 
research agenda has not been about problem solving, I will not offer policy 
prescriptions. Instead, I will identify the significance of my research for 
refugee studies. The thesis ends with an invitation to reflect on the meaning 
of community.
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Returning  to the Refugee Question
The thesis has been a discursive and institutional history of refugees. The task 
has been to reveal the strategies of power that underpin the discourse about 
and the government of refugees, by observing the changes and continuities in 
the international 'realities' and the working of policies and institutions from 
1919 to the present. It has argued that the refugee is a historical artefact. The 
characterization of the 'refugee question' is not a neutral exercise. The refugee 
question and the international refugee regime are formed by historically and 
culturally specific modes of thought and practice.
I have deployed Foucault's work on the government of population, or 
biopolitics, in the modern West to perform this discursive and institutional 
history of refugees. For Foucault, government is a modality of power that 
does not emanate from a single source or sovereign authority such as the 
state. Rather, government involves a complex and heterogeneous array of 
norms, practices, institutions, and knowledge, working to produce subjects 
and regimes of truth. The twin activities of government are characterization 
(mode of thought) and intervention (practice).
Although his analytics of government focuses especially on the government 
of a population within a state, I have extended his idea to examine the 
government of populations in a system of states. I contend that the 
international system of state is important to understanding the government of 
population in two ways. Firstly, the creation of a plurality of sovereign states 
is a precondition for the 'internal' government of population. Securing order 
among the society of states allows each state to carry out the task of 
providing the conditions of justice and human security to its citizens. To 
ignore the international conditions that enable states to these exclusive
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services (and promises) to their populations is to neglect an important reason 
w hy states rem ain significant in politics. Secondly, state sovereignty 
territorializes population and operates to manage inter-state relations. The 
geopolitics of territorial states is one way to order international relations and 
populations. Thus, biopolitics is carried out not only on the population of a 
state but, in effect, on the entire hum an population. The intersection of 
biopolitics and geopolitics gives rise to particular international issues such as 
refugees. The states-system  as a global arrangem ent gives m eaning to 
political identities such as 'citizens', 'migrants, and 'refugees'.
The refugee question in international relations is symptomatic of the division 
of the world and its populations into sovereign territorial states, where the 
institution of national citizenship acts as a regulatory norm. The refugee 
problem arises because the unregulated movement of these people disrupts 
and threatens the organizational structure of the system of states, which is 
seen both as a prerequisite for international order and the core of 
international order itself. The government of refugees, therefore, is concerned 
w ith the m aintenance and reproduction of an international order of 
nationalized states where the hum an population is governed through the 
institution of citizenship.
I have argued that the international order is also a normative order. The 
representations of the international political environment and the normative 
international order have im portant implications for the characterization, 
diagnosis, and governm ent of refugees. The discourse of refugees is a 
reflection of the concerns arising from particular images of international 
(dis)order. Moreover, the symbolic (dis)order of refugees incites the recovery 
of a historically and culturally specific articulation of normality.
262
CONCLUSION
The literature on refugees often assumes that the government of refugees is 
about policy formulation and implementation. But I have suggested that the 
government of refugees includes the activity of thought or conceptualization, 
which makes it possible to identify refugees and to distinguish them from 
migrants of other kinds. Theorization connects and orders events, rendering 
the refugees intelligible and governable. The characterization of refugees is a 
political site, because the act of naming and categorizing is a form of power.
In this sense, the refugee regime governs refugees by producing truth about 
the phenomenon. Regime activities, I suggest, problematize, institutionalize, 
regulate, normalize particular aspects of international life, and socialize the 
participants of the regime. The 'w orking' of the regime, which consist of a 
range of programs, practices, knowledge, and institutions, creates particular 
representations of the refugee problem.
I have also considered the language and activities of the international refugee 
regime as a set of cultural practices. A persistence feature of the discourse of 
refugees is the developmental model of hum an society. This aspect of 
Western thought has a tendency to reduce the hum an population to a single 
historical pattern and trajectory. This evolutionist conception of hum an 
society invariably locates the West as the pinnacle of social evolution. This 
Eurocentrism provided justification for denying nationhood to some peoples 
at the end of World War One. Again, the developmental conception of 
hum an societies was evident in the manner in which non-Western refugees 
were included in the refugee regime. After the Cold War, the government of 
refugees through the liberal civilizing project and the containment policies 
also indicate a continuation of this cultural disposition of the West.
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R e v isit in g  t h e  Refug ee  J o u r n e y
The thesis began with the end of empires and the political upheavals in 
Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. These events altered the 
international order and perceptions about the significance of population and 
the movement of people between national states. The development of an 
international protection regime was initially a response to the Peace Treaties 
of 1919, which created new states based on the principle of national self- 
determination. The minorities protection regime, I argued, was an important 
aspect of international protection that worked in conjunction with the refugee 
regime to govern population displacement and to maintain order in Europe.
Chapter Three examined the minorities protection regime as a preventive 
measure dealing with unintended consequences of state making based on the 
principle of national self-determination. The aim of minorities protection was 
to counter the thwarted ambitions of groups who had been denied a national 
state of their own, to deal with those who now found themselves minorities 
in states dominated by other nations, and to moderate policies of national 
homogenization. The belief was minority problems could destabilize the new 
European order and could lead to international conflict and the displacement 
of populations. The minorities protection regime was, therefore, crucial to 
consolidating the outcomes of the First World War.
The mass population displacement triggered by the Russian Civil War caused 
further anxieties about stability in Europe. The refugee regime was a 
palliative program that initially dealt with displaced populations from Russia 
and continued in an ad hoc fashion as political events unfolded after World 
War One. Chapter Four explored the discursive and institutional
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development of refugees as an international problem between 1919 and 1951. 
The purpose was to connect the governmental activity, the flexibility of the 
term 'refugee', and the political environm ent of the period. From 1919 to 
1951, the term 'refugee' shifted from one based in national group category to 
one at a more individualistic and abstract level.
The term 'refugee', despite a degree of fluidity in definition, was organized 
around the relationship between a person and a state -  the state of domicile 
or the asylum state. The purpose of the refugee regime was to provide a 
temporary form of surrogate state-citizen protection until a conventional one 
could be established through one of its durable solutions. In this sense, the 
refugee agencies, their m andates, and governm ental program s such as 
repatriation, resettlement and population exchanges all sought to reestablish 
the contractual relationship between a person and a state.
The 'unmixing of populations', unacceptable methods in the late twentieth 
century, was a practice accepted and sometimes pursued by the major 
powers up to the immediate post-World War Two period. The transfer of 
population was generally perceived as a respectable and usual device of 
governing population. Indeed, the League of Nations endorsed exchange 
programs as means of promoting orderly departures of the 'unwanted'.
Thus, both the m inorities protection regim e and the refugee regime 
contributed to the wider project of establishing and maintaining international 
order by dealing with groups whose condition represented possible 
destabilizing situations. Both regimes (re)produced the value of the national 
state as the location of belonging. The refugee regime institutionalized ideas 
about nationality and national minorities and strengthened the bond between
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the territorial state and the national citizen. The numerous treaties aimed at 
protecting the rights of minorities also reinforced the ideal of a national 
political community and the dangers of multi-ethnicity.
From 1919 to 1951, the refugee regim e's efforts to address population 
displacem ent had largely been lim ited to Europe. The plight of the 
Palestinian and Korean refugees attracted some attention because they were 
highly political issues at the UN. But displaced non-Europeans were mostly 
peripheral to the refugee regime itself. The incorporation of non-Western 
refugees was the focus of Chapter Five. Decolonization and the shifting 
geography of displacement expanded the operation of the refugee regime. 
But the formal end of colonialism did not end the coloniality of power 
between the West and the non-West. The strategies of power that governed 
non-W estern refugees included the discourse of development. The non- 
W estern refugee, therefore, suffered not only from the disorder of 
displacem ent, but also from the disorder of underdevelopm ent. The 
charac teriza tion  of non-W estern  refugees as developm ental or 
underdeveloped subjects, and therefore, as different from European refugees, 
provided potent justification for fashioning many forms of intervention in 
postcolonial states. This tactic also enabled the implementation of regulatory 
practices that functioned to exclude non-W estern refugees from entering 
Western states.
Since the end of the Cold War, refugee movements have been identified as 
one of the main threats to international order. Chapter Six contextualized 
current responses to refugees by exploring the post 1989 representations of 
(dis)order. The objective was to establish the kind of threat refugees 
represented to contemporary politics. It argued that there are two influential 
representations of the present and the future. One is optimistic about a
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coming international liberal order of progressive global social and political 
transformations. The other is a pessimistic view about a world of conflict that 
is best managed by segregation. Again, Eurocentric assumptions are apparent 
in both images of (dis)order. The optimists' vision of a civilized liberal world 
order came from a tradition of Western thought that locates the cultural and 
historical specificities of the West at the apex of hum an development. The 
pessim ists' defensive cultural diffferentialist position argues for global 
apartheid as a way to preserve Western civilization.
The will to order reflects the concern of the West, particularly the US, over its 
place in the contemporary international system and its relationship with the 
non-West, which in this case included Eastern Europe. Chapter Seven 
considered the influence of the imaginaries of (dis)order for the government 
of refugees. With the disintegration of the Former Soviet Union and the 
Former Yugoslavia, the phenomenon of mass refugee movements returned to 
Europe's door. The policy reaction towards refugees was a mixture of the 
civilizing process and cultural separatism. Geopolitical hum anitarianism  
appears to be the answer to the question of refugees.
At one level, the refugee regime continues to reinforce and reproduce the 
reality that the refugee is an anomalous state of being and a danger to the 
organizational order of states. At another level, the perception of a global 
refugee crisis has given rise to claims that a comprehensive approach is 
needed in order to manage the problem s of refugee movements. The 
strategies of prevention, protection, and solution sought to govern all forms 
of population displacement and the states that generated refugee flows.
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The discourse of crisis and the com prehensive strategies have three 
significant implications for the government of refugees. Firstly, the idea of a 
global refugee crisis has obscured the relations of power that give meaning to 
the refugee question in international relations. The 'global refugee crisis' 
discourse generally refers to the concerns of W estern states about the 
increasing movement of people from the South to the North. The focus on 
countries of origin is a form of containment that allows the West to exercise 
restrictive asylum  policies. Secondly, the discourses of rights, hum an 
security, prevention, protection and solution have legitim ated the 
deployment of some highly interventionist practices. Finally, the emphasis on 
comprehensive solutions has enabled a multiplicity of actors to become 
participants in the name of solidarity, partnership, and burden-sharing. The 
rationale is that the cooperation and coordination of diverse actors from civil 
society will increase the capacity of the regime to govern refugees.
A n  I n v it a t io n
In this thesis, I have demonstrated the usefulness of Foucault's writings on 
m odern governm ent and the productive possibilities of a postcolonial 
approach for the study of refugees. Foucault's analytics of power urges us to 
look beyond the obvious manifestations of power as exercised by the state 
and its institutions. Postcolonial approaches invite us to examine self-evident 
historical and knowledge claims. Both approaches locate thought and 
historicize any claims about the universality of certain forms of knowledge.
Scholars like Anthony Appiah, Dipesh Chakrabarty, A rturo Escobar, 
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Bruno Latour and W alter Mignolo, in their 
various ways, are engaged in an anthropology of Western modernity. Their
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attem pts to 'm ake strange' the practices and values of m odern political 
discourse have demystified the strategies of power that underpin the truths 
and realities that many of us have taken for granted. An example of this line 
of research is Escobar's (1995) exploration of the idea of development, which 
exposes the m ode of thought em bedded in such an idea and the 
consequences of such thinking. By questioning the normal and the natural in 
the discourse on refugees, I share the aims of these scholars.
This thesis has recovered two important historical events in the government 
of refugees, which raises other questions for the contemporary discourse 
about refugees. The first event is the complex assemblage of international 
protection, which includes the m inorities protection regime. Historical 
accounts of the international protection have concentrated on the external 
aspect, that is, the refugee regime. I have argued, however, that an internal 
protection regime has been equally important. Today, we see the return of an 
'in ternal' protection regime, nam ely, the discourse of hum an rights. 
Considering the frequent invocation of hum an rights in the discourse about 
refugees, it would be timely to undertake a discursive history of hum an 
rights that examines the philosophical anthropology of such a notion and the 
historical conditions for its deployment.
The second historical event is the expansion of the international refugee 
regime to include non-W estern refugees. This event illustrates that 
knowledge is social and political. The developm ent-refugee nexus has 
constituted a section of the world as underdeveloped and displaced. In doing 
so, the link defines those concerned as lacking and decides what they lack - 
the predetermined goals which they have failed to achieve -  but must keep 
struggling to accomplish. Too often, the language of humanitarianism has 
obscured this aspect of the international refugee regime. Indeed, the 
distinction between politics and hum anitarianism  demands interrogation.
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What is needed, then, is a genealogy of hum anitarianism that examines the 
historical conditions of possibility, its meaning, and utility in international 
relations.
Given that the issue of refugees is a consequence of organizing the world into 
states and citizens, unless this arrangement loses its value or dissolves, the 
movement of people across state boundaries will remain a governm ental 
concern. These structural conditions define one dimension of the refugee 
problem but my thesis has demonstrated that the significance attached to 
refugees is not the same across time and space. The treatment of non-Western 
refugees by Western governments is indicative of the second dimension of 
the 'refugee problem '. The cultural m eanings attached to population  
displacements also influence responses to refugees.
In a way, the challenges of ethnocentrism are a little less daunting than the 
structural conditions. This thesis has indicated that it m atters how one 
conceptualizes the world. Concepts and theories are analytical tools and 
descriptions. W hether we use terms such as theory, w orldview , or 
perspective, we are alluding to a reality that affects action. The m utual 
implication and connection between ways of seeing, ways of being and ways 
to doing are profound. To examine our own cultural horizon is a first step 
towards pluralizing the m eaning of community. Perhaps then, we will 
recognize that the definition of community needs not be geographical or 
cultural. Sobonfu Some (1998, p.323), a teacher from Bukino Faso tells me that 
'community is a place where a person is seen, witnessed and acknowledged, 
where your soul can be lay bare without fear and your gifts are valued'. Yes.
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